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Cover Illustration: Lissa Conradi, "Rose Bush," intaglio 1978. This intaglio was drawn with an etching needle through a ground on a zinc plate, a printmaking process common in the Victorian era.

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George Eliot and the Victorian "Historic Imagination"

Brian Rosenberg

It happens on occasion that a seemingly insignificant
literary work—a bit of correspondence, or an entry in a
journal—articulates better than more deliberately ambici-
ous studies the spirit of an age or the central idea of an
intellectual movement. Keats’ famous letter to his
brothers, for instance, its definition of negative capability
uncomfortably paired with a discussion of table manners,
manages to be both original and representative, capturing
in a single elusive phrase the widespread Romantic con-
cern with objectivity. Think too of Swift’s letters to Sir
Walter Raleigh, or Gide’s “Journal of Les Faux-
Mannequins.” Significant in a similar way I believe, is a
short notebook entry made by George Eliot sometime
between 1872 and 1879, entitled by the author “Historic
Imagination.”

To call George Eliot representative is not to say any-
thing new, one of the commonplacest of Eliot criticism
being that her intellectual and artistic development epit-
omizes the most decided trends of the nineteenth century.
The brief note on “Historic Imagination,” however, is
almost uniquely concentrated, enlightening, and paradigm-
atic, even for a writer so centrally located as Eliot. Its
subject—the effective incorporation of history into art—
preoccupied Victorian writers as it has preoccupied no
others before or since; its argument echoes and crystal-
izes many of the major theoretical statements of four
decades; and its application extends from fiction to
poetry, social criticism, and other kinds of historical
recreation. Understand these fifteen sentences and we
understand much about what writers like Eliot, Carlyle,
Ruskin, Dickens, and Browning were trying repeatedly to
accomplish.

These are large claims, especially for a fragment that is
less a coherent argument than a series of repetitions and
refutations gradually giving force to a few central ideas.
A brief summary of these ideas, however, will begin to
show how thoroughly they are the products of the time:
(1) The writing of history is extremely, perhaps uniquely
important.
(2) This writing should be neither completely factual nor
completely imaginary, but somehow should combine
concrete facts with the artist’s shaping vision.
(3) Concrete facts should range in scale from the most
mundane to the most extraordinary, bringing together in
historical writing a rigorous particularity and an aware-
ness of what separates the typical.
(4) Imaginative recreation of historical material should
draw from it not meaning—cultural, psychological, spiri-
tual—which transcends the specific historical moment
and applies as well to other places and times. Understand-
ning history, that is, should allow us to see in the past the
seeds of the present and future.
(5) This intimate relationship between past and present
must inevitably affect the style and structure of imagin-
ative historical writing.
(6) Only the heroic figure—frequently the artist—can
see within his or her own time the transcendent, ahistor-
ical meaning.

These assertions, admittedly simplified versions of Eliot’s
own, derive in part from her comprehensive reading of
contemporary artistic and theoretical treatments of history.
Though no full consideration of Eliot’s thought can afford
to ignore Continental writers like Comte, Feuerbach, and
Hegel, I wish to focus here specifically on her relation to
nineteenth-century English historiography. Especially
relevant, in ways I hope to show, are Carlyle’s historical
writings, particularly the essays of the early eighteenth
tenities, Ruskin’s Stones of Venice and Seven Lamps of
Architecture, Dickens’s historical novels Barnaby Rudge
and A Tale of Two Cities, Elizabeth Barrett Browning’s
Aurora Leigh, and Robert Browning’s The Ring and the
Book. This is by no means an exhaustive list of Eliot’s
English sources and influences, but it does begin to
suggest their immense variety and importance.

The first three sentences of “Historic Imagination”
develop most of the ideas I have outlined:

The exercise of a variation might rise in historical writing
seems to be capable of a development that might help the judge-
ment greatly with regard to present and future events. By
variation imagination, I mean the working out in detail of the
narrative form by which a political or social change was reached,
using all extant evidence and supplying deficiencies by careful
analogical creation. How triumphs of opinion originally sprang
—how institutions arose—what were the conditions of new
inventions, discoveries, or theoretical conceptions—what circum-
stances affecting individual lots are standard on the
death of long-established systems—all these great elements of
history requires the illumination of special imaginative treatment.

The primary English source of Eliot’s, and the age’s, great
interest in the “grand elements of history” is undeniably
Thomas Carlyle, worshipped by Ruskin, admired by
Dickens, judged by Eliot the most influential writer of his
time.3 History had of course been an important subject for

1 The entry was originally published in Essays and Lectures from a
Note-Book, ed. Churce and Leavis (1894). All references here are to
the version reprinted in Essays of George Eliot, ed. Thomas
2 Lewis, in the preface to his volume, dates the entries in “Leaves
from a Note Book” as spanning Eliot’s lifetime, between
the appearance of Old Mr. Unity (1871) and Theophrastus Such
(1877). "Historic Imagination" is the fourth of twelve entries.
3 Eliot writes that “there is hardly a superior or native mind of this
generation that has not been modified by Carlyle’s writings.” In
"Thomas Carlyle" (1850), See Essays of George Eliot, pp. 466-467.

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the artist before Carlyle—the novels of Scott tell us that—but it has not yet been properly appreciated as it is the most meaningful subject of all. Between 1830 and 1833 Carlyle published in Fraser’s Magazine “On History,” “On Biography,” and “On History After,” defining in some detail the theory and practice of historical writing and filtering into English thought the ideas of several influential German predecessors. “History,” he asserts, “is not only the finest study, but the only one that includes all others whatsoever.” It is “lost at the root of all science” and is “the first distinct product of Man’s spiritual nature; his earliest expression of what can be called Thought.” Among the many disciples of Carlyle was Ruskin, who in 1848 echoed a number of Carlyle’s strictures in “The Lamp of Memory,” the chapter of The Seven Lamps devoted in part to an analysis of “Historical” architecture. One of the advantages of Gothic is that it “admits of a richness of record altogether unlimited”; the absence of such record “is not slight, no consequenceless evil: it is ominous, infectious, second of other faults and misfortunes.” Less melodramatic by nature, Carlyle or Ruskin, Eliot nevertheless shares their belief in the virtue of historical picturing.

The exhortation to combine fact and imagination in historical writing dominates the early portion of Eliot’s fragment. Its title already suggests a mixture of the real (“Historic”) and the fictitious (“Imagination”), as well as in the pairing of “extant evidence” with “analogical creation” and “elements of history” with “imaginative treatment.” Here the influence of her contemporaries is most apparent. Carlyle distinguishes the historical Artist, able to “inform and enable,” from the Artisan who labors “Mechanically.”; Ruskin, in The Stones of Venice, produces the Gothic buildings for their study, and ability to unite fact with design; and in the prefaces to Barnaby Rudge and A Tale of Two Cities Dickens specifically defines his enterprise as the combination of verifiable truth and artistic vision.11 Browning above all describes in detail the artist’s ability to fuse fiction and historical accuracy. The Ring and the Book, like “Historic Imagination,” embodies in its title the opposite extremes of fancy and fact. The Book is “fancier fact, the documents indeed.”12 what Eliot calls the “extant evidence,” which fancy birds and forms into art, as the goldsmith fashion the ring from the shapeless rod. The result is “Prime nature with an added artistry.”13 The “one way possible of speaking truth.”14 There is, so far as I can tell, no substantial difference between Browning’s statement and Eliot’s. Few to ten years later, that the “elements of history require the illumination of special imaginative treatment.” In both cases imagination is seen not merely as a means of filling in gaps in historical record, but as the only available way of bringing life and relevance to inert factual material.

The historical “elements” Eliot identifies range from the extraordinary to the commonplace, from the “conditions of great inventions, discoveries, or theoretical conceptions” to the “circumstances affecting individual lots.” Victorian historians in general often combine a Carlylean interest in great men or great movements with a Wordsworthian interest in the details of everyday life: in fact, Eliot would argue, the two are inseparable since the common circumstances and grand inventions thoroughly infiltrate and affect one another. Carlyle himself recognized this as early as 1830 though he seems, in his later historical writings, frequently to forget it; “he who sees no world but that of courts and camps,” he argues, “and writes only how soldiers were drilled and shot, and how this ministerialer enemy was conquered other and then guided, or at least held, something which he called the nature of Government . . . will speak a more or less instructive History; but will no longer be called a Historian.”15

Subsequent writers go even further in their desire to abandon the grand strokes and camps. Ruskin argues that “it is well to have,” in both poetry and architecture, “not only what men have thought and felt, but what their hands have handled, and their strength wrought, and their eyes beheld, all the days of their life.”16 If this is not quite Elizabeth Browning’s “faint experience of the common man,”17 it is certainly Robert Browning’s “pure crude fact—Secreted from man’s life.”18 sufficient which the historical consideration of grand ideas and movements could have no firm foundation. This desire to unite the monumental and the mundane, best known to the Victorians from the histories of Scott and Macaulay, as well as the desire to unite historical fact and artistic vision, leads to works depicting both Savonarola and Romola, Mirabeau and Chustel the wine-merchant, Dope Francesco Foscarì and the stone-carvers of the Ducal Palace, Pope Innocent XII and Poempia, Lord George Gordon and Barnaby Rudge. The great man who lived and the humble one who might have are, for Eliot and others, equally necessary elements in any accurate historical picture.

