Methods in the Study of Victorian Style

Richard Olmann

Here is Edmund Burke, responding with feeling to the notion that the state dances when the mob calls the tune. To avoid, therefore, the evils of inconstancy and versatility, ten thousand times worse than those of obstinacy and the blindest prejudice, we have consecrated the state, that no man should approach to look into its defects or corruptions but with due caution; that he should never dream of beginning its reformation by its subversion; that he should approach to the faults of the state as to the wounds of a father, with pious awe and trembling solicitude.

The sentence has enough thickness and weight to contain, not only the core of Burke's political thought, but the core of his style as well. One knows some of the devices from long acquaintance: the periodic opening, with the long infinitive phrase positioned before rather than after the verb it modifies; the neat marshaling of parallel forms: "faults of the state"—"wounds of a father," "evils of inconstancy and versatility."—"those of obstinacy and the blindest prejudice;" the duration of the single syntactic flight (77 words); the generality; and the dependence on abstract nouns like "prejudice" and "subversion." These we consider touchstones of eighteenth-century prose, and of Burke's in particular. Other contours of the sentence are less apparent, though no less typical. Among the abstract nouns, many (e.g., "inconstancy," "solicitude," "obstinacy") derive from adjectives, which is to say that the deep structure of the sentence contains a number of rudimentary structures in the form Noum + Be + Adjective, each of which has undergone a grammatical transformation that couches the adjectival content in nominal form? Again, Burke has a habit of using the possessive medial, so that instead of "reform the state" and "subvert the state" we have "its reformation" and "its subversion," by a series of transformations. More generally, we might mark how coordination works in the interest of compactness, how little repetition there is. We should also note the lack of impudence to syntactic movement, only once does a construction halt midway for another construction to intrude and run its course. Finally, the mood of the sentence is distinctly declarative. To be sure, these observations do not nearly exhaust the makeup of the sentence, much less of Burke's style. But they at least touch the characteristic peaks of expression.

Burke, or some other writer by the same name, might have said what he wanted to say in a different manner, for a style implies alternative styles. How can we shift the underpinnings of Burke's sentence to give the same material another shape? By letting constructions interrupt each other. By shaking the phrases out of their tidy parallels. By transplanting the initial phrase to eliminate the periodic element. By expanding some of the constructions that are pared down in coordination. By converting one clause, say, into a rhetorical question. We must also find alternatives to some of the nominalized adjectives, and phrases like "its reformation" will have to assume another form. Taking these editorial liberties, and a few smaller ones, we arrive at a passage, no more than slightly barbarous, that sounds like this:

To be inconstant, to be versatile, are evils—ten thousand times worse than being obstinate or being most blindly prejudiced. Inconstant and versatile! we have consecrated the state to avoid these evils. Although it has defects, therefore, although it is corrupted, no man but a daily cautious one should approach to look into its defects. And should be dream, ever, of beginning to reform the state by subverting it? No, I say, but approach trembling, solicits, to the faults that it has, and with pious awe, as he would approach to a father's wounds.


2. The linguistic framework that I employ (loosely) throughout this paper is that of generative grammar. The basic grammar is that of Chomsky's Syntactic Structures (The Hague, 1957), a convenient place to consult more recent work in the field, by Chomsky and others, is Jerry A. Fodor and Jerrold J. Katz, eds., The Structure of Language, Readings in the Philosophy of Language (Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1964). I have also drawn on a mimeographed draft of Chomsky's Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, scheduled for publication by the M.I.T Press this spring. The present essay, however, is not a technical exposition, and I hope and expect that the bit of jargon I use will explain itself adequately in context.
Something besides the style has escaped, of which more later; but the stylistic alteration alone takes the passage away from Burke, takes it quite out of the eighteenth century, and in fact, to my ear, places it rather near to this period of the 1860’s.

Children of God,—it is an immense presumption!—and how are we to justify it? By the works which we do, and the words which we speak. When we collect children of God do, our grand centre of life, our city which we have built for God, for His glory, on the site of the old London, with its unutterable external hideousness—cutting out the internal canons of public egregiosae, præsidium opulentia,—thrust the words which Sallust puts into Cato’s mouth about Rome,—unwarried in the world! The word, again, which children of God speak, the voice which most hits our collective thought, the newspaper with the largest circulation in England, say, with the largest circulation in the whole world, is the Daily Telegraph! I say that when our religious organizations,—which I admit to express the most considerable effort after perfection that our race has yet made,—land us in no better result than this, it is high time to examine carefully their idea of perfection. 7

This is Arnold, of course, and it is interesting to notice that he writes in a frame of mind not unlike Burke’s both in its philosophical historical perspective. So that whereas we collect children of God do, our grand centre of life, our city which we have built for God, for His glory, on the site of the old London, with its unutterable external hideousness—cutting out the internal canons of public egregiosae, præsidium opulentia,—thrust the words which Sallust puts into Cato’s mouth about Rome,—unwarried in the world! The word, again, which children of God speak, the voice which most hits our collective thought, the newspaper with the largest circulation in England, say, with the largest circulation in the whole world, is the Daily Telegraph! I say that when our religious organizations,—which I admit to express the most considerable effort after perfection that our race has yet made,—land us in no better result than this, it is high time to examine carefully their idea of perfection. 7


4. That Arnold was doing so, Michael Wolff made clear in "Tennyson and Shelley," The English Institute, September, 1904.


6. True, of course, if the sense of the term "content" is at- tentively to cover every last detail of a fine or contemptive wig. But the dogma becomes a near-truth, and loses interest correspondingly. As important as it once was to such critics as 7 in style and in the narrower and in some ways more helpful sense of "content"; i.e., overt, cognitive meaning. Otherwise a distinction is lost, and criticism is the poorer.

7. There is much to suggest that transformational analysis will eventually illuminate even such matters as imagery, metaphor, and diction, in so far as they impinge on style.

8. "Work" and "city" in sentence three have four grammatical roles apiece. 8 is in the last sentence has five and so on. The five basic sentences that give the pertinent information to the grammatical "organism" are: "We have organizations," "the organizations are religious," "the organizations express an effort," "the organizations land us in a result," and "the organizations have an idea of perfection." The reader must grasp the relations indicated by these sentences or they will be in a small, small world.


10. For example, "He is the work of the city," and so on. Arnold likes labels and this is interesting on his account, for as the tags he has left in our vocabulary will tell you: "machinery," "sweetness and light," "Philistines," and so on. Both because of the name we give things, and that encircling a concept with labels or categories advances thought; that if only the right name can be found.

11. In Arnold’s criticism, the basic sentence is transformed grammatically to emerge as appositives, another mark of the style of 8. To cite but one example, interrupt the sentence that encases them; hence, their precipitation is one cause of still another pattern in Arnold’s style, the tendency to interpunction, or embed, constructions in one another. When the interpolations do not label or classify, they usually add information, or they qualify, or they supply an additional vantage point from which to see the business in hand, and grasp the manner in which it is maintained. I say, of "to use the words which Sallust puts in Cato’s mouth." So Arnold’s interruptions work toward definition, in both senses of that word. His prose strives toward completeness and sharpness, and syntactic forward movement gives quarter whenever necessary in the service of this aim. Still another stylistic consequence hangs upon these procedures. Arnold’s prose has unusual syntactic "depth," for prose in which the clauses are relatively short. By this I mean that one word in the sentence structure is likely to play several grammatical roles in the underlying structure. Thus for all Arnold’s much noted simplicity and conciseness, there is a sense in which his prose is quite complex, though complex in the interest of conceptual clarity. Compare Burke: how much less effort he spends in regulating verbal or conceptual traffic, and how much more in saying what happens, or what will happen if . . .

I have spent some time on this stylistic cluster because it seems to me responsive to a common impulse among Victorian writers; the urge to overcome doubt and confusion in a period when the avenue to truth is far from broad, straightforward, or public. Many Victorians are concerned, not merely to expose error, and speak the plain truth (as is more nearly the case with Burke, Johnson, Shaftesbury, and so on), but to pose the very climate of mind within which truth and conviction will become possibilities. Arnold and his contemporaries on a society where no common framework of feelings and assumptions are taken for granted that their prose strains to provide the framework, in addition to the content of argument, of an argument. Yet at the same time they believe it not unlikely, and not even an impossible place, for the culture to redeem its way of life; they want to experiment and jostle the reader with dogged urgency to this end.

Still other characteristics of Arnold’s style answer to those new beliefs so clearly. In the style of intellectual and spiritual communities, the intelligentsia of the eighteenth century. His famous habit of repetition, for instance, is the mark of a style that tries to establish fixed points and defend the obdurate realities of the eighteen finals. He cannot, as Burke could, simply draw his central, freighted terms from the public stock of language and count on culture to supply adequate meanings; he must work to lodge both terms and meanings in his audience’s sensibility. Again, Arnold’s style relies heavily on the constructions that English has for reporting speech and thought: “I say that . . . .” and “our religious organisations, which I admit to express . . . .” are two examples in the passage at hand. Usually they represent an attempt to put before the reader, not only an idea, but a judgment on that idea, or an attitude toward it, or a sense of the precise strength with which it is maintained. Burke and Johnson could count on ideas as a stable medium of exchange. Arnold must always be setting the rates. On the other hand, he distinctly underplays the transformation, so common with Burke, that converts a predicate adjective into a nominal. To speak of “inconsistent” rather than simply asserting that such and such a person is inconsistent implies a faith in unchanging and universal qualities that was harder to sustain in 1869 than in 1790. And finally, the questions and imperatives that trouble the discursive flow of Arnold’s prose may be partly an acknowledgment that basic accord is a delicate and elusive thing, and partly an attempt to jolt the reader loose from his complacencies.

A caution, the foregoing is a steeply tilted account of Arnold’s style. A more level account would be expected to include features less easily subsumed in the single current of Arnoldian (and Victorian) thought and feeling which I have italicized. But I have meant to be selective because my subject is not only how Arnold’s style was, but Victorian style, and it is conceivable that at least some components of Arnold’s style and of
 Yet I have argued that style reflects conceptual framework and critics like Houghton have amply shown that there is something worth calling the Victorian frame of mind. How can the two points be reconciled? Fairly simply, I think. A man who occupies a given spot in history and culture is urged by his intellectual world to think and feel in certain ways, but the forming power of intellectual culture operates on a mind already formed, deeply and intricately, by a thousand sub-cultures, from the nursery on up. Style is responsive to the cut of a writer's mind, and that is only trimmed and decorated by intellectual culture, not created by it.

If this is so, I imagine it to be, many of us have overstated the importance of historical periods to the description and understanding of style. Those of us interested in Victorian prose style will do well to study individual writers intensively, and with the best linguistic theory available, to discover the unique and intriguing shapes that matter and language take among the Victorians. We could take our direction from Newman's excellent comment on style:

"while the many use language as they find it, the man of genius uses it indeed, but subjects it vital to his own purposes, and moulds it according to his own propensities. The throng and succession of ideas, thoughts, feelings, imaginations, aspirations, which pass within him, the abstractions, the juxtapositions, the comparisons, the discriminations, the conceptions which are so original in him, his views of external things, his judgments upon life, manners, and history, the exercises of his wit, of his humor, of his depth, of his sagacity, all these innumerable and incessant creations, the very pulsation and throrting of his intellect on up style is responsive to the cut of a writer's mind, and that is only trimmed and decorated by intellectual culture, not created by it."

The Prose of the Apologia Pro Vita Sua
George Levine

Newman's style is a various and complicated thing. To talk about it adequately—even in the case of a single work—would require more time and more elaborate equipment than I at present have. I therefore intend here to point only to one aspect of it—one which has been at least partially misunderstood or misrepresented in the past. This aspect of his style, as it appears in the Apologia, seems to me to warrant the kind of analysis I will try to give it, and might help suggest a good deal about the peculiar qualities of Newman's art in general and about the extent to which his vision was genuinely responsive to the full detail of experience.