Historical accuracy is important, Eliot writes, because

7. The Seven Lamps of Architecture, p. 171.
9. See also The Seven Lamps, p. 174.
11. The Ring and the Book, I, 141.
15. The Seven Lamps of Architecture, p. 169.
it "might help the judgement greatly with regard to present and future events." Again she is drawing on an old idea that was given special force in the middle years of the nineteenth century. Historicism from Herodotus to Hume have recognized that history could be, in Carlyle's words, a "Schoolmistress," but none had impressed us so vehemently as Carlyle to "search more and more into the Past," let us explore it, as he too, in "Fields of Knowledge." by whose light alone, consciously or unconsciously, employed, can the Present and Future be interpreted or gauged. We study history not merely to learn lessons or establish connections, but to make apparent continuities that already exist on some deeper level, to unite ourselves in "clear conscious relations" to the past as in "true unconscious relations" we are already united.14 History, more Prophet than Schoolmistress, should not merely instruct the intelligence but should, in Eliot's words, "instruct the imagination in true compassion."15 Precisely what this comparison should teach us varies to some extent from author to author; for Carlyle, who treated history as a moral scripture, and for the Ruskin of the eighteen-fifties, the lesson is largely religious and derives from the omnipresence of God in the world; for Dickens, Browning, and Eliot it is more secular but similarly moral and universal. None of these authors, I should emphasize, believes naively that human nature remains unchanged through the centuries — Carlyle writes that the "inward condition of Life . . . is the same in no two ages"16 — but all believe that some transient meaning is embedded in historical record.

The form historical instruction was most often to take in the Victorian Age became clear with the publication in 1836 of Pugin’s Contrasts and six years later of Carlyle’s Past and Present. These two juxtapositions of medieval history and timely social criticism helped popularize the technique of invoking awareness of present conditions into a partially historical work and helped generate, among other things, the numerous, comparative openings of The Stones of Venice and A Tale of Two Cities. Ruskin, remember, likens the emergence of ancient Tyre and Renaissance Venice to the present existence of England, and uses the destruction of the first two as an admonition to the third.22 Dickens compares the contradictory conditions in France before the Revolution to the prevailing conditions in the English Empire at mid-century.23 Neither writer allows these connections to emerge gradually from the text, but makes them overtly and forcefully in the initial paragraph. Immediate historical linkings of this kind make "consciousness" at the very start those "dumb unconscious" but undeniable connections earlier noted by Carlyle.

Several writers of the period emphasize historical continuity by emphasizing the unchangeability of the surrounding physical world. The prose map of Europe with which Ruskin begins "The Nature of Gothic" defines symbolically the Gothic spirit and embodies its permanence in the permanence of the mountains and lakes. Eliot begins Romola with her own prose map of the Caucasus and the "snowy Alpine Ridges"24 which seems to echo Ruskin and underscores even more clearly the continuity between present and past. And Browning, who ends The Ring and the Book by "Laying our England to his Italy,"25 visits in Book I the roads, rivers, and hills which, nearly two centuries earlier, had formed the backdrop for his story, suggesting through their continued presence its continued moral significance. Like Ruskin and Eliot, he begins by externalizing and thereby clarifying those connections between past and present which "might help the judgement greatly."26 I should add that for Eliot, and to a lesser extent for his contemporaries, ignorance of the past means not only ignorance of the present and future but confusion about personal identity and motive. Since we are almost literally created by the past, the study of history is in part the study of ourselves and should teach us both what we are and what we are meant to do in any given circumstance. Maggie Tulliver is, in this light, setting the part of Eliot's supreme historian when she draws strength from the past to refute Stephen Guest, just as Browning's Guido Franceschi is playing the historian when he explains himself in his stunning second monologue.

In the fourth sentence of the notebook entry Eliot discusses the aesthetic implications of various imaginational freedom. But effective truth in this application of art requires freedom from the vulgar convention of conventional plot, which is become hardly of higher influence than imaginative representation does a detailed order for a picture text by a rich grocer to an emi- nent picture — selecting a certain portion of his earnings to a metal score, another to a fashionable gossip, with a request for a murder in the middle distance, and a little comedy to relieve it.27 This demand for freedom from conventional plot, perhaps explaining the unconventional plot of Romola, reflects the prevailing belief that imagination must do more than merely adorn a basically factual narrative, that to be effective it must organize and respond to the demands of the historical material. Macaulay, a more traditional historian than any that far discussed, states in his "Essay on History" that "a perfect historian must possess an imagination sufficiently powerful to make his narrative affecting and picturesque."28 R. G. Collingwood, in his...

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17. "On History," p. 82.
24. The Ring and the Book, XII, 470.
own essay on "The Historical Imagination," objects as Eliot would that "this is to underestimate the part played
by the historical imagination, which is properly not
ornamental but structural. Without it the historian
would have no incentive to labor." 38 "Structural" imagination,
with which Macaulay, despite his pronouncements, was
generously endowed, leads Browning to abandon conven-
tional plot in The Ring and the Book, where the same story
is told ten times and the ending revealed halfway through
the first book. Carlyle to abandon traditional historical
tone and person in The French Revolution and move
regularly from the past to the present and from third to
first-person plural, even Dickens to move from "it" to
"we" in the opening paragraph of A Tale of Two Cities
and to describe the Manettes' climatic escape from Paris in
the first person and the present tense. 39 To write imagi-
native history that brings the past alive in the present
requires freedom from the "evil genius of stylistic
and structural restrictions, freedom to find the voice and
form most appropriate for the visualization of pure, crude
fact. All the writers I have mentioned, including Eliot, of
course rely frequently on conventions of style and plot,
but this only emphasizes more strongly the importance
of their occasional, radical departures.
Eliot continues:

For what of such real, minute vision of how changes come about
in the past, we fall back on relatively inaccurate estimates of
actual movements, combining in the present what we believe
in the past; and pronouncing impossible processes that have been
repeated again and again in historical progression of the very
system under which we live. A false kind of civilization shuts out
our perception of the meaning in words when they relate to past
events which have had a fruitful issue, for lack of connection
no longer imagine the history of the very phrases which
in other associations are conceptual. 40

Again, "real, minute" vision of the past should lead to
sharper perception of the present and future. But such
vision, in Eliot's own work, is far from available to every-
one. In Romola, an even fuller attempt than Middlemarch
at recreating an actual movement in the past, Eliot limits
vision which transcends the purely temporal and empirical
to Savannah and Ramola, both characters of heroic
spiritual or moral nature. With these two she would
include, I believe, the genuine artist, whose sight, aided by
the "illumination of" special" imagination, also passes
beyond the empirical fact. The visual metaphor, suggested
above by the words "vision," "perception," and
"image," ties Eliot not only to traditional religious
imagery but to a number of Victorian predecessors, a
Carlylean hero like Mirabeau, for instance, "did before all
things see, with that clear flashing vision, into what was,
into what existed as fact." 41 Sidney Carton, perceiving
just before his death the implications of the historic
moment, repeats the word "not" fifteen times in a page
without once using it literally. For Ruskin, it is "the far
sight . . . that, above all other attributes, separate[s] man
from man, and separate[s] man from animal, and make[s]
man a being instead of a mere animal, and give[s] to
Pompeii, and the Pope, the heroic characters in The Ring
and the Book, all "reach into the dark." 42 to see what
cannot be empirically proven and therefore what eludes
popular institutions and opinion. And Elizabeth Browning,
who writes in Aurora Leigh that "poets should/ Exert a
double vision," 43 ends by having her heroine/actress call
"my dear sight" by a main literally
blind and urge to "Gaze on, with insent vision toward
the sun." 44 In every case there is the suggestion that the
hero and the artist alone have the ability to see, within
their own time, the transcendent, historical meaning.
Eliot ends her notebook entry, finally, with two
emphatic, complex, and richly suggestive sentences that
state its central ideas:

I was something different than the abstract
imagination which
belong to mount history from a doctrinal point of view, and
something different than the abstract picturesqueness of
ordinary historical fiction. I want brief, severely conscious
reconstructions, in their concrete incidence, of pregnant
movements in the past. 45

She rejects both "grave history" and "ordinary historical
fiction," rejecting the incompatibility of extremes of
fact or theory without imagination and imagination
without carefully investigated fact. "Schemed
picturesqueness," as much a "parole" as the
beauty for Eliot as for Ruskin, 46 she would associate with novelists
like Scott, the established standard for writers of historical
fiction and still a favorite of Eliot's, and Dickens, who
voices in the preface to A Tale of Two Cities his desire to be
"popular and picturesque." 47 "Abstract treatment"
belongs to the philosophers and traditional historians. In
the grey area between these poles lie, to varying degrees,
most of the historical works I have discussed as well as
Eliot's real historical form. That art form should be
"severely conscientious" and "concrete," that is,
thoughly grounded in fact, even while it remains a
"briefer" reproduction, that is, concentrated and organized
by the artist's creative vision. It should deal with
"pregnant" movements, movements that give birth to
subsequent events and ideas that bear importantly on
the present and future.

It would be convenient if Eliot's note on "Historic
Imagination" illuminated what is best in her own fiction,
but clearly that is not the case. In Ramola, her fullest
attempt at historical recreation, she does indeed attempt

38. TheSevenLamps ofArchitecture,p.17h.
43. TheSevenLamps ofArchitecture,p.179.
44. A Tale of Two Cities,p. 29.
The Victorian Historical Sense and Modernism

Louis Menand

Literary modernism advertised itself— one might even say invented itself— as a reaction against the literary traditions of the nineteenth century. We now understand this to have been a kind of strategy, though a strategy that was pursued for different, not always literary, purposes by different writers and critics of the Modernist period, and we no longer take those writers and critics at their word when we read of their complete rejection of the values and traditions of the previous century. It is accepted today that Modernism did not spring full-blown from the heads of Ezra Pound and T. S. Eliot, or, for that matter, Remy de Gourmont. We take the stridency of the Modernists’ reaction against British literature of the previous century as a signal of the strength, even of the falsity, of the connection between the two traditions. What I would like to suggest is that such a falsity, I would like to suggest that the very idea of Modernism— the idea of a cultural movement that could be thought of as Modernistic— was an idea predicated on the nineteenth century’s own imagination of itself, which is to say, on the nineteenth century’s imagination of history. Or to put it another way, I want to argue that Modernism’s sense of its own historical identity was derived from and inexorably bound up with the Victorian sense of history. I have, necessarily, to cover a good deal of ground in a fairly superficial manner, but I have tried to lend some degree of specificity to my argument by emphasizing the work of two writers who have increasingly been thought of as standing in an important relation to each other, Alfred Tennyson and T. S. Eliot.

The imagination of history implies the imagination of oneself in relation to that history; imagining the past is a way of imagining oneself. The “spirit of the age” is in some sense a novel expression,” wrote the young John Stuart Mill in 1831. “I do not believe that it is to be met with in any work exceeding fifty years in antiquity. The idea of comparing one’s own age with former ages, or with our notions of those which are yet to come, had occurred to philosophers; but it never before was itself the dominant idea of any age.” Still in the stage of his enthusiasm for the optimistic science of Utilitarianism, Mill concluded the fifth of his essays on “The Spirit of the Age” with the hopeful remark that he and his contemporaries were probably headed toward a “healthier state,” and promised to “rescue my subject as early as possible after the passing of the Reform Bill.” This fifth essay was the last.

Such optimism was not restricted to those Victorians whose faith lay in liberal principles. Two years before Mill’s essay in the Westminster Review had written for the Edinburgh Review a piece called “Signs of the Times,” which, though hedged about with transcendental doubts, ended with an expression of hope: “indications do we see in other countries and in our own, signs infinitely cheering to us, that Mechanism is not always to be our hard taskmaster, but one day to be our pliant, administering servant, that a new and brighter spiritual era is slowly evolving for all men.”

In October 1833, shortly after these meditations on the progress of the century, Alfred Tennyson learned of the death of his friend Arthur Hallam. Tennyson’s grief, though famous, was not wholly inconsolable. By the end of the year he had written or sketched out: “The Two Voices,” “Ulysses,” “St. Simon Stylites,” “St. Agnes,” “The Beggar Maid,” “Tithonus” (the early version of “Tithonus”), and part of “In Memoriam,” and he had begun what was eventually to be the last of the Idylls of the King, the “Morte d’Arthur”: in short, a career.

60. Mill, pp. 93-94.
What had happened, apart from some interesting evidence for speculation about the link between emotional stress and creativity, was that Tennyson had found his true poetic muse, and almost overnight he had changed from an accomplished and minor disciple of Keats into the major poetic voice of his time. The mode was the elegy: Tennyson wrote in a great variety of forms, but the dominant mode is almost always the elegiac. It is the appropriate note for the century; it was as the subjects of elegies that the great Victorians liked to think of themselves.

The form of the elegy is a familiar one: the speaker stands in the present moment and contemplates someone (or, perhaps, something) that is now dead. It is customary to say that the emphasis is on part of the object of the speaker’s meditations—Edward King or Arthur Hallam—and in part on the speaker himself as he was in the past—the young Milton or the young Tennyson. In Memoriam is, of course, the classic elegy of the Victorian period, but Tennyson was adept at manipulating the relation between speaker and subject: in “Ulysses,” for instance, the figure of Hallam has been distanced and becomes “the great Achilles, whom we knew,” while the drama centers on the speaker (Ulysses/Tennyson) and his relation to his past self. In the “Morte d’Arthur,” the elegist becomes a character in the poem itself. This poem was literally written between sections of In Memoriam in Tennyson’s manuscript book. Here is its ending:

Long since Sir Bedivere
Slew many marvels, all the hall
Looked on black dusk against the verge of dawn.
And on the morn the waiting died away.*

The figure of Sir Bedivere does a sort of double duty here, for he has a status as a historical figure, a contemporary of King Arthur, but also one as our condensation: he represents Tennyson and through him Tennyson’s readers as he watches either Hallam or the idealism of medieval chivalry, depending on our reading of the poem, recede into the past. It is appropriate that the poem should end with the disappearance of the brave bearing Arthur over the horizon for once the grandeur of Arthur has ceased to reflect on him, as light reflects on objects and so defines them, Bedivere is nothing.

What is interesting about this 1833 version of the “Morte d’Arthur” is that it is described, in the same that surrounds the poem, as only the eleventh of the twelve books on Arthur that the poet, Everard Hall, had written and attempted to destroy. What was meant to follow? The return of Arthur? The establishment of a new order? Certainly some token of renewal is implied, some hope for the post-Arthurian world, and in this Tennyson’s poem resembles those essays of the same period by Mill and Carlyle with their suggestions of the propriety of optimism.

But when the “Morte d’Arthur” was used again, in 1869, as “The Passing of Arthur,” it became not the eleventh but the twelfth book of the Idylls of the King. As if to acknowledge his new perspective on the poem, Tennyson added twenty-nine lines at the end that, though they seem to offer a hint of the future, actually close off the poem completely. The waiting has died away, but still Bedivere clings to the hill for a sight of the large, and this time like Tennyson himself reflecting on his own poetry and its predecessor of 1834, again he hesitates, or the echo of a cry.

Throw once more the mallow about, and chain
Even to the highest he could climb, and saw
Stealing his eyes beneath search of hope.
Or though he saw, the light that bare the King,
Downs that long water opening on the deep
Somewhere far off, past an wonder, and so
From loss to love and vanish into light.
And the new sun rose bringing the new year.

What has happened is that the King, who throughout the poem has been identified as the sun, has become merged with his symbol, so that as Arthur "sets," so to speak, a new sun, though it is only the real, literal sun of the nineteenth century, rises in its place. But there is to be no thirteenth book; a notion of history as progress has been replaced by a notion of history as a cycle. Civilization, as Tennyson’s Morte reiterates the theme of letting go, rise carrying with them the seeds of their fall, in their destruction are the germs of the new order.

This image of Bedivere on the hill, watching over a landscape that has become empty, I take to be the representative image not only of Tennyson’s poetry, from "Mariana" onward, but of the Victorian writer’s relation to the past generally: "The first of the leading peculiarities of the present age," John Stuart Mill had written, "is, that it is an age of transition." The Victorian writer stood on Bedivere’s hill, straining for a glimpse of the past he might use to orient himself in the iron time. His identity was the reflection of the past moment; left in the present, he was a cipher, Matthew Arnold before the Grenade Chartist, John Ruskin before St. Mark’s or almost anywhere; and when the future turned out to be characterized by the same formlessness, the same homelessness, as the present, the result was frequently bitterness and a sense of betrayal.

"All ages are ages of transition," grumbled Tennyson in 1857, more than fifty years after Mill’s announce, "but this is an awful moment of transition . . . I tried in my ‘Idylls’ to teach men these things, and the need of the

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8. Mill, p. 6: Mill is, of course, referring to a political, not explicitly a cultural, state of affairs. His essay was a response to the important passage of the First Reform Bill. There is, nevertheless, an implication about the social culture in Mill’s remark, just as there are distinct political implications in the remarks of Tennyson and Eliot quoted later on.
Ideal. But I feel sometimes as if my life had been a very useless life. There would have been many in 1887 to agree with this self-assessment. Tennyson’s death in 1892 surprised us,” said Oscar Wilde. “We had not thought he was still alive.” This remark, like most of Wilde’s, is two-edged, revealing both the innocence with which the writer of the Nineties viewed his predecessor and the cavalier despair with which he acknowledged the weight of their presence: Tennyson’s position in the literary tradition was so dominant that it befuddled a dead rather than a living poet. The whole idea of a decadence involves—and Wilde’s remark is a perfect example of this—an agreement about one’s place and the place of one’s contemporaries in the historical process. A decadent writer, when he thought of himself as a decadent, as many did, had no practical use for history or for tradition, since he chose to be totally defined by them. His chosen role is to act as the object of history’s lesson: he enacts the alienation and the loneliness, the sense of an ending, that the past has burdened him with—but he does not seek to change it, only to show how perverse it can become. This state of affairs cannot last very long, for what does a generation that has a decadence for its heritage build upon?

“The decadence is far decayed,” wrote T. S. Eliot in 1917. “Time has left us many things, but among those it has taken away we may hope to count A Rebours, and the Debatables, and the writings of miscellaneous prose poets.” “Decadence,” for Eliot in the years of the First World War was a form that could be used to describe the whole of the Victorian tradition. “[The generation after 1830],” he wrote in 1919, “preferred to form itself upon a decadence, though a decadence of genius; Wordsworth; and upon an immaturity, though an immaturity of genius; Keats and Shelley; and the development of English literature was retarded.” And he wrote elsewhere: “Consciously the Victorian period is anti-professional. Carlyle as an historian, Ruskin as an economist; Tennyson, who could write such good prose as the St. John’s episode, and considered himself a kindly but penetrating satirist; George Eliot; who could write Amos Barton; and steadily degenerate. Decadence in art is caused by mixed motives. The art of the Victorians is spoiled by mixed motives, and Oscar Wilde, finally added ingredients to the mixture which made it a ludicrous emetic.”

These attacks by Eliot on the Victorians were joined, of course, by his fellow contributors to the Yellow and the Afternoon, by Pound, Wyndham Lewis, T. E. Hulme, various members of the Bloomsbury circle, and so on. But in this same period, Eliot was writing poetry that patterned itself after a characteristic Victorian mode. Edmund Wilson noticed this in Ariel’s Guide, though, because of that work’s prefabricated version of literary history, he failed to perceive its true lineage. Eliot’s quatrains poems—“Buchwald with a Aaukler: Bleistein with a Cigar,” “A Cooking Egg,” the beautiful poems—are based on a contrast of the past with the second present. The development of this theme of past versus present in modern literature Wilson attributed to Flaubert. But if we look for a programmatic application of it as a method for making a criticism of life, we find it not only in Flaubert but at the heart of Victorian writing and thought. From A. W. Pugin’s Contrasts in 1836 to the magnificence of Carlyle’s Past and Present to George Eliot’s historical novel Middlemarch to Ruskin’s passionate history The Stones of Venice and his defense of the Gothic, the Victorians constantly wrote about contemporary life by holding up to it the picture of a noble, or at least a more culturally organic, era. The contrast and its associated nostalgia informs the Idylls of the King, Arnold’s “The Scholar-Gipsy,” the spirit of the Oxford Movement. And its persistence in the English tradition explains much about Modernist thought, not least its reactionary temper. Yet this mode of understanding one’s own time by taking the perspective of a Bentley’s Last Effort effect, an effect seen clearly in the work that took the method to its extreme. The Waste Land is a poem in which the speaker of the elegy, the subject, has become lost in the rubble of fragments of history. The mirror he looks into, the mirror of the past, reflects not a single image of the present moment but a fractured and distorted heap of voices, images, quotations. The poet’s voice has disappeared, as Tennyson’s Beloved foretold, in the chaos of the present moment.