Instead of surveying generally aspects of his prose already surveyed, I want to concentrate on what might be called its concreteness or particularity. When we call Newman's prose concrete and particular, we do not, I think, mean that it is like the prose conventionally associated with the traditions of the realistic novel (again, I would argue, to the conventions of modern autobiography). That is to say, it is not particularly attentive to the minute surface details of experience. The concreteness we desery in Newman seems to be altogether of a different tradition. He may admire St. Chrysostom for the interest that saint takes "in all things, not so far as God has made them alike, but as he has made them different from each other," and for his capacity to mark all things with 'graphic fidelity,' but an element of the other side of this is that the particularity of his prose is in part an effort to create a living felt reality while at the same time it remains largely abstract, one might almost say eighteenth-century, not only in its rhythms and diction but in the generalizing force of its language.

Perhaps the fairest place to begin an examination of this problem is at one of the least generalized and abstract passages in the book, that which concludes the first chapter of the autobiography proper:

When we took leave of Monmouor Wtse- man, he had invited us to a dinner which I thought might take a second visit to Rome. I said with great gravity, "We have a work to do in England." I went down at once to Sicily, and the presentation grew stronger.

I struck into the middle of the island, and fell ill of a fever at Leonforte. My servant thought I was dying, and begged for my last directions. I gave them, as he wished; but I said, "I shall not die." I repeated, "I shall not die, for I have not sinned against light, I have not sinned against light." I have never been able quite to make out what I meant.

I got to Castro-Giovanni, and was laid up there for nearly three weeks. Towards the end of May I left for Palermo, taking three days for the journey. Before starting from my inn in the morning of May 26th or 27th, I sat down on my bed, and began to sob violently. My servant, who acted as my nurse, asked what ailed me. I could only answer him, "I have a work to do in England."

I was aching to get home, yet for want of a vessel I was kept at Palermo for three weeks. I began to visit the Churches, and they calmed my impatience, though I did not attend any services. I knew nothing of the Presence of the Blessed Sacrament there. At last I got off in an orange boat, bound for Marsilles. Then it was that I wrote the lines, "Lead, kindly light," which have since become well known. We were becalmed a whole week in the Straights of Bonifacio. I was writing verses the whole time of my passage. At length I got to Marsilles, and off for England. The fatigue of travelling was too much for me, and I was laid up for several days at Lyons. At last I got off again, and did not stop night or day (except a compulsory delay at Paris) till I reached England, and my mother's house. My brother had arrived from Persia only a few hours before. This was on the Tuesday. The following Sunday, July 14th, Mr. Keble preached the Ascite Sermon in the University Church. It was published under the title of "National Apostasy." I have ever considered this, as the start of the religious movement of 1833.10

2. I use the edition edited by A. Dwight Culler (Boston, 1966), pp. 33-34.
This is a remarkably forceful passage, especially when one considers how unstudiously unheeded it seems to be. It is also a perplexing passage. It would be difficult, for example, to say that it was not concrete. Indeed, in some ways it confirms the general view and Newman’s own that he was fascinated by the particular and concrete. It is true that he wrote about things, but we have some dialogue, some dates, and a carefully developed narrative sequence. Moreover, we have not only some dates, but a precise account of how his brother’s arrival, Keble’s preaching of the Assize sermon, the brother’s arrival, though not apparently relevant, is key to which Newman is related, but for the moment only passively. Even the unexpected “orange boat,” with its sudden description of function amidst the bare outline of experience, adds to the atmosphere of passivity.

But the full trance-like force of the passage comes from its annual (at least for Newman) sentence structure. Only the first sentence of the passage runs over twenty words. All but two of the rest of the sentences are simple or compound (except those which include short quotations) and run at longest to about sixteen words. They create a sense of rapidity of movement guided in a single direction by the comparative refrain, “I have a work to do in England.” But the most unusual aspect of the prose for Newman is the almost total absence of conventional transition. In this respect, the passage has some of the quality of Biblical prose. It gives a sense of a strong controlling direction, but a direction which depends not on logic or on humanly imaginable connections; rather it depends on a power outside the passage—or in the Blessed Sacrament, which Newman was not ready to understand.

The passage then is much more useful autobiographically in its style than in the facts it presents. Of the immediate experience itself, there simply isn’t enough information to give us a sense of the inwardness. We capture the feeling of the passivity, speed, and disconnectedness of delirious movement. The immediate experience becomes secondarily subjective. And it is subjective. Looking back Newman sees the experience as part of a pattern, and we are allowed by the style to enter into it as we please. This is not to say that this is not a valuable exercise. We can see this attitude in operation in the passage we have already noted. There is an interesting passage later in the way it feels explicitly to describe how he was acting while he was writing. He describes how on his return from Italy he was “fierce in act” and amused himself at the intellectual discomfort of his friends. He sees himself as someone who had an fierce, tolerant and moderate in his reasonings. “All this,” he remarks, “may seem inconsistent with what I have said of my ferocity. I am not bound to account for it.”

The strength of that statement relates again to the whole method of the Apologia. In a way, it might seem simply a firm refusal to discuss his most private feelings (about the Apologia, in fact, remarkably silent most of the time), but it is not certain that Newman could have “accounted for” it had he thought it appropriate to do so. In the text he appeals to the past and says, “there have been men before me, fierce in act, yet tolerant and moderate in their reasonings; at least, so I read history.” Aside from asserting his usual reticence, that is, Newman seems to be appealing to experience to superior to any human capacity to establish connections by means of reason. And although Newman sees the world as unified and directed by God, experience by itself is an accumulation of fragments not inherently applicable. Newman’s nominalism (and secularly speaking he seems to have been thoroughgoing nominalist) ends in mystery and what seems to us patently self-contradictory. The resolution of the mystery is the ultimate mystery—God himself (and in this world, His visible church). The commitment to the particular and the concrete, then, leads in Newman’s world—contrary to its effect on, say, Huxley or George Eliot—to mystery and an awareness of the irrational. But unlike modern psychology, which moves from a recognition of irrationalism, through curiosity, to a scientific understanding of the irrational, Newman’s awareness of the irrational leads him on the one hand, to Christian faith, and on the other, in things of this world, to a kind of Humane rationalism.

But if Newman is not bound to account for inconsistency, he is bound to face it; and much of the Apologia shows him facing—though not exploring and accounting for—irrational experience. There is one point, however, perhaps the climax of the book, where he does attempt to account for it, and in accounting for it he demonstrates both in his style and in his mood the full range and the nature of the limitation of his view of experience. Here is the first part of the passage:

To consider the world in its length and breadth, its various history, the many races of men, their starts, their fortunes, their mutual alienation, their conflicts; and then their ways, habits, governments, forms of worship; their enterprises, their aimless courses, their random circuits, the demands of the moment, the impotent conclusions of long-standing facts, the tokens so faint and broken, the philosophy of the design, the blind evolution of what turn out to be great powers or truths, the progress of things, as if in a closer world, as if in a final cause, the greatness and littleness of man, his far-reaching aims, his short duration. The unending story of his futurity, the disappointment of life, the defeat of good, the success of evil, physical pain, mental anguish, the prevention of the intercession of sin, the prevailing idolatries, the corruptions, the devoir hopeless riddling, the condition of the whole race, so fearfully yet exactly described in the Apocalypse’s words, ‘death and beauty, truth and lies, power and weakness, body and spirit, life and death, all—this is a vision to dizzy and appeal; and infects upon the mind the sense of a profound movement which is absolutely beyond human solution.”

This is one of the passages, it seems to me, on which depends Newman’s reputation for rich particular and concrete prose, but we find here again the same tendency.
to minimize the particular for the response to it that we have already noted. The force of the passage lies in the accumulation of elements in the catalogue, which is rhythmically and musically controlled in ways which would meet an admirable test. But here we must focus on the power derived from Newman's rare capacity (reflected, for example, in his theory of development as well as in his style) to break down a single feeling or idea into innumerable subdivisions, which are sometimes misapprehended as particularities. Instead of the particular and concrete, he intuitively subdivides them under the general. Experience comes through Newman's prose as through a filter. Explicable and inexplicable alike reveal themselves as under the direction of providence, which alone can account for everything. We live through his language not the experience described but the feelings of a reserved, sensitive, and dignified man, whose mind is made up and who can, therefore, transmute the particular into the general—which itself becomes a principle of providential order.

Newman avoids the romantic commitment to the particular which has its fullest work, not in the novels of his contemporaries, basically anti-classical both in form and style. The commitment to raw experience and to the minute investigation of particulars and sufferings was essentially a secular kind of commitment, as the novel and the autobiography are essentially secular forms. The thrust of this kind of realism is made explicit in a comment of George Eliot's in Middlemarch: "If we had a keen vision and feeling of all ordinary human life, it would be like hearing the grass grow and the squirrel's heart beat, and we would die of that roar which lies in the other side of silence." Newman's reticence, his gentlemanly sense of decorum, his commitment to the next world keep him a long way from the heart beat of the squirrel. The heart beat of the spiritual and the numbing of the heart are God's province. Newman's belief that literature always offered a challenge to religion must have been at least in part a result of his awareness of its surrounding in its conception of the world. The details of experience literature was confronting the world in a way that only God was equipped to confront it.

The mystery which Newman faces but cannot explain is thus part of the full Christian vision. The division between God and man is absolute and incomprehensible; the deep commitment which the Christian tradition makes and man redeemed is absolute and incomprehensible. The particular contemporary conditions with which fiction and autobiography are concerned are ultimately irrelevant to man's salvation: that depends on his recognition of his part in the Christian tradition under which all particular experiences can be organized and patterned. Experience can do no more than point to the need for superhuman intervention and create the will to transcend this world for the needs of salvation. Newman's patience with injustice in this world because of his faith, his respect for this experience in this way, and through it he describes faithfully an experience which is of no time and no place, but, perhaps, everywhere and eternal.


Scott and Dickens: Realist and Romantic

Edgar Johnson

As early as the appearance of Pickwick Papers readers were already comparing Dickens with Scott. During its periodical publication Miss Mitford wrote Elizabeth Barrett that Dickens was "the next great benefactor of the age to Sir Walter Scott"; by 1839 Harrison Ainsworth described him as "now installed in the throne of letters vacated by Scott." Even Dickens seemed to regard himself as Scott's literary successor and, like the heir to a crown, often invoked the name of his predecessor. When he wished to justify his desire for a vacation abroad and a cessation from literary toil, what, he asked, might not the sune of Rome and Naples have meant to Scott if he could have enjoyed them in youth and the "pleasures of power" instead of shadowed by illness and decay; when he pleaded in the United States for international copyright he besie his hearers think of the shame that the creations of Scott's imagination had brought him no grateful American dollar to lighten the financial burdens under which he was dying. All Dickens' references to Scott invariably treat him as an honored literary progenitor.

Let us conceive, however, what might have happened if Dickens had been born ten years earlier or if Scott had switched his genre—this latter no impossibility since Scott was only sixty-one when he died. Under these circumstances Pickwick would have been competing for popularity with Woodstock, Oliver Twist with Chronicles of the Canongate, Nicholas Nickleby with Anne of Geierstein, and The Odd Curiosity Shop and Barnaby Rudge with Count Robert of Paris and Castle Danger. None of Dickens' first five novels with an unimaginable series of tales pouring from Scott's aging but undaunted pen. It is impossible not to suspect that this would have sharpened in Dickens—never unobtrusive in self-assertion—a sense of rivalry rather than respectful admiration. Though it is improbable that Dickens would have attacked Scott by direct criticism, like the young Henry James trying in a politely adverse review of Our Mutual Friend to develop the old lion who stood in his own literary path, he might well have exaggerated—if exaggeration were possible—the ways in which his own demonic genius differed from the cooler though vigorous and heroic genius of Scott. In such a Homeric battle of two literary giants Dickens would have been seen even earlier and more plainly as the tremendous revolutionary force in fiction that he was.

It is not the aim of this paper to make invidious comparisons between the two; Scott was also a great revolutionary force in literature and a great artist. What I do desire to do is to point up, even by a degree of overemphasis, if necessary, the significant contrasts between their viewpoints and achievements, and show that they were not literary kinmen at all, but antagonists, fundamentally unlike in every major way.

Scott was a Tory, steeped in a sense of the historical past and deeply aware of our cultural, social, and political roots in that past; Dickens a Liberal tinged with radical sentiment, seething angrily at the heritage of stupidity, injustice, and cruelty from the past. Scott was not, to be sure, one of those Tories resistant to change. Though a faithful member of the Established Church, he publicly defended Catholic emancipation in 1829, and in the last year of his life he wrote a political paper urging upon the Tory administration the revival of the income tax and the use of its proceeds to aid the unemployed and to provide free education for the children of the poor. Nor did he oppose technological change, the printing press which he was the major proprietor used the most up-to-date steam presses, he was one of the first householders in Scotland to install gas lighting in his home, he used scientific methods in farming and forestry on his estate and built into Abbotsford a new system of pneumatic bells instead of the old tangle of belfries and wires. During his impression of 1817, and later, he established a private plan of work relief for the unemployed—planting trees, making roads, and building improvements he had not planned to execute until later—and urged a similar course on his fellow landowners.

Scott was powerfully impressed, however, by the strength of custom, habit, and tradition as shaping forces. He distrusted what he regarded as highflew speculative schemes of amelioration and radical social changes, and warned against the danger of subverting respect for law by making far-reaching political experiments. He would have agreed with James Madison—who was hardly a

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Poor Peter Freeseis, in Bedgebury, Dickens would have expanded into one of the major exhibits in Bedgebury House, but if Dickens has an occasional sketch of an honest lawyer, such as Mr. Peckar and the awkwardly upstanding Mr. Fagin, and without which perhaps the wisest and best of governments would not possess the requisite stability. The superficial reading of Scott, though, seems as an uncritical laudatio temporis acti. His deep and extensive reading made him well aware that the same vices and virtues were a part of human nature throughout all ages, and so he depicted them in his books. To take but a single example, despite his own support of Stuart independence, Scott published Waverley in 1814, the attempt of Bonnie Prince Charlie in 1745 to regain the throne as mainly supported by wild and ignorant Highlanders, blindly devoted to their clan leaders; their chiefs themselves he represents through the figures of Donald Ban Leun, a cattle thief and a wily trickster who is a traitor to both sides, and Forgue Macelor, callously disingenuous for all. His gallantry, and at least as eager for an earldom as to advance the Stuart cause. Nevertheless Scott believed that in the course of time society accumulates some wisdom and some orderly method of dealing with problems which it would be madness to toss hastily aside for some enmilastic paucities.

Dickens, on the other hand, felt nothing but wrathful impatience with tradition. It was an "obstinate adherence to rubbish," symbolized for him in that archaic collection of wooden spools once used as tassels for keeping accounts, that caught fire and destroyed the Houses of Parliament. In his library at Gad's Hill there were seven dummy volumes collectively entitled The Wisdom of Our Ancestors, successively sub-titled 1. Ignorance, II. Superstition, III. The Block, IV. the Bible, V. Diet, VI. Dirt, and VII. Disease, and one single volume labeled The Virtue of Our Ancestors, so narrow that the words had to be printed sideways.

Though Dickens responded to the picturesque appeal of quaint old many-gabled houses with winding stairs and narrow passages, with dark vaulting, and soaring towers of medieval churches, for him the good old times were nothing but the bad old times, which he satirically describes through Scrooge's ghost in Dombey and Son: "Those darly bygone times ... with their delicious fortresses, and their dear old dungeons, and their dealt and placed torture ... and everything that makes life truly charming!" For Dickens, established institutions were predominantly instruments of vested interests, privilege, corruption, and the most deplorable and obstructive survivals of barbarism. His entire literary career was a protracted campaign against these forces, from the works on the character of lawyers in Dodson and Fogg and Sergeant Buzfuz, through those on the osplementation and the workhouse, the Yorkshire schools, the Court of Chancery, aristocratic politics, the Circumlocution Office, to his blistering assaults on the greed of big business and the cults of monetary respectability.

It is significant to note the different emphasis is approach between Scott and Dickens in such a detail as the delineation of the legal profession. The case of

organization of society can certainly be inferred from his work, he was not a propagandist, either for social or political reform or for resistance to transmutation. He was primarily concerned with creating a clear-sighted picture of the world as it is, in all its complexities, contradictions, and cross-currents, and with showing the operations of the forces of permanence and change as they are brought to bear in different times and places on individual men and groups. It is the struggle, indeed, between two states or stages of civilization—foul and modern, Highland and Lowland, agrarian and commercial, abasement and constitutional monarchy, rebellion and legal authority, Europe and Byzantium—that forms his most constant theme. And in these mighty collisions, though he could enter with imaginative understanding in the feelings of both contenders, it is clear that the weight of his rational sympathies always led to that which tended toward the development of a well-ordered and humanly organized society. William Hazlitt, who hated what he regarded as the prejudices of Scott's personal politics, nevertheless bore testimony to the absolute justice of Scott's portrayal of history.

Though one of the leaders of the romantic movement and though his themes and subject-matter were often what is conventionally regarded as romantic, Scott did not handle them in a romantic spirit. I am not denying, of course, that there are occasional traces in him, as there are in most men, of romantic feeling. But fundamentally he was not a romantic at all, but a realist. With his rationalism, his cool-headed skepticism, his belief in the control of the emotions, his insistence on having the matter and not the fancy, his lack of the romantic's fear of the past or the future, his just and penetrating comprehension of human nature, untinged by either bitterness or sentimentality, his consciousness both of the beauty and the infirmity, the influence of tradition and of the frequent evils it may help support, his ever leading trait is realistic. And for all the vivid reality with which Dickens portrays the thronging scene of mid-nineteenth-century England, he is no less clearly a romantic, rebellious, individualistic, contemptuous of tradition and conventional opinion, a fiery enthusiast and fantasist whose imagination erupted in thousands of wild conceptions and unbridled grotesques, who imposes his emotional vision upon reality with mesmeric power, and whose very intelligence is rooted in his ardent heart.
A Note on Hegel and George Eliot
Darel Mansell, Jr.

In a letter written in 1845 George Eliot comments on "that phlegmatic dulness which we are to know what it is to feel for human misery until we have heard a shriek ..." This is her version of a passage in the Aesthetik and is, so far as I know, the only certain reference to it in her works. But the Aesthetik seems to have influenced her ideas on tragedy, particularly as these ideas appear in her "Notes on the Spanish Gypsy and Tragedy in general"; and, to the extent that she gives her novels the form of tragedy (she declares in a letter, for instance, that it is her 'way' to "urge the human sacrifices through tragedy--through pity and terror as well as admiration and delights"), the Aesthetik seems to have influenced the novels themselves. The influence shows itself in two features certain of her novels have in common. First, her idea that the tragic conflict is between two forces of good, rather than a good pitted against an evil; and, second, her unusual idea that the resolution of the tragic conflict should reassure the commonplace, everyday life that goes on after the hero or heroine has gone down to defeat (the "wharves and warehouses on the Floss" which are busy again "with voices of every voice, with hopeful lauding and unlauding" in the Conclusion of The Mill on the Floss).

George Eliot conceives of her novels as a kind of tragedy. In her early "The Sad Fortunes of the Reverend Amos Barton" (1857) she calls attention to the "tragedy ... lying in the experience of a human soul that looks out through dull grey eyes ..." (Scenes of Clerical Life, v, 167). She observes in a letter written in the middle of her career that it is her "way" to "urge the human sacrifices through tragedy--through pity and terror as well as admiration and delights" (Letters, IV, 301); and in the last novel, Daniel Deronda, Deronda sees in George Eliot's last heroine, Gwendolen Harleth, what George Eliot has seen in heroines like Dinah Morris, Maggie Tulliver and Dorothea Brooke as well: the "girl-tragedies that are going on in the world ... unheeded" (II, xvii, 201).

In these four girl-tragedies the heroine is pitied against the commonplace values of the community. She sets herself apart from the community, attempts to rise above it, and fails; and at the end the community either re-absorbs her, or, in Daniel Deronda, is shown going its way without her. There are variations, but this is the outline of the single plot of these girl-tragedies. This plot first appears in the career of Dinah Morris in Adam Bede. She is not at the center of the story, and the arc of her rise above the community is shallow, but her career is the first tentative version of George Eliot's girl-tragedy. At Dinah's introduction she is elevated above the community, standing on a cart on the Hayshope Green, preparing to preach (I, ii). She tells her audience, "you must think of me as a saint" (I, 29). She has been ruled "to minister to others, not to have joys and sorrows of my own ..." (I, iii, I, 48), and she desires "to live and die without husband and children" (40). This is Dinah Morris' rise above the community. But at the end she has been reabsorbed into it. She marries Adam Bede, to have joys and sorrows of her own; and the Hayshope community comes to her wedding. She is now no saint, and has given up preaching forever. And in the Epilogue the woman who desired to live and die without husband and children is seen with her husband and children. The saint who held herself above the community has become part of it, a housewife, albeit a matronly, happy one standing in sunshine in the Epilogue.

In The Mill on the Floss Maggie Tulliver repeats Dinah's career, even though she is young. She is introduced alone, outside Tulliver's house, "wanderin' up and down by the water, like a wild thing: she'll tumble in some day" (I, I, 13). She stands apart from the community of St. Org's, and tries to run away with the gypsies. She, too, is saintly, a "creature full of eager passionate longings" (III, vi, 369) who is introduced to the writings of Thomas à Kempis, and sets out on the "path of martyrdom and endurance" (IV, iii, ii, 39). She is eventually ostracized by St. Org's, and the great voice of morality in the community, her brother Tom, turns her from his door. But here, again, there is a kind of re-absorption of the heroine at the last, in the drowning arm in arm of Maggie and her estranged brother. To the extent that Tom, a creature St. Org's thinks "is quite likely to rise in the world," represents the sentiments of the community, Maggie Tulliver has been divorced in the course of the novel, her drowning with him at the end is a kind of hasty, shorthand, and perhaps embarrassed indication that the river which has settled her upon an aerial back into its common course; the commonplace life of the wharves and warehouses goes on in sunshine. Nature has repaired her ravages.

The description of Dorothea Brooke's plain clothes in the first paragraph of the first chapter of Middlemarch sets her apart from the community of Tipton parish. Like Dinah Morris, she is above her surroundings. She years after some "lofty conception of the world which might frankly include the parish of Tipton and its own rule of conduct there"; she is "enamoured of intensity and greatness ..." (I, i, 19). And, like Dinah and Maggie Tulliver, she is saintly. She prays "as if she thought herself in the time of the Apostles" (10); and she is very much concerned with her "spiritual life" (8). Her sacrificial marriage to the scholarly Casparian, which the community condemns, marks her separation from it. And the marriage is a failure. By the end of the novel she has come to Tipton, and has "no dreamer of being praised above other women, feeling that there was always something better which she might have done, if she had only had the heart to do it better" (Fifteen; III, 461). At the conclusion of the novel, her second marriage, like Dinah's marriage to Adam, begins her reabsorption into the community. Mr. Brooke invites the couple to the Grove, Sir James lets Celia visit them, and Dorothea's son at last inherits Brooke's estate. Dorothea at the end joins Dinah Morris and her own neighbors in the housewife's world. Many who knew her," George Eliot concludes, "thought it a pity that so substantial and rare a creature should have been absorbed into the life of another ..." (Fifteen; III, 461). But that is the way of George Eliot's girl-tragedies.

And in George Eliot's last novel, Daniel Deronda, she again in the first chapter introduces her heroine as a thing apart. The players at the gambling resort recognize the "beautiful woman" as "one of the others". She too holds herself above her surroundings. She dislikes being "middling" (VI, xvi, 39), and takes a "Pompeian tone" (IV, v, 28) with no "arbor and intensity of the other heroines, if not the saintliness; and is in "passionate youthful rebellion" (III, xvvi, II, 50) against a commonplace life. Her grandiose marriage to Henleigh Grandcourt ends in disaster, and, like the other heroines, she comes down to earth at the end. She is prepared to take "kindness, even from a dog, as a gift above expectation" (VIII, lxxix, III, 355) and there is a hint that, like Dorothea, she may someday make a firm second marriage, and then die.