What the Modernists learned from the Victorian experience, what they saved from the futilities of the decadents, was that one might invent one’s own past, one’s own tradition. The very idea of a “modern” literature depended upon such an assumption, and it could only happen in an age when writers still felt in a powerful way what Nietzsche called the nineteenth century’s “sixth sense”: the historical sense.” That is, what the Modernists shared with their Victorian predecessors was an acute self-consciousness about their position in the historical process. The great revolution undertaken by the Modernists was the abandonment of the received tradition, and, simultaneously, the institution of traditions of their own devising (something Pater perhaps had taught them how to do). Thus, in the three famous essays on the metaphysical poets in Homage to John Dryden, Eliot attacked the poetic tradition of the nineteenth century as escapist and at the same time established a new line based on Dante, the seventeenth-century metaphysical poets, and the French Symbolists. Pound had undertaken the same sort of enterprise in his criticism, and in the Cavalcas he virtually ransacked history for historical models.

12. T. S. Eliot, “Professional, Or,” The Egoist, i (August 1910), 44.
Homer, Maiastega, John Adams, and Confucius are among his King Arthur's.

The cultural tradition has been trying to suggest existed in the period between roughly 1830 and 1930 is one that partakes of a common assumption about the relation between the past and the present: I have tried to show how that manner of perceiving the relation between oneself and one's imagination of history led, by an inner logic of its own, to the idea that the actuality of a distance and then a modernism, and that the experimentation with the past carried on by Modernist writers led, though they had not intended it to, to a breakdown of the historical sense. For what distinguishes this period of 1830 to 1930 from our own, I suggest, is precisely our lack of such a sense. Lionel Trilling, in a famous article directed against the ahistorical methodology of the New Criticism, wrote in 1943 that critics were neglecting a real way of experiencing literature when they failed to take into account our sense of its pastness; but underlying his admonition there lay the fear that his contemporaries had indeed lost that sixth sense of which Nietzsche spoke: "And since there never was a time when this instinct for dividing— and 'quickly'— the order of rank of cultural expressions was so much needed, our growing estrangement from history must be understood as the sign of our desperation." This was a problem that continued to worry Trilling, and he returned to it thirty years later in the final chapter of *Secrecy and Authenticity*, where he speaks of the contemporary disillusionment with the very idea of history.

Trilling was, I would suggest, right about this disillusionment: it is something we have learned from Modernism. In order to have faith in the past, no matter how intractable the present moment may seem for art, one must believe that its history can be written. One of the reasons that nineteenth- and early twentieth-century writers turned to the past for their themes and settings was that the present was understood to be too chaotic, too mundane, too vulgar, or too "eventless" for art. The Modernists solved this problem by halves: half of *Ulysses* is Homer, half of *The Waste Land* is *The Golden Bough*. But where one sees history to be first something that might be invented and re-invented and then something that might be a complete if necessary fiction, one loses any faith in the idea that the past can teach us something that the present cannot; the past becomes the weapons our contemporaries use against us and the lies our fathers told us.

The signal, for me, that we have lost that historical sense is that we have not any name for our own moment.

We call the culture of the last thirty or forty years "contemporary" or "post-Modern" or even, for those who take the long view of these things, "post-Romantic" or "post-humanist," but these are ways of avoiding placing ourselves within the limits of any historical identity. We are, perhaps, "post-movement," or at any rate "post-cultural movement." I am not at all sure that this is a bad state of affairs for art to find itself in. But this problem of identity is no doubt one that will someday be settled for us. For that, as a character says in a Tom Stoppard play, is why we have these conferences.

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Carlyle's Incidental Montage:
The Guises and the Theory of Transcendent Historicism

Rodger L. Tarr

That Carlyle's theories of history have, for more than a century, been the subject of considered and ill-considered debate seems a minor point to make. In fact, the name Thomas Carlyle has become synonymous with history—history, that is, which finds its methodological impetus somewhere between the constraints of Calvinism and the freedoms of Romanticism. Carlyle is an enigma in the annals of historical consciousness. He creates history where he records it. He prophesies, explicates, even threatens; and he is seldom if ever objective. His method is manipulative; and his object is to dovetail fact into personal crescendo. His historical conscience is tinted. It is indifferent to the classicism of Gibbon; it abhors the plodding of Maccabi; yet, paradoxically, it embraces the

mis-devotion of Saint Simon, and argues the orthodoxy of biblical revelation. Carlyle's notions of history inverse the dialectical, as he shoulders terror—Biblical terror—at the always impending apocalypse. Indeed, his conflation, *The French Revolution*, left him without peers.

The editorial Mill was stunned into direct quotation; the anonymous Thackeray was pleased by its uniqueness; and the emerging Emerson was left to say that a new Homer had been born. But, as quickly as the cannons had announced the birth of a new advocate of history, they lapsed into silence, to recharge briefly for Oliver Cromwell, and still later for Frederick the Great, and Early Kings of Norway. Modernity has done little to alterate the sounds of silence. Carlyle as historian remains a mean

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tain as yet unexplored.

There are many reasons for this failure of the modern to correct and to elucidate. Certainly, primary among them is the want of a holograph copy. In the case of *The French Revolution* only Exquemelin ever wrote; in that of Oliver Cromwell only part of the blueprint has survived; and in the case of Frederick the Great literally thousands of pages of text, notes, and proofs leave even the heroic hand-held, yet are scattered and is more reconstructive than restorative. However, there is the recently discovered *The Guises*, a completed history which, I believe, provides us with some answers regarding Carlyle's methods; or, at the very least, it tells us a great deal about the disposition of Carlyle's historical imagination in the year of its composition 1835.

*The Guises*, ostensibly a history of France from the middle ages through the seventeenth century, is more remarkable for its failings than for its successes. Clearly, it seems written to sublimate fact to fabrication. It is more of a discourse on the art of history than a record of history itself. In the end it becomes a forum for Carlyle's theory (that history is shaped not evolved, that it is the incidental, not the monumental which sugars events, what George Eliot was late to call those nameless "unhistoric acts" which shape our destinies. If Carlyle had intended monument, he surely would have chosen the Queen Mother and sometimes Regent, Catherine de Medicis. Instead he chose those incidential to the throne, those whose unhistoric acts were nevertheless responsible for the course of western history. They were la maison de Guise. Descendants from Chartres, pretenders to the throne, the family of Guise was at the pinnacle of power in the French Renaissance. They were at once the most feared and the most beloved family in France. Warriors, statesmen, cardinals of Catholicism, they fought to the end to deny Huguenotism a place in French life. Yet, with the whole canvas of France before him, a subject of the immensity which historians plead for, Carlyle retreats. His subject is incident, his object truth. His is a Hebraistic dance through the Hellenistic splendor of Renaissance France. He dismisses the intriguers of court, he seems uninterested in the ramifications of Trent, he wanders aimlessly through the Wars of Religion. His subject is man, not men. His story is, in his own words, "cold blood."

Carlyle's method in *The Guises*, as elsewhere, is to brandish, to withhold the thrust long enough for the reader to see the blade of his imagination. He relies upon fact, but only as an immediate vehicle to propel as beyond it. Carlyle's method is literally to use his historical imagination to frustrate phenomenon and to make it subordinate to prophecy. His movement through history is both linear and cyclical. It is Coleridgean. Yet Carlyle's historical manner allows him to accomplish what Coleridge would not have attempted, the shaping of the transcendent in the form of history. Carlyle's narrative method, like Chaucer's, works from incident to character to conclusion. He never loses sight of the fact that it is the pilgrim, literal man, who gives reason to incident and purpose to conclusion. This linear promissio allows for the paradoxical level of cyclical intrusion, a point where Carlyle, the subjective pilgrim, becomes the objective narrator, and Carlyle, the objective narrator, becomes the subjective pilgrim. We are reminded of his theory that "Narrative is linear; Action is solid."

One of the early, and most poignant, passages from *The Guises* is a case and point for Carlyle's simultaneous linear and concentric methods. It demonstrates not only the movement from incident to character to conclusion, it is an excellent example of how Carlyle takes phenomenon and shapes it into history. After recording the factual detail of James V of Scotland and his place in the Guise realm, Carlyle turns to James's disastrous defeat at Solway Moss and ends with this elliptical account of the King's death:

"Poor James was now but 30 when he died. We know not what he made, nor a successful man at all, poor man, nor wise as it might have been, but he lived to crown the age. He would not build a house, but has been a builder of dynasties. He says to him, Linda red, "I am King. And the majesty, — they all followed him as if edged by rope drawn by sheer force, and not away at the first hint of battle, without fighting at all. The proud young King, all the power that he was born to, took from the throne and never reigned again. His wife likewise took to bed, but for a different reason, his wife was in fact as she was, brought to bed at this juncture entirely probably by those bearing circumstantial. Word was brought into the King's inner chamber that the Majesty was slowly delivered. "And what has she got?" said James, finding now how quickly "a young and vigorous" — "Oh! out!" the poor King turning his face to the wall. "It came with a loud roar came to be by Elizabeth Morton, "and it will spring with a blast," — and there these were the last words he spoke. In the clouds of thick darkness, turned from daylight and seeking to be still farther, and never, this proud young soul parted away...."

Here we have an excellent example of Carlyle's dovetailing phenomenon into character to achieve prophetic conclusion. Indeed, he makes a mockery of fact. His intention is clearly not to capture sense, rather essence. It is poetic, in Emerson's terms Homeric, and it turns a dreary account of the Scots' defeat by the English into an epic figure of constancy. James, according to Carlyle, did not die from defeat but from a broken heart. The center of Carlyle's perception is James, not the ignominy of Solway Moss. The method is fabrication and the result dramatic. Almost in parody, Carlyle is able to turn death into life. Mary Queen of Scots is born before our eyes, not in triumphant fanfare, but with the predication that her life too will be shaped by "clouds of thick darkness." With James's death comes the beginning of the end of French Catholicism in Scotland. Yet as if in afterthought Carlyle remarks that James was a "celestial churlish" when set in relief to the "pig-farmer interests" of Victorian England. The circle has now been shaped and the prophecy concluded.

Another dramatic example of Carlyle's method of pre-
serving the incident in the face of bigger issues comes later in
The Guiser when he describes the infamous St. Bartholomew's Day Massacre. Again, the incident is set, the participants located, and the conclusion drawn. And once
again, phenomenon gives way to fabulation as Carlyle
intuits the scene at the LOUVRE:

... On Sunday night 24th August 1572 there burst upon us a scene
as the world has seen before or since, in Paris and over France
-the massacre of St. Bartholomew. The horrible phenomenon of
which I have now the spirit to describe [Carlyle's concat-
nation]. To fill these accosted Huguenots at one fell swoop.
... That was the plan of ... Catherine de Medicis, and the official
authorities of France, the king himself, weighed exclusive moral,
was now flinging down the fugitive Huguenots. That is a window in the Louvre; the valet who looked for him, missed him
after missing, has testified he had been alarmed. Everywhere,
... Tossa burst out: and dolorous human beings breathing the
creeds along with the dagger and the touch of the fires.
Huguenism is buried in the Louvre itself; Henri is hidden
triumphant, trembling servitors, ran to the young wife for shelter,
who screamed if she could, and sat or knelt about all night
in a practically mad among mortals and mistresses. Suffer-
able ly: September: only 100-fold bigger, more infernal looking.

Although similar in method and movement to the passage
on James V, the language of apocalypse here replaces the
earlier metaphor of reflection. Carlyle himself is against
The... The Louvre, is commanding; the participants
more shadows of human beings; and the conclusion
predictable - the Guise-planned annihilation of
Protestantism is the work of the Devil, "infernal looking."
Carlyle does not allow us to escape to the sanctuary
of historic objectivity. We are bombarded with Miltonic
paradoxes, surrealistic metaphors, and passionate
language. But the whirlwind is always the same: men, or
women's events, not events man. Phenomenon once again
made incidental. In passages like this one, Carlyle lends us past
incident, through characterization, in history - his history;
here that even, in ferocity might does not always make
right. We are propelled by the transcendence of his
imagination; like Abub we sail through the mists
of phenomenon into no man. Carlyle insists that we join the
pilgrimage, the land of historical wonder is the goal.

That Carlyle was aware that he was leading his readers
in an historical odyssey seems certain enough. His manu-
script copy abounds in aids to himself and to his readers.
His audience was before him as he wrote, and he was
continually reminded that his purpose was evaluation not
record. Indeed, a great deal of his writing seems to come
from memory. His digressions are legion (one is reminded
that more than 30% of the approximately 1700 paragraphs
of The French Revolution have nothing to do with the
history per se), and the following one on the value
of Voltaire's Histoire tells us a great deal about this
historian's view of history:

"How much better had a real history than an unimaginably Dry-

Here we have Carlyle's definition of history. Voltaire's
Histoire prosperus because it is not "Dry..." It is, in
Carlyle's words, a "real History" precisely because it is the
"condensed arranged intelligent and intelligible image
[emphasis mine] according to fact," the "voice of God
speaking from the whirlwind of things." Fabulation
triumphs once again.

Carlyle's subjective interjections are more often than not
tests to excite his readers' instincts, to anger, to defy, to
ridicule. The language of sarcasm and irony becomes his
weapon. Nor here is this more apparent than in his
descriptions of the French monarchy. Francois II is
described as a "handsome tall man"; his successor
Charles II as a "proud beaute boy"; the infamous Henri III as a
"wretched little Miserere" and the conciliatory
Henri IV as "beneficent grace-hearted." These portraits
are ample evidence of Carlyle's willingness to shape
history to his cause. Yet he is also capable of being amb-
igious, as seen in his paradoxical description of
Catherine de Medicis as being "bricked-eyed even
hectically vivid." Whether it is the deference to the
indigent, Carlyle's broadminded like brush seldom falls.
His method here of forcing the reader from objectivity by
placing history in emotional context continues as we cross
the channel to Britain. He not only chooses what he wants
us to know, but he chooses how we are to know it. James
V of Scotland is a "gallant dashing young fellow": his wife,
Marie de Guise, later Regent of Scotland, is a "bright young
Princess"; and her celebrated daughter, Mary
Queen of Scots, is an "unfortunate being." Lord Darnley,
Mary's tutor, is sarcastically dismissed as a "booby.
And, Carlyle is quite willing to go outside the annals of
history to employ his Cervantesque humor. As if to under-
state the significance of the Spanish Armada, he sets it in
relief to the birth of Thomas Hobbes: "cribbed little
Hobbes, Philosopher of Malcontents, hardly yet fifteen
inches long, and not like living, lay packed in downy wool
to give the little witch a chance." Life, Carlyle asserts, is surely
"double or quits."

The Guiser, then, is Carlyle's microcosm for his macro-
philosophy of history. He kaleidoscopes fact into a
memory that in turn successively in its limitless imagin-

Yet, in the end Carlyle was not blind to his own
inadequacies (and here again manuscript copy is inval-
able). At one point he becomes so exasperated at not
being able to remember dates and sequences that he writes
in despair: "Phooey-ho!" As humorous as such a remark
is, it does speak to the basic weakness and strength of
Carlyle's historical imagination. His world was that of the
nineteenth, and this fact costs him considerable pain as a
writer. It would have been easier for him to plot like
Macaulay or to record like Gibbon, but his world lay beyond in the hieroglyph of truth. We may be critical of him for not fulfilling our expectations, but then he was critical of himself for the same reason. His last words in The Coler reflect his epic-like despair: "All is Great: men are not great." One last time the human paradox is subordinated to the larger truth.

I see, then, Carlyle's theory of history as implosive. He works upon word and image, the hieroglyphs of fact, to transform the readers' perceptions. We instinctively look for phenomena, only to be propelled beyond it. Our historical conceptions are contradicted by Carlyle's transcendent consciousness. His intent seems to be to destroy that vestige of reality upon which his histories are formed. We must succumb, or be defeated. Carlyle does not provide us with a sanctuary. His historical eye may well be formed in phenomenon, but it is focused in the numenous.

Hence, as readers we are faced with irresoluble paradoxes. If we demand fact for its own sake, we are disappointed; and, if we expect linear definitions for cyclical issues, we are frustrated. Indeed, Carlyle's implosive technique seems geared to deny us access to the imaginable. He cares little about the facts of James's defeat at Solway Moss; he ignores the impositions of Catholic Mary and Protestant Elizabeth; and he views with disdain the politics of intrigue between Catherine de Medici and Philip of Spain. He is, in fact, bored with the inescapable-ness of fact. He is pains to place history in logical context. His histories are art forms not discursive discourses, rather, on what should be perceived instead of what is perceived. To use the words of Eugene O'Neill, Carlyle writes from "tears and blood."

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**The Historical Imagination: Browning to Pound**

**Adena Rosmarin**

That age is gone,
Petrie de Mente is gone,
I have walked on these roads,
I have thought of them living.

— *Ezra Pound, "Provincia Eusebi"*

To imagine ourselves thinking, writing, living, and dying in another time is to imagine ourselves as other selves. It is also to define ourselves as such. Here we have the central and inevitable paradox of all acts of historical imagination: they free us from the present even as they heighten our awareness of its ineluctable presentness; they expand the borders of our historical and personal selves even as they define them. It is a paradox which finds perhaps its most striking embodiment in Victorian literature.

Having moved beyond the provinciality of antiquarianism, wherein the present is costumed in the various trappings of the past, the Victorians had become painfully and profoundly aware of the pathos of the past, of having come on the scene too late, of having lost Eden. Arnold's "The Scholar Gipsy" and Hardy's "Under the Greenwood Tree" are replete with this quintessentially Romantic nostalgia. But we also find — in writers like Macaulay and the early Tennyson — a mystic privilege of the present and a complacent delight in its presentness. We find, that is, a tendency to endorse either the past over the present or the present over the past.

These endorsements — so obviously antithetical — are also profoundly similar in origin and purpose: first, both arise from the increasing awareness of an immense difference between then and now. Second, both define the past by the needs of the present. Such a past was recreated, with however a disdain for historical accuracy, less for its own interest than to serve the present interest of the present writer. Whether arguing for progress or for decadence, the polemics which magnetized Victorian thought — the concept of historical time invoked was the same: ineluctably linear, intensely felt, and unambiguously rhetorical. Thus the temporal and perspectival understructures of Browning's "Rabbi Ben Ezra" ("The best is yet to be") and Arnold's "To Margaretten — Contained" ("For surely once... we were Parts of a single continent") of Tennyson's "Laulley Hall" and Ruskin's "The Storm Cloud of the Nineteenth Century" are continuous. But a past which exists in order to

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reasure or threaten the present must lose immediacy, vitality, complexity, and seriousness. Such a past must, in short, become facile modern as it is potenti.

Thus the best literature of the time was powerful and, indeed, characteristic in so far as it displayed less of this moral and temporal certainty (as we shall see, the two certainties, or uncertainties, are kin). Its acts of historical imagination do not deny the interpenetration of past and present but invite it: they please even though — and indeed precisely because — they edify more than they depre.

Such acts invite us to feel the past as though it were the present and to dwell in the minds of others — past others — as though they were our present selves. I will take as my texts certain dramatic monologues by Browning and then — as a foil — a poem by Pound which looks like a dramatic monologue but which, significantly, is not.