But in this last novel George Eliot has cut short the plot of her girl-tragedy before any reabsorption into the community is more than hinted at. Cowarden is still an alien at the end, and her last words in the novel are a letter to Daniel Deronda acknowledging that she has a letter to write. She has settled down on an open common and in Dinah and Dorothea, and swap recipes with the neighbors: "I have remembered your words--that I may live to be one of the best of women, who makes others glad that they were born. I do not yet see how that can be. . . . The world goes on without her. The novel ends with Deronda's marriage to Mirah Cohen, and the beginning of their journey to the East.

At the conclusions of these four tragedies George Eliot is at pains to show that the heroine has either rejoined the general life of the community, or, in the last novel, that life goes on without her. The commonplace, everyday life seems suddenly and unaccountably to take over these novels at the end. George Eliot's tragic novels are unusual in this respect; and she considers this concluding celebration of the commonplace a part of the essential formula of tragedy. In "Notes on the Spanish Gypsy and Tragedy in general" she maintains that in tragedy the "individual" must always give way to the "general"; and by "general" she means this commonplace world that her heroines must give in to at last. A good tragic subject "must support irreparable division between the individual and the general ...; and a tragedy has not to expound why the individual must give way to the general: it has to show that it is compelled to give way, the tragedy consisting in the struggle involved, and often in the entirely calamitous issue in spite of a grand submission.

This seems to be George Eliot's version of Hegel's theory in the Aesthetik that tragedy is a conflict between the individual protagonist and the general life of the state, a conflict in which the individual is bound to lose. To Hegel, tragedy produces the "downfall of the individual"; and "that which is abrogated in the tragic issue is merely the one-sided particularity which was unable to accommodate itself to ... harmony, and consequently in the tragic course of its action ... either is committed ... to destruction or at least finds itself compelled to fall back upon a state of resignation. ..." Hegel apparently is the source of George Eliot's "death by the parable collision between the individual and the general ..." Likewise, her observation in the notes that the

2. "Tone as interjection, as the cry of grief ... is already, quoted above the most immediately vital expression of soul-conditions and feelings, the ah and oh of the soul," The Philosophy of Fine Art, trans. F. P. B. Osmaston, 4 vols. (London, 1860), IV, v, 398. See Vorlesun-
gen über die Aesthetik in Weke, 18 vols. (Breslin, 1834-45).
4. John Walter Cross, George Eliot's Life as Related in Her Letters and Journals, New Edition, 3 vols. (Edinburgh and London, 1885), III, p. 44. 46. These "Notes ... are drawn from the last five pages of MS. with not so much evidence as to the date." He says that they seem to have been left unfinished, and that they give them as they stand in the diary (IV, 41). They speak of The Spanish Gypsy as finished, which dates them later than 29 April 1866 (Letters, IV, pp. 420-30); and they mention Clough's poem (p. 48). George Eliot's Journal for 23 January 1866 records her having read Clough's poem "during the months (Letters, v, p. 6), and so these notes may have been written at the beginning of 1866 or later.
"general" is the "irresistible power" 6 may follow the statement in the Aesthetic that the individual is in collision with other forces, which... even in a contrary direction to that willed... by the active personality, effect the ultimate course of the events... 7

George Eliot is attracted to Hegel's theory of tragedy because such a theory constitutes on what is universal in tragedy, rather than what is local or accidental at any time and place. The action of a good tragedy is universal. It appeals to human nature, the man himself, to a point of view, which Hegel points out, as an example, that the Greeks were not taking an artificial, entirely erroneous standpoint in their art—a standpoint which, however, was the true standpoint which religion and their art. They had the same essential elements of life presented to them as we have, and their art symbolized these in grand schematic forms. 8 Hegel's idea of interpreting the tragic action as a conflict between the individual protagonist and the general life of the state allows George Eliot to give the Antigone of Sophocles, for instance, a universal appeal. Whereas Matthew Arnold had held in 1853 that the action of the Antigone "is no longer one in which it is possible we should feel a deep interest," 9 George Eliot claims, in a review, "The Antigone and Its Moral," written in 1856, that if the action is considered to turn on the very fact of conflict between, say, the importance of Antigone's mind of the sacred rites of burial on the one hand (the "individual"), and obedience to the state on the other (the "general"), then the action is of perennial interest." 10 It is probably no coincidence that in the Aesthetic Hegel treats the Antigone in the same way. He considers that the conflict is between "ethical life in its social universality and the family as the natural ground of moral relations; and concludes that a 'content' of this type retains its force through all times..." 11

This is what George Eliot strives for in her girl-tragedies. Their single plot, in spite of all complexities and variations, is Hegel's one universal tragedy and the "individual" attempting in vain to divorce itself from the "general," or what she calls in the "Notes..." the "irreparable collision between the individual and the general." 12 She assumes that this gives her tragedies the perennial significance all good tragedies must have.

Famine tragedies, she points out in the review "The Antigone and Its Moral," must appeal to perennial human nature. 13

To both Hegel and George Eliot the tragic action between the "individual" and the "general" is not a conflict of bad against good, but of good against good. The force which drags Dinah Morris and Dorothea down to earth, and Maggie Tulliver under water, is not evil, but good in its way. Hegel maintains that, in the tragic collision, "both sides of the contradiction, if taken by themselves, are justified..." 14 and likewise George Eliot, in the review "The Antigone and Its Moral," considers that the conflict in the Antigone is between "two principles, both having their validity..." 15 Martyrs like Antigone are never fighting against evil only, they are also placing themselves in opposition to a good—to a valid principle which cannot be infringed without harm. 16

The standpoint which this tragic action asks of the spectator is the "universal morality," which is based on the "good" man's "good" woman, such as the mothers of our race have commonly worn all latitudes" (I, xli, 169), becomes solid and maturely, like final nails. Fred and Mary are George Eliot's moral celebration of the goodness of the commonplace, or Hegelian, "general." They are the good which marriage still holds to Dorothea after her tragedy. Dorothea now has no dreams of being praised above other women (III, 401), any more than Dinah Morris does. She is no longer enamoured of intensity and greatness. But she can still give "wisely help" as a wife and mother (461). There is no "unreturned tragedy in the solution of the story. In the finale her marriage to Will Ladislaw, her absorption into the general life of the community, is still a "great beginning" (455).

The conclusion of George Eliot's last novel does not redeem the tragedy of her heroine. Cwengelred has not been reabsorbed into the community. Deronda has told her the opportunity to help mankind forward a little, to "make others glad that they were born," is still open to her, as it is to Dorothea at the end, but Cwengelred's last words on the subject are, "I do not yet see that she can be..." There is only a hint that someday she may go the way of Dorothea. At the conclusion she is alone.

Dialectical Structures in Hardy's Poems

D. E. Mclner

Few readers of the Collected Poems will deny that Thomas Hardy allowed too many "bad" poems to survive. The dreadful ineptitude of these, his lesser performances, tends to obscure the unquestioned brilliance of his better pieces. Too often must one do battle with awkward metaphors, getting dicing, and more bad tune; one is supposed to imagine "Time" with "his ghostly arms revolting"; or contemplate "the grisly grin of things"; or, worse yet, gaze upon "a dribbling gob." But there is also to be found, among his many verses, the severe excellence of a poem such as "Nature's Questioning":

When I look down at awaking pool,
Field, flood, foam, and all the tree,
All seem to gaze at me

Like charmed children sitting silent in a school.

It is the Philosophy of Fine Art, 14 a poetically occasioned offshoot to a body of work comprising over 900 lyrics; it is the frequency and the severity of his failures that has led critical attention to address itself more toward discovering the roots of Hardy's insufficiency than toward a search for the sources of his peculiar competence,

Deronda and his new bride Mirah leave her, and set out for a new life of service in the East. Pretty little Mirah, who was never cut out for "great tasks" (V, xxviii, II, 316), goes her own way in the final chapter like the river Floss after nature has repaired its ravages. Mirah appears "in the warm sunlight of content" (III, 404). She is incapable of understanding Cwengelred's grief, or Cwengelred's relation to Deronda (405), and she is mindlessly able to explain the events of the novel to herself in a way that does not interfere with the "bliss" of her own marriage (405). She too, in her common unhomic way, will be able to give her husband "wisely help." Mirah's marriage in the final chapter is George Eliot's last celebration of the goodness of the Hegelian "general," the commonplace life left open to her heroines after their aspirations to individual greatness have been destroyed. Here in Mirah, as in Fred and Mary, is a "good," if the heroine could only take it. This last tragic novel, like the others, is not "art which leaves the soul in despair"; and it concludes with a passage from Manon's final speech in the tragedy Samson Agonistes. In the novel the passage refers directly to the death of Ezra Cohen, and indirectly to the entire novel; and concludes George Eliot's tragic fiction with the proposition that, in spite of what has been destroyed, all is well and fair.

Nothing is here for tears, nothing to wail
Or knock the breast; no weakness, no contempt,
Dispise or blame, nothing but well and fair,
And what may quiet us in a death so noble. 16

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Occasional defects of diction and of metaphor in a poem may often be ignored if overshadowed by the superiority of the general effect. Hardy's poems, however, die too often at the very heart; they are ill-conceived and, in consequence, emerge still-born. Since it is believed that recurrent, fundamental, structural characteristics in the body of a poet's work ought to be emblematic of his manner of conceiving any given poem, students of Hardy's verse have sought such characteristic configurations in order to understand his "poetry." The two of the most significant investigations of this sort are R. P. Blackburn's "The Shorter Poems of Thomas Hardy" and Samuel H. Morison's "The Pattern of Hardy's Poetry." Both critics discovered that the single, most characteristic structural element in the greater number of the poems—both narrative and lyric—was a dichotomous thematic configuration rooted in Hardy's philosophical attitudes. The present essay is primarily concerned with the relationship between Hardy's sensibility and his poetic achievement as formulated by Mr. Hynes.
Mr. Hynes’ thesis, stated briefly, is as follows: in order to achieve an ironic representation emblematic of his world-view ("He saw experience as a configuration of opposites, every event contrived or qualified by a succeeding counterpoint, an infinite series of destructive tensions."). Hardcover chose to balance the idea-situations in his poetry by means of an antithetical construction: Hardy’s poetry is dialectical (A vs. B in 22 citations). To quote Hynes: Thesis (usually a circumstance commonly accepted as good—marriage, youth, young love, the union of husband and wife) is set against Antithesis (infidelity, age, death, separation) to form an ironic complex, which is left unresolved... the pattern... is built on the relation of appearance and reality.

Mr. Hynes insists further that this type of structural arrangement is present in and characteristic of the greater number of Hardy’s many lyrics. The presence of the pattern, however, does not in itself determine the success or failure of a poem; but, as a consequence of Hardy’s compressive achievement to a world-view that he wished to express or define artistically, the pattern is too often applied mechanically or forced upon inappropriate situations. In other words, the exploitation of this particular structural configuration degenerates into a formula.

The general tendency of these observations is correct, especially the emphasis placed upon the destructive effects of Hardy’s reliance upon a formula, but one cannot agree that the characteristic structures in the verse are antithetical. On the contrary, they are quite definitely dialectical.

First, irony itself is a species of dialectic, both as method and as effect: the opposing terms in any ironic configuration must interact with the perceiver of the “ironic” situation to form a new intellectual or emotional construct, usually a new or more complete insight. Anti¬thesis is an oppositional convention, strictly speaking, exclude any such reconstructive interaction because its function is as an analytical tool for the identification of real or apparent opposites. Strictly speaking, opposition as an artistic method can achieve, at best, only interesting juxtapositions. Secondly, Hynes himself indicates that Hardy’s manner of juxtaposing to Hardy’s frequent and explicit moralizing, he remarks that the poet was at his best “when he was content simply to interpret the life he saw about him” and let them act upon another (my italics). Now the opposed ideas do not act upon another in a vacuum but in the minds of both the writer and the reader; and all laws of relationship demand that, whenever two things “act” upon one another, there must issue some product or effect. If, then, one must choose between the terms “dialectical” and “antithetical,” it is the former, and not the latter, which must claim our attention.

The reasons are obvious. Creative interaction is crucial to the purpose of any ironic—and Hardy was such in both his novels and his poems—because irony represents the exploitation of an achieved doctrine or attitude toward the revelation of “appearances” in assumed “realities” in order to indicate higher or more valid “truths,” of which the instrumental doctrine or attitude is a function. The new truth or insight, however, is frequently a more or less forced or rhetorical conclusion derived from the responses of an essentially morose temperament to the more depressing aspects of nineteenth-century determinist dominance.