Browning's "Cleo" invites us to participate in the spiritual despair of its speaker, a Helleneic Christian, a man who knows and has done everything his world has to offer, a man who has everything but the hope of eternal life. We do not decline the invitation, and for some 335 lines of this 335 line poem we dwell in the speaker's increasingly painful and threatening despair:

Say rather than I fear, is the dread still,
In this, that every day my sense of joy
Grows more acute, that my soul is numbered
By power and insight more entwined,
While every day my hair grows more and more.
My hard [edges, and the heavy years advance —
The church quickening roll from year to year.
The commotion coming past escape.
When I shall know most, and yet least enjoy —

Dwelling in such a mind is not comforting for the reader, and because it is not the poet must work to sustain the condition, work to counter our anticipated attempts to pull back, to deny, and to judge. Thus he makes the speaker self-conscious, able to anticipate and thus control our judgment within his own: he isolates him in his world, granting his vision prominence as well as power; he makes him introspective, atoning inward which he replicates; he grants him eloquence, a verbal grace which secures our adherence to the vision it articulates; he grants him the ability to imagine beauty as well as pain, thereby lifting his vision from the distancing monument of solipsistic complaint. These rhetorical strategies foreclose the illusion of distance, either the distance of nostalgia or that of condescension. We become Cleo, and the momentum of our acquaintance carries us through even the vision of his death, through both the longing for release and the denial of even the possibility.

1. I feel thinking, seeing men,
   The man who loved his life in the moonlight.
   Sleep in my arm it is so terrible,
   I saw at times in my mind
   Some Future state called to me by Zeno.
   The mind of man, in its eternity
   For joy, as this in desire for joy.
Bishop Orders His Tomb" depends for its effect upon the split between the speaker's meaning and the poem's meaning; we perceive, that is, the earthly vanity of the bishop even as it is made clear that he does not share our perception. But we are not allowed our perception until we have dwelt in this vanity, both enjoying its glories and suffering its torments.

As in "Clean" we share a vision of death:

I shall lie through centuries, And hear the blessed monitor of the mass, And see God made not only all day long, And feel the deadly candle flame, and hear Good strong thick stippling incense smoke!

The difference between this vision and Cleon's is the difference between a Hellenistic and a Renaissance spirit. What is not different is the mode of our sharing: we become the Bishop as we read; much as we became Cleon. And, as we left Cleon, we leave the Bishop:

And leave me in my church, the church of peace, That I may watch in leisure if he leaves —
O God of God! — at rest from my own gone. As still he revives me, so, I fear, she will.

These concluding lines confirm the Bishop a lecherous hypocrice and, as they do, return us to our present selves. But because the return seems more the natural consequence of the speaker's character and less the contrivance of the poet's polonies, the poem is finer and more difficult than "Cleon."

The difficulty and fineness of "Andrea del Sarto" are similar; we are led to understand that Andrea's search for self-knowledge is an exercise in self-deception, but we earn our understanding only by participating in both search and deceit. And, in what is perhaps Browning's greatest Renaissance vision, we find the cosmic conflict of body and spirit to be as much ours as Fra Lippo's.

These poems always demand we judge their speakers; they always return us to our present, which is to say, to our Victorian selves; they always realign the norms of the time in which they were written. But the greatest of these poems allow this return and reaffirmation only after our active and serious dwelling in the past. Thus my opening paradox: they bind us to our present but only after freeing us; they remind us of ourselves, but first they invoke our potential to be others.

Let us now turn to "The Ballad of the Goody Fere," a poem Pound wrote to protest "a certain sort of cheap irresponsibility." And the poem is indeed as intensely persuasive in its purpose — which is to make the reader see Jesus as "a man o' men" — as any of Browning's monologues. But unlike Browning, Pound does not focus his poem on the speaker, the Apostle Simon Zealotes, and his failure to see, but rather on what he sees and the intensity of his vision:

He cried to see what they drive the mill And the blood poured hot and free. The hands of the criminal sky gave tongue But never a cry cried he.

If I saw him come a thousand years
On the hills of Galilee,
They quailed as he walked out calm between
We his eyes like the grey of the sea.

We come away from this poem with a sense of having seen with ancient eyes, of having experienced that most extraordinary time. But unlike the dramatic monologues, this poem does not ask us to judge that vision or our experiences. Rather, our vision and the speaker's remain conflated; the poem's meaning and the speaker's meaning remain one. As with the monologue the vision which this poem and similar poems, called mask lyrics, invite us to share comes into being in a particular time and through a particular personality. But unlike the dramatic monologue the vision is not bound to its historical point of origin. Thus Zelotes projects himself forward in time in anticipation of our modern vision:

If they think they ha' seen our Goody Fere
They are fools utterly.

Whatever the state of our religious belief, the very endurance of Christianity sets us at the speaker's side against those who "are fools utterly." As is always the case in the mask lyric, the protection is self-defeating and precisely because it is; it protects the speaker from our historical discounting. In "The Ballad of the Goody Fere" this protection combines with the striking novelty of an intensely physical Jesus and the linguistic vigor of the speaker to structure our imaginative belief in the transcendent vision which concludes the poem:

I ha' seen him eat o' the honeycomb
Set they build him to the tree.

The archaism and diachronic distance of the monologic vision favored by the Victorians thus gives way to the layered synchronism of the mask lyric favored by the moderns. 4 A familiar passage, written within a few years of Pound's poem, glosses this distinction for us:

the historical sense invades a perception, not only of the past.

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4. The term "mask lyric" was, as far as I know, first used by Ralph W. Rusk in his "The Dramatic Monologue and Related Lyric Forms," Critical Inquiry 3 (Autumn 1976), 133-137.

5. Most of the early poems of Eliot and Pound are mask lyrics. Pound's transition poems in particularly telling instances of the synchronic historical imagination. See also Edward Adlington Robinson's "Ben Jonson Enjoins a Man from Straining."
Kearns advances the discovery of the cave paintings at Altamira: "They simply existed outside of history. No felt continuity reached back to them, with dimmed, surreal perspective, as it did for the Indians from Ole Tipo or Raphaelesque favor. Time faded over; now lay flat, transparent, upon the then.""1

The impact of these two discoveries is undeniable: in 1902 Picasso visited Altamira, and Elton, within a few weeks of visiting a similar cave in 1919, wrote the passage quoted above. One wonders, however, why these visits assumed such significance. Oceano wonders why Elton's elaborate fluttering of poetic tradition, the search for poetic ancestry among the Jacobines and French Symbolists, why Pound's forlorn searches, why the palpable linguisitics of the Context and the pinched allusions of "Proust" and "The Waste Land" why the analogous visual experiences of Picasso and Braque? To answer that the foreground allusive attempts to discard old continua of correspondence and chronology for new, synchronically structured coherences is more reprehensible than answer. One also needs to consider the rhetorical and philosophical context of the dawning.

Analysis of a particular text in which such a dawning takes place — for example, Elton's "The Metaphysical Poets" — reveals that an attuned structure is no less rhetorical that those which are overtly temporal, that the assertion of equality and synchronism among various historical epochs is inherently poetically a gesture as the more obvious chronologism indulged in by the early Victorians. For just as in the illusion of linear historical time can and has been employed as a strategy for arguing the superiority of industrial civilization, Elton's rearrangement of English poetic traditions can be explained as a strategy for arguing the superiority of early modern poetry. The attempt is at once apologetic and heuristic.

To convince his readers he alters them in new ways of reading and, in doing so, recapitulates Wordsworth's...
similar and similarly successful attempt over a century earlier: both poets reject their immediate ancestors—Tennyson and Browning for one, Gray for the other—to return to one less immediate, less particularized, and less threatening—the linguistic complexity of the metaphysical verse, the "language really spoken by men" for the other. The point is that assertions of temporal continuity and discontinuity do not exist in a rhetorical vacuum, but are themselves articulated in order to give philosophical substance and hence, suitable force to the arguments in which they are embedded.

This shift in historical consciousness, as revealed in terms of literary genre and poetry, was but one manifestation of a profound shift in our notions of reality, knowledge, and language. The reverberations were felt in virtually all disciplines precisely because this shift was essentially philosophical in nature. Thus it is no accident that while an impervious opacity and unapproachable elusiveness were appearing at the heart of physical reality, the poet and novelist were discovering human reality to be similarly opaque and elusive. By 1931 Heidegger's uncertainty principle and Godel's incompleteness Theorem had formalized the conceptual issues generated by a universe whose newly revealed curvature and randomness were moving it beyond the ken of Euclidean geometry and Kantian teleology. And Virginia Woolf, in her remarkable essay, "Mr. Bennett and Mrs. Brown," tells us that in or about December, 1910, a human character changed. Not quite serious about the arbitrary date, she could not be more so about her point: "All human relations have shifted ... And when human relations change there is at the same time a change in religion, conduct, politics, and literature." 6. D. H. Lawrence makes a virtually identical assertion in his foreword letter to Edward Garnett's June 2, 1914: "You mustn't look in my novel for the old stable ego of the character."

Because the very essence of human reality seemed suddenly to have changed, the old ways of character portrayal, as in the novels of Galsworthy, Wells, and Bennett, were just as suddenly obsolete. The Edwardian tools for rendering character, in Woolf's words, "laid an enormous stress upon the fabric of things," giving "us a house in the hope that we may be able to decode the human beings who live there." But character no longer had the socially grounded stability and psychic shallowness which rendered it discoverable and communicable in terms of externals. Taking its place, Lawrence announced, is "another ego, according to whose action the individual is unrecognizable." The radical implications of this revision were fully revealed some years later:

"Ah, but we do die to each other, etc."

What we know of other people
Is only our memory of the crimes
During which we knew them. And they have changed since then.
"To pretend that they and we are the same
Is a useful and convenient social convention,
Which must sometimes be broken. We must also remember
That at every meeting we are meeting a stranger.
"- E. S. Eust, "The Crocked Party"

The old literary forms and techniques were dead, then, because they were unable to plumb the inexorable depths of this new and fluid reality. But they were also dead because they were unaware not only of the inherent limits of this inquiry but of the inherent limits on its communicability. Wittgenstein's pronouncement—"What can be said at all can be said clearly, and what we cannot talk about we must pass over in silence"—is perhaps the most famous doubting of our linguistic powers, but Woolf's missing To the Lighthouse is probably the most eloquent:

"Mrs. Ramsay sat silent. She was glad. Lilly thought, to be in silence, to be present to the existence of human relationships. Who knows what we are, what we feel? Who knows that we exist? and the enormous mystery, that knowledge! Aren't things, things, things, Mrs. Ramsay may have asked; it seemed to have happened to them, this silence by her start by saying them? Aren't we more expressive than this?"