But it is as an artist, not a philosopher, that Hardy must be judged. As R. P. Blackmur puts it:

To his ideas as such, then, there is no primary objection. The object of his failure is to absorb them by craft into the representative effect of his verse. Indeed, from a literary point of view, all that is objectionable in Hardy’s ideas would have been overcome, had they been absorbed; for they would have struck the reader as consequences instead of instigators of significance. It is the rectification of craft, that what it handles makes it actual, objective, authoritative, anonymous (my italics). 8

To demonstrate the operation of dialectical opposition in Hardy’s verse, I shall take the poem “The Convergence of the Twain” (as the central illustration. Mr. Hynes discusses it as a specimen example of a poem whose structure is antithetical. At any rate, the eleven stanzas of the poem are concerned with the disastrous sinking of the Titanic. The first five stanzas describe the sinking ship resting on the bottom of the sea; this is the thesis term. The remaining stanzas describe the fashioning of the iceberg and the collision; this, the antithetical term. But Mr. Hynes discovers no synthesis here:

The meeting is not a synthesizing one; it just "jars two hemispheres", but does not answer the question that the "moon-eyed fingers [take?]... What does this vaingloriousness down here?" The iceberg is the cause of the ship sinking, but for Hardy there is no final cause, and the answer is only a recognition that there are no answers (my italics). 9

The final stanza reads as follows:

Till the Spinner of the Years
Said "Now!" And each one hears.

And consummation comes, and jars two hemispheres.

Hynes refuses to accept two things. First, though he himself perceives what is actually the synthetic notion: "A recognition that there are no answers," he ignores its significance. Hardy’s implication may be disputed but it ought not to be dismissed out of hand. Secondly, he does not grant significance and agency to the figures "Spinner of the Years" in Stanzas XI and "Imminent Will" in Stanzas VI. The poem clearly identifies these forces as representative of the final cause—so far as it can be known. And anyone familiar with Hardy’s poetry ought soon to realize that such figures as "The Will," "Spinner of the Years," or "publithed Doomer" are not used casually. They represent, in Hardy’s scheme, a principle of change, in effect cruel and accelerate, his Transitory in its operation as to constitute the only recognizable principle of order. His poetry is rarely free from his compulsive concern with this idea. The poem itself answers the question it raises: the ship rests on the ocean’s floor because the Immanent Will, "that stirs and urges everything," caused it to be there.

The synthesis may be seen more clearly, perhaps, if the opposition in the poem is viewed as one existing between reality and appearance. In appearance, the ship and the iceberg are without visible connection. The ship is an object created by human beings to fulfill definite functions and purposes; the iceberg is the mere detritus, natural slough. "Alien they seemed to be! No mortal eye could see..." that they were actually "twins halved of one August event." That "August event" is, of course, the revelation that the pursuer object created by men and the piece of natural debris in fact controlled and guided by the same transcendent force, a force indifferent to those discriminations of importance men would make between the two objects. This revelation constitutes the synthetic term; this insight is the new unity.

The poem does not explore or search out possibilities. It interprets an event from the fixed point of view of Hardy’s world-view. Thus, his dialectic seeks to affirm and to reconcile. "The Convergence of the Twain" is a "formula" poem. Yet it is successful despite this characteristic because, in this instance, Hardy was able to do more and do it better. The operation of Hardy’s transcendent and universal principle of accident is introduced into an appropriate circumstance: the actual and apparent event being replete with suggestions of the ironic and malevolent workings of some purposeful agent while the catastrophe with which the poem ends is the necessary consequence of the foregoing action. There is no sense of formal or affective discontinuity in the poem; its parts work together harmoniously.

The latter, on the other hand, serves as an instructive contrast. A woman, in a momentary fit of annoyance, destroys a letter from an unknown admirer. And the letter is addressed to the fund of affection it contains, repents, tries to reassemble the pieces, but cannot recover the name and address of the sender. An opportunity to form a sympathetic union with another human being has been lost. Now, to this point in the narrative, all actions have proceeded easily and naturally as consequences of her own rash decision; there has been no least suggestion of the operation of the principle of accident. But the poem is destroyed in the final stanza.

4. Hynes, p. 54.
VII
I learnt I had missed, by rash unheed.
My track; that, so the Mill decided,
In Life, death, we should be divided,
And at the sense I aimed indeed.

VIII
That ache for, born long ago,
Throbs on. I never could outgrow it.

What a revenge, did you but know it!
But that, thank God, you do not know.

It is painfully obvious that "the Will" is here an obtrusive element. Its presence deflects the movement of the poem suddenly to a totally unexpected, unprepared-for, and unnecessary plane of significance; its agency is false and

contrived. Indeed, the irrelevance of Stanza VII is such that to omit it when reading the poem does not in the least disturb the sense sequence. In fact, to do so elimi-
nates the clumsily implied link between "the Will" and "God" in Stanza VIII, and the "ironic" point of the poem is established with greater subtlety and force. Thus, it is the degree to which Hardy's formula is integrated into the total structure of a poem that largely determines success or failure.

Despite the paucity of illustration here presented, it is believed that the consistency of Hardy's work permits the conclusions arrived at to be extended to the entire canon of his lyric verse.

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William Johnson Fox and Mill's Essays on Poetry

F. Parein Sharpless

The crisis in our "mental history" which John Stuart Mill first experienced in the autumn of 1859 caused a profound revision in the character and extent of his commitment to the principles of Benthamism, one of the most im-
portant aspects of which was the lesson that "the passive susceptibilities needed to be cultivated as well as the active capacities, and required to be nourished and enriched as well as guarded," that a "due balance among the faculties" required the "cultivation of the feelings." Thus, Mill says, he began to feel the need for what he had heard or read about the importance of poetry and art as instruments of human culture. He adopted, as he said, the Goethean motto "many-sidedness" as his own. He became, as he admitted to Carlyle in 1834, "catholic and tolerant in an extreme degree, & thought one-sidedness almost the one great evil in human affairs." To this new frame of mind Mill read Wordsworth, Byron, Goethe, Coleridge, Comte, the Saint-Simonians; he cultivated friendships with John Sterling, John Arthur Biochuck, F. D. Maurice, and, slightly later, with Carlyle; and finally, he fell in love with Harriet Taylor. These associations mark the adoption of the culture of the world and a permanent separation from the narrow Benthamite party in which he had been raised.

Mill's interest in the feelings led him to poetry and to the publication in 1835 of two essays on poetry. "What is Poetry?" and "The Two Kinds of Poetry," and in 1835 of a review of Tennyson's poems. But when we try to discover specific relationships between the literary theory set forth in the essays and these new influences on Mill's thinking, we can find only a very wide variety of very general possibilities. Certainly all of Mill's new friends had thought more deeply about poetry than had Mill. There are broad similarities between Mill's ideas and Wordsworth's Preface to the Lyric Ballads, and Mill gives some evidence of knowing Goethe and Coleridge. Mill himself gives complete credit for his ideas on poetry to Harriet Taylor, but again there is only a general kind of evidence to support the statement; we know nothing of her ideas or tastes (except that Shelley was her favorite poet) and we do know that Mill was something less than objective in estimating her abilities. As a result, the circum-
nstances of Mill's relationship with William Johnson Fox come to have special interest because here there is specific evidence of an association involving literary matters, and of similarity in both the subject and the content of their critical writing.

Fox was a Unitarian clergymen and was active as a writer in support of various liberal political causes. His friendship and ideological sympathy with the utilitarians of a generation older than Mill's (Fox was twenty years

older) led to the appearance of several essays by Fox in the early issues of the Westminster Review which Besham and James Mill had founded in 1824, and to which John Mill was also a frequent contributor. We can assume therefore that Fox was one of the early friends of Mill, that Fox wrote the first essays on Tennyson which appeared in the Westminster Review, and that Fox's first essay on Tennyson was written in the winter of 1830-31, introduced the young woman to Mill, either because he thought Mill might be able to provide the intellectual stimulation she required, or be-
cause he thought that he could thus capture the services of a woman for the Westminster Review, or both. Whatever Fox's intent, these results did come from the introduction. Mrs. Taylor recovered from her sadness, Fox got access to a bright young man, and Mill gained entrance into a new circle of acquaintances of a very different kind from those utilitarians from whom he had recently cut himself off, and the opportunity to develop his new interest in litera-
ture and poetry in the company of Fox's literary friends, Harriet Martineau, poetesses Eliza and Sarah Flower, and Fox himself.

The earliest extant letter between Fox and Mill is Mill's acknowledgement on April 3, 1832 of Fox's invitation to contribute to the Westminster Review. While he has nothing to offer at the moment, Mill agrees that "whensoever I do write anything of the kind, (suitable for the general public) I can find no mode of disposing of it that would be more pleasing to me than by giving it to the world under your auspices." Over the next two years the two men had considerable correspondence between them (Fox's own correspondence with Tennyson is as extensive as the one to whom Mill allowed even the slightest intimacy on this subject.) During the same period Mill contributes over 200 letters and notes, a total of some 350 pages to the Westminster Review.

There is little specific evidence in the letters of any direct exchange of ideas on poetry between Mill and Fox, but there is a good deal of evidence of other kinds to suggest that Fox was taking a direct interest in Mill's career, and attempting to give him guidance. We know, for example, that it was Fox who supplied Mill with a review of Tennyson's In Memoriam, that Mill wrote but failed to place a review of the poems, that he returned the review copy with his dissatisfaction recorded in the Then we find that Fox's second essay was his passage of putting at the head of a review of Tennyson somewhere. I think I might create a better review of Tennyson, and with the same ideas too, in another way." 9

Tennyson was by no means an obvious choice as a subject for Mill's first review of a specific poet's work. He was young, he had published only two volumes, he had not been widely noticed by other journals, and the notice which he had received was largely adverse. 10 Mill and Tennyson did have a number of friends in common, particularly Maurice and Sterling, who had preceded Tennyson at Cambridge. Moreover, Mill's interest may have been aroused by the opinion among those who did know the poet's work, that he was a radical in politics, and by the fact that the few favorable reviews that the poems had received were from journals associated with this political persuasion. 11 But perhaps more significant than any of these connections is Fox's early acquaintance with the poet, seen in two extremely favorable reviews: the first in the Westminster Review of January 1831, the second in the Westminster Review for January 1835, the same issue in which Mill's first essay on poetry appears. 12

A connection between Fox's poetics and Mill's first dis-

cussions of poetry is further substantiated by the numer-
ous similarities between Fox's views of Tennyson and Mill's two essays on poetry and his review of Tennyson. The most striking of these similarities is their com-

mon adherence to rationalistic aesthetics in their analysis of the psychological process by which poetry is created. Poetry, says Fox, is not a gift of the gods, nor is the poet inspired with supernatural genius.

There is nothing mysterious, or anomalous, in the power of producing poetry, or in

4. Mill refers only once to Fox in the Autobiography, p. 138. "During . . . 1834 I wrote comments on passing events, of the nature of newspaper articles (under the title 'Notes on the Newspapers'), in the Monthly Repository, a magazine conducted by Mr. Fox, well known as a preacher and political orator, and subsequently as member of parliament for Oldham, with whom I had lately become acquainted, and for whose sake chiefly I wrote in his Magazine." See also Richard Carnett, The Life of W. J. Fox (New York, 1910), and Francis E. Minkel, The Disillusion of Darwin, The Westminster Review, 1830-1838 (Chapel Hill, 1944), pp. 169-365.

9. Early Letters, pp. 177-78. Mill continues by praising Harriet's help: "If you like the idea, and if you see her before Monday, with whom you mentioned it,-you know it is here—if she approves, it shall be yours."
11. Ibid., pp. 195-96.
12. "Tennyson's Poems," Westminster Review, XIV (January, 1831), pp. 210-24; "Tennyson's Poems," Monthly Repository, VIII (February, 1835), pp. 30-44. The first of these reviews has been attributed to John Bowring who was editor of the Westminster at this time. But Shannon, op. cit., p. 184 n. 17, and William D. Paden, "Tennyson and the Reviewers (1829-1835)," in Studies in English (University of Kansas Publications: Brownawell's Studies, VI, No. 4) (Lawrence, Kansas, 1940), pp. 22-27, agree in attributing it to Fox.
that of its enjoyment; neither the one nor the other is a supernatural gift bestowed capriciously nobody knows how, when, or why. It may be a compound, but it is not incapable of analysis.