The irony inherent in such expressive revelations of what, presumably, can neither be revealed nor expressed does not undercut the text so much as it dramatizes its self-aware complexity. Indeed, this reflective drama is among
the most telling and characteristic persuasive strategies of
the early modern text.

Waste strain,
Crack and sometimes break, under the burden,
Under the tension, slip, slide, part,
Dreary with impatience, you are not in place,
Will not stay still.

—T. S. Eliot, "The Burial of the Dead"

The shift in historical imagination explored in this paper is one variant of the self's increasing doubting, however articulate, of its capacity to know itself and other selves and of its capacity to express that knowledge in words (the two doubtings are, if not one, inextricably connected). As we have seen, the dramatic monologue assumes our capacity to refer the inner character of the speaker from represented verbal gesture. The genre depends, that is, upon the "old stable ego." It also depends upon a double leap of the historical imagination: we must remove from our present to the writer's present and thence to the speaker's present, all the while respecting the discontinuity of these pasts and presents. Concurrent with these temporal mappings and mappings are those negotiated among reader, speaker, and poet. Thus, the return to the Victorian present at the end of "Cleon" is simultaneously a revelation of the previously implicit presence of the implied author. The impact of the poem is only fully described in terms of our sudden awareness of the discontinuities of history and of persons. Browning, in his most complex and sustained exercise of the historical imagination, The Ring and the Book, does attempt to transcend the perspectival limitation of the individual monologue and, thereby, to structure a more accurate representation of the past. The attempt is modern in its recognition of the inherent insufficiency of the single perspective, but it remains characteristically Victorian merely because each individual speaker is diminished by this formalization of his particularity. Because the reader participates in all the perspectives, his is necessarily superior to any particular one.

Only by juxtaposing past and present with the speaker's awareness can he become the reader's equal. Thus the mask lyric, by confiding persons — reader, speaker, and poet — and presents — reader's, speaker's, and poet's — would grant us access to other minds and times in the way that we in life have access only to our own from within. In terms of the opening paradox, the mask lyric, like the greatest of the monologues, invades our potential to be others, but, unlike the monologue, it does so without inviting our judgment of those others or their times. The two genres, then, superficially so similar, register in their radical difference nothing less than a profound shift in our conception of human reality and human time.

My remarks imply that the historical imagination of the early moderns was more sophisticated than that of the Victorians — and if self-consciousness is the key ingredient of sophistication, then this is indeed the case. But today we suspect that the massed spectacles of our present selves are more value-laden and harder to remove than Eliot and Pound thought. If this is so, then we might also suggest that the acts of historical imagination represented by Browning's monologues are no more naive than they ought to be.

These suspicions suggest we conclude that our attempts to become others are, at best, only provisional and, as such, can have no lasting value. But it will venture a more optimistic — and paradoxical — conclusion and suggest that it is the very provisionality of these attempts that makes them possible and valuable. Because we are not branded with the imprint of every mind in which we dwell, we can entrust ourselves more fully to any given mind and to many minds in turn. And it is the sum of these provisional dwellings in the minds and times of others which can move us beyond ourselves and our time. For it is the process itself, the tutoring in empathy which such repeated acts of imagination afford, which is of irreplaceable value.

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Imitation in "The Lady of Shalott"

Nathan Cresc

"The Lady of Shalott" first appeared in *Poems* (1833). Severely revised, it was republished in the 1842 collection which included "Morte D'Arthur." Both poems feature an idyll water-journey by a dying personage of mysterious origin, the Lady from her "silent isle" and Arthur to the island-avalley of Avalon. Ambiguous symbols which denote both death and purity reflect the essential nature of the central figures: "lilies" and the "swan"—barker and a swan-song accompanies both the Lady and Arthur in their movement toward final identity: "a carol, mellow, holy," and "some full-breasted swell" that, fluting a wild cornet ere her death..." Although not embarking directly from it, Arthur leaves the earthly Camelot by dying, whereas the opposite is true of the Lady of Shalott. It is her corpse that arrives at Camelot. Previous to their beginning in the Arthurian romance died violently with humankind, with history, and so had the Lady, though on a different level of vision—that of keen eyesight. If we may say that Arthur resembled a chivalric Odysseus, we may also say that the Lady was a Penelope with no need to unravel her work, because she had no suitors, false-hearted or true: "She hath no loyal knight and true." The Lady of Shalott." She had no temptation to stray from her task, bound as she was by nature as to a marriage vow.

In 1871 Tennyson repeated some of the natural detail first delineated in "The Lady of Shalott" in "The Last Tournament" where "the yellowing woods" and Doganet dancing "like a wither'd leaf before the fall" echo "The pale yellow woods were waning" and "The leaves upon her golden light." (The Lady is on some force of nature, an animal, the lower, earth-bound, soul, and the yin principle, and it is therefore feminine."") Fittingly, name of the last tournament is "The Tournament of the Last Innocence," evoking a post-Eudic loss of contact with our natural environment which, fallen along with us, may often be experienced as a loss, or as a sacrifice of such as the Lady cannot thrive in such a realm. Entering the precincts of Camelot, she dies. For Camelot is the domain of the animus, where ideals out of touch with nature perish ignominiously or dissipate themselves in wholly unconscious projections, in identity/strait quests which strike us as the pursuit of an angelic Numen. The formalism that undergirds Camelot considered as a hieratic symbol, helping us to find personal equilibrium in reactionary and has its counterpart in rationalistic rhetoric. The principles of Mill's logic, for example, are all current among the intelligentiles of the period, and so is Tennyson's poetic muse that Camelot is set up as an anti-rationalistic citadel, but the truth is that Tennyson's Camelot is the offspring of Victorian rationalism. Reaction to something as a form, often inversely parallel, of imitation, The Lady is able to see and copy things and events as embodied designs of the radical nothingness of the fallen world. She represents Tennyson's poetic muse, sending for incident as arcane meaning but nonetheless valuable.

Even Lancelot cannot enter the Lady's breath of undifferentiated consciousness unless the poet himself is unwilling to be true to his task, which is to be a "Poet of Sensation." Lancelot cannot enter the Lady's breath of undifferentiated consciousness unless the poet himself is unwilling to be true to his task, which is to be a "Poet of Sensation." It is to isolate the subject from his environment, since instead of a real relation to it there is now only the virtual one. Projection changes the world into the space of one's unknown face. Tennyson's "St Iilda" thought: "How much more I am, or you, from an enormous (in the merely using for abusing) to pass through.


2. Much of Tennyson's earlier poetry may be described as Enchantic rather than gripped-questing (romantic rather than numinous). "Transformation Symbolism in the Sinus," p. 339: "The vision, in which probability has the character of a dream, most be regarded as a spontaneous psychic projection which was never consciously aimed at. Like all dreams, it is a product of the mind's opus and spirit, and it does not have the same logical structure. To our absurd mind, we cannot imagine a consistent psychic, and the Mind Prefect. The view is an intuitive and natural one, and the Diana of the highly differentiated mind. To wit, one great and the other minor-minded,"" directly speaking, the unconscious is uncompromisingly unconscious of its own function. To wit, the Lady's voice and the magic of the Wic-ale-W, where nothing and nothing are identical.

3. "Tennyson's Camelot. The Kingdom of Folly," *University of Toronto Quarterly* April, 1968, pp. 281-295. The quotations in this paper are from this essay.*

4. Jung, "Alas," p. 8. "As we know, it is not the conscious subject but the unconscious that does the projecting. Hence one encounter projects, one does not make them. Yet the effect of projection is to isolate the subject from his environment, since instead of a real relation to it there is now only the virtual one. Projection changes the world into the space of one's unknown face. Tennyson's "St Iilda" thought: "How much more I am, or you, from an enormous (in the merely using for abusing) to pass through.

5. Jung, "Alas," p. 27. "But the psychic phenomena cannot be grasped in its entirety by the mind, for it consists in nothing but of meaning but rather, this depends on the intensity of the accompanying feeling-tones." "I am half sick of shadows," said The Lady of Shalott.)

6. Consciousness as a "monachistic" (Jung, p. 275 and following), which is the essence of the Lady's crime. The distinction is to the point here ("Temperature of the Chinese way of cognizance, pp. 271-273: "While the Western mind clearly self, the Chinese picture of the unconscious encompasses everything down to the remotest unconscious detail, because all the ingenuity make up the observed moment.

7. The phrase is Heilman's (The Enlightened's Magazine, 1891), "Mr. Tennyson being assigned to the case, we have already described as Poet of Sensation."
The Lady of Shalott (1835) Tennyson remained true to his muse. Although dead, she still identifies herself, confronts, and rebukes Camelot's "well-fed woes." "Ocher island bower she sings 'by the moon' (imagination) a 'fairy song.'" She recognizes rationalism (the "aun") as incidental or, in its less perching aspects, antithetical to the life of nature ("the leave."). While the appearance of Lancelot, "The sun came dazzling thro' the leaves," and burned upon the brazen gravenes. The negative-evaluation words here are "dazzling," "flamed," and "brazen." In contrast to Lancelot's brass, Wislawa's "realm of gods," is the Keatsian "realms of gold." (On First Looking Into Chapman's Homer), the poetic imagination. Tennyson's earlier poems "The Poet's Mind" and "The Poet" are to the point here. Tennyson tells us (["The Poet"]), "The poet in a golden chime was born." With golden stars above, even when played upon by the poetic imagination and its shapes duly recorded ("when the moon was overhead"); hardly proves satisfying. "I am but sick of shadows," said! The Lady of Shalott. is It not appropriate in this brief newsletter to go beyond these altogether new indications as to how "The Lady of Shalott" is to be read or appreciated. In the light of my condition, the Lady as she approaches overhead Camelot, whose many towers bespeak habit and stasis will rather than the philanthropic coolnesses of aesthetic contemplation. In the original version, the poet's scorn of "The well-fed woes at Camelot" is clear enough; and so is the nature of the Lady's seclusion and, indeed, her own challenging identity: "The web was woven curiously, the charm is broken utterly." Draw near and fear not — this is Hf The Lady of Shalott." It is Tennyson here rebuking the rationalistic judges, the animality directed against such aesthetic poetry as "Mariana.