Poetry arises from an inherent "physical organization" present in both poets and readers of poetry, a common ability to respond to physical patterns of form, rhythm, and color. The poet differs from ordinary men only in his superior knowledge of "metaphysical science," that is, in his understanding of the psychological and mental laws of mental activity. This rejection of a priori epistemology is one of the foundations of Benthamism, and Fox notes that the poetic principles which Tennyson's work shows are fully in keeping with the new "utilitarian spirit."

This strict empiricist (or experimentalist, to use the word Mill preferred) point of view and its rejection of the inessential metaphysics of the a priori school is similarly the basis of Mill's criticism. In the essays on poetry, for example, Mill attempts to "explain" the function of the poet in terms of experimentalist metaphysics in order, as with Fox, to avoid crediting the poet with any inherent truth, truths known by intuition without experience. Mill's discussion is, characteristically, more elaborate and careful than Fox's. A poet, he says, is not inherently different from ordinary men: "poetic excellence is subject to the same necessary conditions with any other mental endowment," although "consistent with the principles of a sound metaphysics...[there are poetic natures]."44 These natures, however, differ not in kind, but in degree, in susceptibility to external images, in habits of organization and association. They are, in short, different in degree of sensibility and fitness of emotional tone, but not in any fundamental way, that is, in any way which would allow one mind access to truths denied another.

Both Mill and Fox give similar descriptions of the psychological "act" of the creating poet, both subscribe to the analysis of "partaking of the same emotional "act" of poetry," to the view that the poet turns his "attention" inward, finding the source of poetry in the passage of impressions and sensations through his mind. The words of the poem become thus a projection of or expression of of "correlative" of the feelings. Fox takes this view with astonishing literalness, and renders the idea in a metaphor that is perhaps as literal as expressive poetical theory can tolerate. Tennyson, Fox writes, is especially good at the analysis of the "act" of poetry, as moral discretion, because of his thorough knowledge of "metaphysical science."

He seems to obtain entrance into a mind as he would make his way into a landscape; he climbs the pinnace gland as if it were a hill in the centre of the scene; looks around on all objects with their varieties of form, their movements, their blaze of colors, and their blend of relations and influences, and forthwith produces as graphic a delineation in the mind as Gainsborough could have done in the other, to the great enrichment of our gallery of intellectual scenery.

Mill also alludes to the notion of an "interior" reader: the truth of poetry is to paint the human soul truly: the truth of fiction is to give a true picture of the world. Great poets are often proverbially ignorant of life. What they know has come by observation of themselves; they have found within themselves one highly delicate and sensitive speciation of human nature, on which the laws of emotion are written in large characters, such as can be read off without much study.

Both Mill and Fox advise the skill with which the poet's sensitive nature partakes of and sympathizes in various particularized states of mind, and bodies each of them forth in external scenery which is consonant with the character and state of mind being represented. According to Mill, such poems as "Maritana" and "Eleonora" and "The Lady of Shalott" are praiseworthy because they fulfill his earlier prescription that in the best poetry feeling is seen "embodied itself in symbols which are the nearest possible representation of feeling in the exact shape in which it exists in the poet's mind."45 To Fox, Tennyson has excellently "made the feeling within generate an analogous object in the mind,"46 and to Mill, he has demonstrated the capacity for "scene-painting," that is, the "power of creating scenery, in keeping with some state of mind, so fitted to it as to be the embodied symbol of it."47

Finally, both Fox and Mill see in Tennyson's poems ground for the prediction that he will continue to achieve the most desirable combination of emotional sensibility and intellectual power. The "true poet," writes Fox, is "compounded of the philosopher and the artist." Tennyson must have internal "tenacity," which will produce the "firmest web of solid thought," while at the same time his feelings must be "tremulous as the strings of the Aeolian harp, that quiver in every breeze."48 Tennyson, concludes Fox, has generous capacities in both categories, extended good sense and moral guidance in intellectual power only by Wordsworth, and in emotional sensibility only by Coleridge. Mill agrees in this division of poetic faculties, also citing Wordsworth as the exemplar of the intellectual powers of what he calls the "Poet of Culture," and contrasting him with Shelley, to "Poet of Nature," the poet of natural sensibility. Mill is, however, more cautious than Fox in giving Tennyson credit for the synthesis of the two, with a possible slighter anti-shy view. The true course of stastical amount of intellectual talent to avoid shipwreck, and Tennyson must continue to acquire this protection.

To render his poetic endowment the means of guarding against a too strong a strain on his strength, he must by continual study and meditation strengthen his intellect for the discrimination of such truths; he must see that his theory of life and the world be no chimera of the brain, but the well-grounded result of true and mature thinking—how he must cultivate, and with no half-devotion, philosophy as poetry.49

Mill most admires the "Pictorial Art" because it attempts the "highest object of poetry," that is, to represent symbolically "spiritual truths," to incorporate the abstractions of reason in visible forms and images which can appeal to the senses.50

While these similarities are due in part to the common heritage of utilitarianism that was shared by Fox and Mill, it is also clear that they were engaged in working out their own "explanation" of poetry. They suggest that the starting point may be with some skepticism at Mill's statement of the importance to the development of his interest in poetry of Mrs. Taylor's enthusiasm and Wordsworth's affecting pictures. Finally, Mill's association with Fox is an example of what was to become Mill's customary procedure: to evolve broader and more general views from study of the authorities and the history of the question, to move carefully from older dogmas to newer and better syntheses.

University of Pennsylvania

Parents and Children in Great Expectations

Veeren M. Bell

At the end or Great Expectations Joe and Biddy have a child whom they name Pip and through whom our Pip will be able to relive that age of his own life. Little Pip, because of Biddy's wisdom and Joe's love, will no doubt grow strong and brave. The true course of nature is beginning to be restored. Until this point in the novel, however, there is nothing like a sound and intelligent one, the lack of the paternal influence, the normal course of nature has been tragically perverted. Some of the children are orphans, either utterly alone or dominated by brutal parent surrogate; the ones who are not orphans have parents who are either grotesque and domineering or witless and incompetent. Not one of these children has the parent he needs, and no parent provides the love and nature guidance he is meant to.

In Great Expectations this pattern is clearer because the context is less cluttered, but of course all of Dickens' novels are the same way—there are not many loving and sensible parents anywhere in his fiction; and this, it seems to me, is one significant element of Dickens' art that is both conspicuous and explainable. Obviously it reflects the lasting influence of his own childhood, but beyond this, given the memory of his misery as a child, and given his conception of the world and society as desolate and ineradicable, it seems natural that Dickens should have hit, perhaps unconsciously, upon the bleak parent-child relationship as a kind of unifying metaphor for his total vision. More specifically, in his insistence— if only vaguely realized—parallel between parent and society, Dickens is able to embody here a distinct personal awareness—that of the moral and social chaos that follows upon the abuse of the or the delibration of the responsibility. And in Great Expectations, as the focus sharpens upon the central characters—particularly upon Pip—the loosely relevant metaphorical pattern becomes even more securely articulated with the demands of thematic movement; it develops ultimately into one of the central insights of Pip's moral growth.

The general motif is stressed in an odd variety of domestic situations, involving peripheral as well as central characters. It is mentioned, for example, that Startup "had been spoiled by a weak mother, and kept at home where he ought to have been at school"—over-protected, in other words, and sheltered from his normal course of development. And yet Startup is the most minor of functions with nothing much more to do than row. The remark about his mother's influence apparently has no bearing on his role in the novel. On the other hand, Miss Havisham has a similar relationship with her father that has disastrous consequences. "Miss Havisham," Herbert tells Pip, "was a spoilt child. Her mother died when she was a baby, and her father denied her nothing." (XXII) It was a sliding jealousy that motivated her half-brother to conspire with Compensation against her fortune; and we have no difficulty in imagining further what Herbert only implies—that her father's unthinking devotion served to make her vulnerable, ironically, to the very plot which it engendered. It was he who was responsible for

20. Early Essays, p. 266.
22. Early Essays, p. 266.
23. Ibid., pp. 266-68.
24. Chapter XXI. All of the quotations from the novel are taken from the New Oxford Illustrated Edition (London, 1953), introduction by Frederick Page. For the sake of convenience I have chosen to cite chapters rather than pages—and henceforth, within the text.
both for her innocence and for the high valuation she placed upon herself.

Again at the outer edges, like Startop, is Clara Barley, Herbert’s fiancée, with no identity to speak of other than her subservience to an irascible, invalid father who is landlocked in an upstairs room. “He makes tremendous rows—always says he’s in need of a ‘holy illuminating instrument’” (XXX). At home Clara’s life consists mainly of receiving the provisions he passes out from his imagi

dary-guide’s gold and the his own personal income, Old Barley, had pressed into his service” (XLI VI). In lieu of a mother, Clara has only Mrs. Whipple, the laudable, who bears her confidences and sympathizes with her thwarted affection for Herbert. It was understood that nothing of a tender nature could possibly be confided to Old Barley, by reason of his being totally unequal to the consideration of any subject more psychological than Gout, Bum, and Purse’s stores” (XLI VI). Only after the old Ogre had drunk himself to death can Clara finally be reclaimed. Judging from the frequency with which it recurs, the captive child figure evidently held as much vaguely symbolic significance for Dickens as it did for Blake.

Of course Herbert himself is victimized by an unorthodox, if slightly more congenial, domestic background. His character seems to be composed almost symmetrically of paternal and maternal attributes. From his father he inherits his good nature, his generosity, his manly integrity, his cheerful if impractical industry; from his mother, though he is unsympathetic with her witless patrician illusions, he derives a special faculty for dreaming, a kind of naive offshoot of self and his, the eldest of eight children, he is set loose prematurely upon the world, like a juvenile M. Hiccup, looking about him, waiting for something to turn up. Herbert’s character, circumstances, and the chaos that prevails in his father’s household are all the indirect result of a parental influence three generations in the past.

Mrs. Pocket was the only daughter of a certain quite accidental deceased knight, who had invented for himself a conviction that his deceased father would have been made a Baronet but for somebody’s determined opposition to stirring out of eternally personal matters... and had tackled himself into the nobles of the earth in right of this quite suppositional fact... Be that as it may, he had directed Mrs. Pocket to be buried under a white head-candle as one who in the nature of things must marry a title, and who was to be guarded from the acquisition of plebian domestic knowledge.

So successful a watch and ward had been established over the young lady by this judicious parent, that she had grown up highly ornamental, but perfectly helpless for the realm.

Mrs. Pocket therefore devotes her hours to reading “all about titles” while her children are left to “tumble up” under the harassed direction of their two nurseries. Utterly baffled by his intellectually impoverished wife, Mr. Pocket seems to have resigned all claim to patriarchal authority, and the unexpressive power in the house to hold Pip discovers to be vested exclusively in the servants. Considering the circumstances of his upbringing it is not surprising that the young man’s character of amiable but tenderly imperfectly self-satisfied, self-satisfied, self-encircling, so-called gentee, might, under the influence of his own circumstances, never have been able even to form a general idea of the nature of their being imprisoned, whipped, trans- ported, neglected, cast out, qualified in all ways for the hangman, and growing up to be hanged. Put the case that pretty nigh all the children he saw in his daily business life, he had reason to look upon as so much swann, to develop into the fish that were to come to his net—to be persecuted, defended, forsworn, made orphans, beleaguered, somewhat... Put the case, Pip, that here was one pretty little child out of the heap who could be saved...” (LI).

The world’s orphans cannot expect to find a parent in society, have no cause to believe in a family of man. The orphaned stage in general is pivotal in the book’s secure and logical relationship between cause and effect. Because Magwitch is an orphan he is abused; because he is abused he wishes to be avenged; because of his desire for vengeance he “adopts” another orphan to remake into a gentleman and an alter-ego. Because Pip is an orphan—perhaps the most important—he is susceptible to being remolded.

In all of the most recent admiring commentary on the opening scene of Great Expectations, the one most striking and naturalistic effect of that scene is sometimes ignored: that is the image there of a lonely, dispirited little boy, who has lost his parents (and his little brothers) without knowing what has happened to them. Without knowing what affection Estella is capable of feeling for Pip is not for Pip the gentleman but for Pip as he always was. Pip’s being part of the plot, in other words, is not just a plot device but a deep and crucial influence upon his motivation.

Even Magwitch at first loves him more for what he symbolizes than for what he is an imperfect conception. And Magwitch’s intellectualization of Pip is simply an inversion of society’s attitude toward Magwitch. Ironically, Magwitch has a true daughter, who, through no fault of his own, has been made into an exact female counterpart of what he intended Pip to be. And again ironically, both of them—the daughter that he engenders and the son that he manufactures—turn out to epitomize the very cultural attitudes that have made him what he is—Estella arrogant and without feeling, Pip miscalculating and neurotically jealous of his respectability. Pip and Estella have in common the fact that they are both the instruments of someone else’s vengeance, that both—either actually or in effect orphans—have their true natures distorted and corrupted by a foster parent’s
The Name Jude

Robert F. Petersen

RECENT INCIDENTS AT HARDY'S would-be priest, who valiantly tries to become a loyal servant of God but fails because of the undermining of his human nature, need to be studied. Thus the inference of Professor Norman Holland from the coincidence that the name Jude happens to be spelled the same way in the ancient Gk. as in Christian, suggests that it be thought of as "the names of the characters form an important part of this religious imagery." (p. 51) and when he considers "remind us of a Christian another edition of Jude as Christ." (p. 58); but even the possibility that Hardy was deliberately drawing upon some of the prominent writings of the philosopher Schopenhauer would not imply that the German rendering of his hero's name was significant to the novel.

Professor Holland is not the only author. John Paterson shifts the criticism to a consideration of "The Return of the Native" as Antichristian Document, yet he fails not to recite the other novel again as well: "Hardy could be . . . in Jude, to record in more specific terms his quarell with the Christian order of things." (p. 127). But also, to be discussed in the pages following. That I strongly disagree with his argument does not mean, of course, that I have any less respect for him as a scholar.

3. Jude the Obscure: The Author's Intent. Judgment of Christianity, NCf, IX (1954), pp. 50-60. He has other reasons, includes the 1912 Postscript to "The original Preface.
7. P. 27. All citations are to the Anniversary Edition of the Works (London and New York, 1935), Vol. III, which includes the following 1912 Postscript to "The original Preface.
8. Quotations from the original edition of the New Testament published in 1779 by Dr. John New. An edition of 1830 was supplemented by the researches of Matthæi, Althus, Birch, et al., in the Boston edition of 1830 used for this paper.

Vanderbilt University
A Note on Browning's "Childe Roland to the Dark Tower Came"

Victor Hoar

Joan Lindberg's "Graal Themes in Browning's 'Childe Roland'" (VNL, Fall, 1959) considered that enigmatic poem in terms of the materials of myth and ritual. Drawing in great part upon Jessie Weston's *From Ritual to Romance*, Lindberg developed certain Graal motifs which had been introduced into the poem and found that the image of the Graal, both in the scenes and in the poem is "all bound together by a unified aura of feeling," a thematic mood indistinct to the variations among the major elements. The comment of folklore among them in a subconscious drive toward self-expression. 1 He concluded that the theme of "Childe Roland" is "the desire to surface and redeem the incorruptible evil of a society that has escaped from the control of the specific human sanctions of nobility and good faith in men." 2

Perspective though it is, and certainly perplexing in regard to this poem is long overdue. Lindberg's analysis falls to account for an arrangement of symbols and themes which dominate the poem. Furthermore, this arrangement can be discerned particularly with the assistance of Miss Weston's study of the Holy Grail. The symbols are the

the acme of la condition humaine and furthest point to which his human nature could go, though even in interrelated with His divine nature since the words constitute a devotional recitation of a psalm) and 'I thirst.' If there is any indication in Browning's poem of anything resembling to a second-century Christian sect which here source describes a rite comprised of two initiations, the first and lower being a contact with physical evil and the second and higher initiation consuming a contact with God. The Perilous Chapel episode signifies the


2. Holmes, p. 57.
3. Lindberg, p. 54.
5. The Technique of Thomas Hardy (New York, 1912), p. 218.
6. "Newman", p. 13. Interestingly, however, and may be more coincidental, that Jude's anguished cries and subsequent third have a parallel in Joan Lindberg, "Graal Themes in Browning's 'Childe Rol-


12. "Newman", p. 13. Interestingly, however, and may be more coincidental, that Jude's anguished cries and subsequent third have a parallel in Joan Lindberg, "Graal Themes in Browning's 'Childe Rol-


lower common, and presumably the discovery of the Grail represented the completion of the higher. Miss Weston has explained the joining of the two themes in the court of Arthur.

The esoteric side of the cult gives us the Human, the folk-lore, elements—the Suffering King, the Wasteland, the effect upon the Folk, the task that lies before the hero, the group of Grail symbols. The Esoteric side provides us with the Mystic Meal, the Food of Life, connected in some mysterious way with a Vessel which is the center of the cult, . . . a double initiation into the source of lower and higher spheres of Life; the ultimate proof of the successful issue of the final test in the restoration of the King.

The hero described by Browning is not the Grail hero. There is no reason to assume that Roland is the only one who would or could succeed to the tower and meet the challenge that waits there. Indeed, there is no reason to assume that Roland will endure the trial. He must pass a series of tests; he has not yet passed them all as he clears the wasteland. He is a young, relatively unstable man; he may not even, as yet, be a knight. But he is brave, and it is this virtue that Browning seems to be recommending to his own age.

Religion, Art, and the Poet
Arthur F. Beninghouse

Aznoun to The Dead Cardinal of Westminster is most characteristic of Francis Thompson, derelict man and despousing poet, very little critical attention has been given it. Here, as in The Hound of Heaven, Thompson's desire to be the poet of England's return to God conflicts sharply with his sense of guilt and his obsession with sensuality. As in The Poetcy, another indicative poem, Thompson is concerned with one of his driving themes, the ultimate worth of poetry and the fate of the poet whose art has condemned him to spiritual revelation through earthly values exclusively.

Written in 1862 at the request of Wilfred Meynell for an elegy on Henry Manning, To the Dead Cardinal of Westminster has never ceased puzzling readers because it dissipates the memorial aspect in a few lines and hurries on to "press a private business." However, the third, sixth, and seventh stanzas of the original version—now suppressed—supply needed clues. Thompson could not bear the company of the ascetic churchman, Cardinal Manning. They had met in January 1851 after the poet had advocated creation of a Catholic Salvation Army. Invited to return to the Cardinal's quarters for further consultation, Thompson stayed away. He explains why in the suppressed portions of the elegy:

Your singer did not come
Back to that stem, bare home:
He knew
Himself and you.

Paradoxically, it is precisely because of his dislike that Thompson is pressing a private business instead of continuing with a formal elegy. The Cardinal was an ascetic who despite the fact that he had "all the world for cell" did not succumb to the temptations of the flesh. Thompson, just the opposite, is an artist—a slave to sensuality. While it is true that Thompson has written neither "for gold" nor for "The loud / Shout of the crowd," he has allowed himself to be driven by "The inpitiable Daemon, / Beauty." Have Thompson's artistic impulses led him to hell? He feels guilty at the possibility of having neglected God's service.

So the poet begs the Cardinal, who is now in heaven, to intercede with "The hosts angelical" by explaining that Thompson was "stricken from his birth / With curse / Of destinate verse." Like the Cardinal, but after his own fashion, the poet had dedicated himself to a vocation and served God. The churchman is to plead that the poet—precisely because he is an artist—"near


Suffice it to say that at the time of the resurrection of these ceremonies in the early Middle Ages, the most obvious participants were King Arthur's knights, already established as part of courtly culture.

University of Illinois

Henry James to Stopford Brooke: An Unpublished Letter
Fred L. Standley

A week after Henry James died on February 28, 1916, Stopford Brooke noted in his diary: "Henry James is deceased. Great loss to literature and France, but not to the U. States to which he did not really belong . . . I did not know Henry James well, I could not claim him as a friend, but I met him in society and he used to come and see me in Manchester Square." Sir Frederick Wedmore, a friend of Brooke and frequent guest in his London home, attested to the fact that James occasionally called upon Brooke as also did Holman Hunt, William Morris, and Burne-Jones. Although James and Brooke were not intimate friends and the circumstances whereby they first became acquainted remain unknown, the relationship between the two was apparently cordial.

On January 21, 1975, James published in The Nation a review of Brooke's Theology in the English Poets which was complimentary but emphasized the one-sided nature of the latter's critical method: "he rather too readily forgives a poor verse on the plea of a fine thought." That James thought well of Brooke's literary œuvre, however, is demonstrated by the presentation in 1887, to his niece's friend, Constance Fenimore Woolson, of an inscribed edition of Shelley's poetry which had been selected, arranged, and prefixed by Brooke.

While attending a social engagement at the home of Mrs. Blanche Crackanthorpe, on February 16, 1884, Brooke suggested to James two "little ideas" for stories. One of them was later used by James as the basis for his novel, The Sacred Fount. Mrs. Crackanthorpe, author of "Revolv of the Dancers" and "Sex in Western Literature" in the Nineteenth Century, and mother of Hubert M. Crackanthorpe, the essayist and writer of short stories, often entertained such persons as James, Brooke, Thomas Hardy, and George Meredith. In 1897 when Last Studies by Hubert Crackanthorpe appeared posthumously, the volume contained a prose work entitled "An Appreciation," by James and a "Memorial Poem" by Brooke.

Both James and Brooke were inveterate travelers and made numerous excursions on the continent, particularly in Italy. Frequently, they recorded in letters their general impressions of a specific journey that had been taken. On one occasion after a summer's sojourn in Italy, James wrote to Brooke and described in detail a portion of the trip. August 16th

34, DeVere Garden, W.

Dear Stopford Brooks:

Especially now that I am back (within a few days) from Vallombrosa and that the whole land of Italy becomes as it does daily, always, under these circumstances, a land of fable and romance walloped off by the Alps from our hard northern world,—I especially now, as I say, want to reassure you about the said Vallombrosa and to say that, (except that the nights might be rather too cool,) I should think it wd be very blessed in September. It isn't 'spoiled' in the least; the strud carrazzable hasn't corrupted it, the "big hotel" is very small and the little dependance of the same—the PandAlume, about 12 minutes' roughish walk higher up is the place to stay. It has a charming terrace which is a wonderful place to sit in the morning and the evening (when the evening is warm). At the Albergo Centrale, Via Condotta, Florence, you get all information. I wish indeed, I were there, to give it to you on the spot. Don't answer this— I only wanted not to leave you under illusions pertinent to a spot most dear, to yours ever

Henry James

Although an exact date cannot be assigned to the letter, the value of the correspondence cannot be minimized. The letter reveals a prevalent attitude of James about Italy and England. It shows the author's ability to recall the minute details of his experience. It portrays his willingness to offer suggestions about accommodations to an acquaintance who is preparing to embark on a similar trip. Apparently, Brooke heeded the expressed command, for there is no evidence that he answered the letter.

Florida State University

2. Ibid., p. 419.
Carlyle, Jeffrey, and the "Helotage" Chapter of Sartor Resartus

Alon S. Ryan

The chapter entitled "Helotage" (Book III, Chapter IV) is an intricate example of Carlyle's laces in handling the fictional element in Sartor, and perhaps the most serious one. The chapter, only four and a half pages long, begins thus:

At this point we determine on advertising shortly, or rather reverting, to a certain Tract of Hifraith Heathieeke's, entitled Institute for the Repression of Population, which lies, dishonourably enough (with torn leaves, and a perceptible smell of aloetic drugs), stuffed into the Bag Pieces. Not indeed for the sake of the Tract itself, which we admire little, but for the marginal Notes, evidently in Teufelsdröckh's hand, which rather copiously fringe it. Then we are told by the Editor that Heuschrecke is a disciple of Malthus and that his zeal "almost literally eats him up." The remaining four pages of the chapter are entirely devoted to Teufelsdröckh's highly critical and, at times savagely trenchant, comments on Malthus's social philosophy. As for the tract itself, we learn nothing of its contents except by implication.

Now what the reader has learned about Heuschrecke up to this point makes his Malthusianism surprising, to say the least. In fact, we feel that the Malthusian tract is singularly out of character. The first glimpse we have of Heuschrecke is of one who plays a kind of Wagner to Teufelsdröckh's Faust. He is a disciple, but not an especially brilliant one. The Editor refers to him as "our Professor's chief friend and associate in Weissbichtwo" and paraphrases the first letter from Heuschrecke diluting "on the deep significance and tendency of his Friend's Volume." In a later passage, the Editor presents a two-page sketch of Heuschrecke's relationship to Teufelsdröckh. He begins by saying that Heuschrecke was the only other person he ever saw in Teufelsdröckh's study. To be sure, the description begins on a negative note and includes a comment on Heuschrecke by Teufelsdröckh, first in German and then in translation: "He has heart and talent, at least has had such, yet without a fit mode of utterance, or favour of Fortune, and so is half-cracked, half-coagulated." But then the Editor stresses Heuschrecke's "noble and instructive" influence on Teufelsdröckh and says he hung on the Professor with the fondness of a Boswell for his Johnson. He looked on Teufelsdröckh as "a living oracle" at every utterance of the Professor he would give his "heartiest approval," either with a chuckle or with a "Brav! Das glaub' ich." Not only is there nothing here to indicate any fundamental disagreement between Heuschrecke and Teufelsdröckh, the emphasis throughout the passage is on how-worshiping discipleship.

In the next few chapters the Editor begins to sketch out the lines of Teufelsdröckh's clothes philosophy, while he waits for the biographical documents promised by Herr Heuschrecke. He emphasizes especially that our Professor's "is a speculative Radical, and of the very darkest tinge," a point which is of considerable importance in relation to the alleged Malthusianism of Heuschrecke. Finally Heuschrecke sends the documents in "six considerable PAPER-BAGS" and with them "a long-winded Letter." Long-winded the letter may be, but in style it is worthy of Teufelsdröckh himself, as the Editor acknowledges. More important, Carlyle puts into the mouth of Herr Heuschrecke his favorite doctrine that a writer's work cannot be understood apart from his life. Everything in the letter, both in tone and thought, shows Heuschrecke to be in complete agreement with Teufelsdröckh.

After this we hear no more of Herr Heuschrecke until Book III we encounter the chapter called "Helotage." Now, after all we have heard about Heuschrecke's discipleship to Teufelsdröckh, we suddenly discover that he is also a disciple of Malthus, and has written a Malthusian tract on population. Even more implausible is the fact that Teufelsdröckh should first write a long note on the cover of Heuschrecke's tract, and then should cover the margins with notes refuting his disciple's entire scheme. Nothing prepares us for the contrast here made between Teufelsdröckh as a "speculative Radical" and Heuschrecke's "deadly fear of Population." However formalized or stylized the fictional device of Sartor may be, Carlyle does preserve a consistency elsewhere that he loses in this chapter. It is as though Carlyle momentarily decided to sacrifice consistency in order to make an attack on Malthusianism through the mouth of Teufelsdröckh. As Teufelsdröckh's antagonist, Carlyle selects the character who, next to the Editor himself, is pictured elsewhere in Sartor as in closest rapport with Teufelsdröckh's entire philosophy, and simply foists on him this Malthusian tract.

How can we account for this somewhat awkwardly introduced chapter? Both James Anthony Froude, in his Thomas Carlyle, and David Alec Wilson, in his Life of Thomas Carlyle, emphasize the fact that just when Carlyle was being in, September, 1830, to work on the "Thoughts on Clothes" that later developed into Sartor Resartus, Francis Jeffrey arrived at Grangemouth for a week's visit. There were more than the usual disagreements, especially over Carlyle's rapidly intensifying social and political radicalism, and a spirited debate between the two was carried over into their letters. Froude even sees the visit as crucial in the friendship of Carlyle and Jeffrey, and says that, "A Whig of the Whigs," cooled in his esteem for Carlyle from this time on. And what is most relevant here, both Froude and Wilson interpret the chapter called "Helotage" as Carlyle's answer to Jeffrey.

If we examine Jeffrey's long letter to Carlyle of November 13, 1830, which Froude and Wilson cite as their principal evidence for the theory that "Helotage" is a criticism of Jeffrey's Malthusian views, we note that:

1. Jeffrey attacks Carlyle's radicalism, i.e., his defense of human rights against property rights, and stresses his own "horror of radicalism."

2. Jeffrey goes so far as to say that "the greater portion of all societies must be always on the brink of extreme poverty and waging a hard battle with all sorts of feuds and sufferings."

3. In the following key passage of the letter, Jeffrey expresses what is called in "Helotage" a "deadly fear of Population."

"But it is their (the poor classes') very wants and urgent necessities which first roosed the spirit of invention and improvement—and it is only—as it would appear—by their fears and miseries that their multiplication to a still more frightful extent is prevented. If men could have lived merely by breathing, and required neither clothing nor any other accommodation, I take it to be quite certain that they would very soon have increased until they had not room to lie down on the surface of the earth, and second that they would have so lived and propagated in as brutish a state as the very lowest of the animal creation."24

Unlike Wilson, who quotes the letter, Froude is content merely to summarize. He notes that this passage "represents what Swift's famous suggestion of a remedy for the distresses of Ireland." Such an interpretation ignores, of course, the ficile element of Sartor, and simply views the book as an essay, if not Froude is correct in saying that Carlyle is answering Jeffrey, he at least furnishes a possible key to a basic inconsistency in the fictional relation between Heuschrecke and Teufelsdröckh. It is certain that, in contrast to the relation between the two fictional characters, the disagreements between Carlyle and Jeffrey at this time, as the letters and journals make clear, were not even confined to social and economic matters, and far less confined to the pros and cons of the doctrine of Malthus. Jeffrey criticizes Carlyle for his whole response to experience, for his impatience and truculence, for his assumption of the prophet's mantle. By the same token, Jeffrey's Malthusianism, if it can be called such, was part of a consistent point of view. On the other hand, up to the chapter on "Helotage," Heuschrecke had been presented as a devotee of that very "Clothes-philosophy" which Jeffrey would dismiss as sheer mysticism. In fact, as early as 1828, after Carlyle had restored in the proof-sheets of the Burn's essay a few sentences on clothes which Jeffrey had cut, Jeffrey wrote back as follows:

"How can you dream of restoring such a word as FRAGMENTARY, or that very simple and well used joke of the clothes making the man and the tailor being a creator? It was condensation enough to employ such oraments at first, but it is inconceivable to me that anybody should stoop to pick them up and stitch them on again, when they had once been stripped off."

If, then, Carlyle is "answering" Jeffrey in this chapter on "Helotage," he does so by putting Teufelsdröckh against his own disciple, making Heuschrecke at once a Malthusian (to use the term loosely) and a transcendentalist. By contrast, the debate between Carlyle and Jeffrey over human rights and property rights makes sense as part of their larger disagreements.

There is, finally, one other bit of evidence to show that "Helotage" is curiously inconsistent with the fictional unity of Sartor. In Book III the Editor turns from the autobiographical documents of Teufelsdröckh back to the volume/ densities with which Book I is concerned. Each of the first three chapters of Book III is supposedly based upon a chapter of Teufelsdröckh's Clothes Volume. Throughout Book III,
in fact, the Editor is selecting, at times giving an entire chapter, at other times only what strike him as the most revealing passages.

Chapter I, "Incident in Modern History," is based on Teufelsdröckh's chapter called "Perfectibility of Society." For Chapter II, the Editor not only retains Teufelsdröckh's chapter title, "Church-Clashes," but tells us at the outset that since it is "the shortest in the Volume" he translates it entire. Chapter III, "Symbols," is likewise based on a chapter or section of Teufelsdröckh's volume, though the Editor says that "to state his whole doctrine indeed were beyond our compass..." But for Chapter IV, "Hetogate," as we have already noticed, the Editor returns to the autobiographical documents where, "stuffed into the Bag Piece," he finds Heuschrecke's tract covered with Teufelsdröckh's gloss. For the Editor thus to turn momentarily from the Clothes Volume back to the autobiographical documents is probable enough, in spite of his having told us at the end of Book II that he was putting them aside. But when he opens Chapter V, "The Phoenix," with these words: "Putting which four singular Chapters together,...we are puzzled. The Editor has not given us..." four singular Chapters" of Teufelsdröckh's book, either in whole or in part, but three chapters, the fourth having come from the autobiographical documents. Granted that this is a very minor oversight on Carlyle's part in managing his fictional framework, it is more significant than would be a similar lapse in a novel. It serves to corroborate the evidence I have already given for concluding that the whole notion of Heuschrecke's tract and Teufelsdröckh's gloss on it had little organic relation to the larger plan of Sartor. It is probable that Teufelsdröckh's "prophesying" (and, we might add, Carlyle's) in this chapter takes over so completely that Carlyle forgets where, according to the fiction, it is supposed to have come from.

This examination of the "Hetogate" chapter could be pursued further into the question of why Heuschrecke left the copiously glossed tract in the bag Piece in the first place. What we know of him makes it unlikely that he would send so sharp an attack on his ideas to the English Editor, and thus risk having his chastisement at the hands of his beloved Professor made public. But to ask such questions is to strain at gnats after swallowing camels. The manner of introducing the "Hetogate" chapter is evidence of how subjective a book Sartor really is. We know that many passages put into Teufelsdröckh's mouth can be found almost verbatim in the journals. And in reading Carlyle's letters to his brother John after the completion of Sartor we notice that Carlyle exhorts his brother to be courageous in adversity by quoting the very words of Teufelsdröckh as expressing his own deepest conviction. In short, there is much additional evidence to show that the fictive, the expository, and the confessional aspects of Sartor are not fully harmonized, and at times, in the present instance, come into sharp conflict.

University of Notre Dame

15. Sartor, p. 213.
17. Sartor, p. 231.

English X News

Committee News
- Chairman John T. Fain announced that the following officers were elected at the 1964 meeting: Wendell Stacy Johnson, 1966 Secretary; Kenneth Knickerbocker and Michael Wolff, Advisory and Nominating Committee Members, 1966-68; Martin Savige, 1965 Program Chairman. He also invited suggestions for an editor for the proposed volume of non-fiction prose. Some changes, directed toward more flexibility in electing future chairmen and secretaries of the group, have been proposed.

Information and Requests for Help
- John M. Robson, Associate Editor of the Collected Works of J. S. Mill and Professor at Victoria College, Toronto, Canada, is considering publication of a Mill Newsletter. It would contain news of new and forthcoming books, work in progress, notes and queries, and reviews. Attention would be given to related matters—for example, the Bentham edition, late-nineteenth-century utilitarianism, the Chadwick papers, and so forth. Another useful feature might be a cumulative and continuing bibliography of writings on Mill. Two or more issues a year are contemplated. Professor Robson is interested in receiving any news, including work underway, recent publications, queries, and so forth.

- Professors Karl Beckson and John M. Musso, of the University of Toronto, are editing the letters of Arthur Symons and would appreciate aid in locating material.

- Mr. Gordon Pitts, Editor of Victorian Poetry, advises that preparations for an edition of Browning are underway at Ohio University Press. The text, including the prose, will appear in seven volumes and will record chief variants. Notes and annotations will be issued separately for convenience of use and to facilitate updating. The work is under the general editorship of Bonnie A. King, Jr., the other editors to be Park Honan, Morse Fickham, and Gordon Pitts.

- Images of Eternity, by Professor James Beniger, is now available in paperback from Southern Illinois University Press, at $2.50.

- Mrs. Monica Manuhatem, Hackespottagatan 23, Gothenburg, Sweden, is interested in ascertaining information about Meredith: what works were published in 1964 and 1965, what research on Meredith was in progress 1963-65, Meredithian dissertations?
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