Jung, "Alas," p. 31: "Experience shows that individual mandalas are symbols of order, and that they occur in persons chiefly during times of major disorientation or confrontation. When the unconscious mind the mandala appears as first as an unimposing point or line, and a great deal of fortandinivating work as well as the integration of many projections is generally required before the full range of the spiritual content or anything like completeness understood. The 'dirt of Arthur's vault' change is particularly interesting in this connection, and the Round Table may be seen as a "magical code," Jung p. 31 a mandala. Hence, what we have been the deal with in the two 183 poems: in Arthur's going and the Lady's coming, in the myth of Camelot and Arthur (without King Arthur) of the fallen world. Such a world, profoundly dead and hence dead in the more the contrary, is visited by visionaries who then give way to the new world, the new order, and return to the poetics. Artistic is the poet's attempt to possess anything more than poetic science: it is a truth of the unconscious (Von Hartmann's Social Unconscious) of Camelot, the Lady can only function. She is, in the manly significance of the poetic's more, which she does, according to her own principles, by getting as a corpse, save to Canada's. Arthur must in fact be an essence of the animism present (Jung, p. 33). . . . A baby spirit of arrogance, haughtiness, wooly-romance, criminal anxiety, and diacritical loveliness, a poet of that the mandala is in the very texture of the imagination, the Lady's web has many tech

dent, she proves to Camelot new light and exalted using this new light would be the setting up a number of for the instant, the mythical day, they take to seriously. The Lady's death is a simul- taneous death and the Lady's, the death of Camelot. As such, she attains the time-space coming now.

Jung, "Alas," p. 16: "In both his positive and its negative aspects the animism's relationship is always full of ambiguity, i.e., it is an emotional and collective, affective level of the relationship and bring it closer to the heart. However, this is the case, in which many have nothing individual about it. Very often the relationship is its considerable one, for everyone who between me don't know what happened to them, "The Lady of Shalott," as one might expect of genius. Also, it means the "careness, the animus animus relationship."

Take note 5. See Jung, "Alas," p. 69. We read p. 71: "In shadow is a moral problem that challenges the most sensitive personality. For me one can become conscious of the shadow without considerable moral effort. For the Archaic Poet, the temptation is to take subject as something less valuable to submerging to psychopoeic conventions and generalities and becoming their masterpiece or special pleasure in "The Lady of Shalott," the "shadow," is only outside of the domain of a "shadowed." And moving that it's "mournful." This brings before us still the year, the Shadow of the world spirit, when the transformation comes by some of the gesture of her magic web, they become transformed with other eyes. The world is reduced to by art, always with aesthetic pleasure manifested. Once this distance is traversed, the Aesthetic Man, the Lady of Shalott, died.
Adrian's Shrug: A Note on the "Wise Youth"

Thomas J. Campbell

Adrian shrugged. Nevermore the Wise Youth recurred a mental difficulty in instinctively liking his shoulders in such attitudes, in which case he laid no doubts to a balance in the case, plenty to be said on both sides, which was the main to be set as a definite solution.

Is this the shrug of cynical complacency, of mental or moral indifference? Is it a sign of resignation in the face of life's inevitabilities? Is it perhaps the characteristic gesture of one who recognizes the multiplicity of human experience and who therefore refuses to impose mechanistic systems on life? I suspect the shrug encompasses all those possibilities as well as others. It is precisely this sort of ambivalence that surrounds Adrian...

Harley in The Ordinal of Richard Faucent, making him at once attractive, elusive, and thematically telling. Somehow it won't do to simply label and dismiss him as a parasite, as that stuck tag insinuates the range of his function in the novel. It seems to me he is more than a mere self-serving Epicurean, a laudable in the employ of a man whose philosophy he inverts and opposes, but to whom he outwardly offers the expected ingratiating responses in the hopes of obtaining the long-desired Alpine adventure. Such a one-dimensional reading of Adrian misses the more subtle significances of his character.

Paradox most obviously, Adrian functions as an antidote to the self-indulgent romanticism of the blossoming Richard. The overly soft patronization of

1. George Meredith, The Ordinal of Richard Faucent (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964), p. 166. All subsequent quotations are from this edition of the novel and will be identified by page numbers in the text.

2. Critics, when they have dealt with Adrian at all, have generally dismissed him as a poorly developed character. A. J. H. Smith, The Future of World Drama (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1935), p. 41, makes the point, declaring: "Adrian is a nightmare ghastly."


4. "As a writer, he is a master and one of the few who have ever written a novel with a psychological basis and a vividly revealing" (N. F. C. Chisholm, The Ordinal of Richard Faucent, 1972, p. 127). It is important to show the novel's explication by and reflection upon the novelist's own experience of the world. The " novelist's symmetrical structure" (B. A. Fish, "The Unspeakable," 1968) - yet does differ slightly in the style, the tone of voice associated with Adrian, and of the novel's "heroic" community of action. This styling, shared with the "wise youth," is characteristic of the novel's "heroic" stance.

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Richard and Lucy is neatly balanced by Adrian's cynical laughter. The excessive lyricism, both in sentiment and language, in the love passages (Chapters 23 and 24) borders on the embarrassing. The rhetoric, overblown and self-conscious, becomes merely sentimental. Adrian counters this uncontrolled emotionality and pulls the drama earthward. It is he who checks Richard's fanciful chivalric notions with the sensible reminder that "we were animals, and he an animal with them." (99). Richard, of course, rejects this sensible admonition; yet because he refuses to accept Adrian's imperfect world, because his sense of reality does not allow for an admission of human falling, Richard is restricted to merely Quixotic gestures—the reenactment of Mrs. Mowatt, the duel with Mountfalcon—which ultimately involve him in a double betrayal of Lucy. Adrian is the necessary counterweight not only to Richard's idealistic excess, but also to Lucy's immaculate sense of duty and purpose, Mrs. Dora's chicanery, Clare's martyrdom, Mrs. Berry's intrusiveness, and certainly to Sir Austin's partnership, vengefulness, and hypocrisy. Though an egotist like some of the others, his egotism lacks a certain aggressive edge; it is strangely tolerant and flexible, almost benign.

Though in the service of Sir Austin and hence of his system, Adrian does not see man as a machine. To him it is folly to attempt to imitate Richard's nature with a rational plan. Scientific systems that propose subordinating nature to reason fly in the face of human experience. Systems choke vitality. Yet Sir Austin insists on playing God; he aspires "to be Providence to his son," to create a paradise of reason, free from the tempestress Eve. Adrian finds such grandiose, pretentious, and ultimately doomed projects wrong-headed, though of course amusing. Because he has an "instinct for the majorities," (25) he goes along, however, accommodating himself to the facts and emotions as much as he can.

Adrian is an acute observer of life rather than an active participant in it. It is through him that we get an unobstructed view of the proceedings.

He had no intimates save Gibbons and Hasard, and the society of those two individuals of humanity helped him to accept humanity as it had been, and was; a Supreme ironic presence, with Laughter of God in the background. (26)

Standing back from the facts, alert to the underlying irony, and urbane in articulating it, Adrian is able to take his (26).

Though he may seem a statesman, there is a sense of depth lurking beyond his surface impassiveness. He is one of those on whom nothing is lost. He sees that "in real life all hangs together," and he does not wonder, as do fools, that "this great matter comes out of that small one." (25). He recognizes that everybody's fate, as he tells Austin, is in the process of being decided. (66). He relates cause and effect, promptly and clearly, and he is quick to apprehend the truth behind a lie or to discover a motive cleverly disguised.

That Adrian is clear-sighted is, I think, apparent. And this quality makes him a valuable currier in the novel. The technique of "Wise Youth" is not misleading. He is not wise simply because, as the Sibyl says: "wisdom goes by majorities"; he is unsaddled, well-grounded, undeluded about himself or others. As such, he functions as a kind of truth-teller. When he presents the wedding cake to the assembled family, he is the glorious vehicle for bursting illusions all round. He shedding his particular brand of light on the others not because he feels compelled by any moral imperative, but rather for the sheer amusement of the situation promises. His motives may be questionable, but his analyses are invariably acute, and we value him accordingly.

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Carlyle's Secret Debt to Schiller: The Concept of Goethe's Genius

Lee C. R. Baker

Few scholars have recognized Thomas Carlyle's debt to Friedrich Schiller. In the main we cannot be blamed for this critical lapse since Carlyle himself has put us off the track. In a journal entry of March 1823 Carlyle questions the validity of Schiller's claims for aesthetics. "One is tired to death," he complains, "with his and Goethe's palaver about the nature of the fine arts." Although he later changed his mind, there is yet another false trail upon which Carlyle sets us - he assumes some important Schillerean concepts to Goethe. One of Carlyle's letters to John Stuart Mill provides us with the clue which explains why critics have failed to perceive Carlyle's debt to Schiller. Writing to Mill to praise his recently published essay "What is Poetry?" Carlyle explains: "That characteristic you fix on is worthy of testing; I find in it indeed a kind of relationship with that old Unconsciousness which, as Goethe hinted to me, is an element in most great things." As we will see, Carlyle has confused Schiller's ideas with Goethe's, for Carlyle ascribes to Goethe an opinion about unconsciousness which comes from Schiller.

When Carlyle claims that Goethe had intimated to him the importance of unconsciousness, he is referring to Schiller's essay On Naive and Sentimental Poetry. There Schiller says that "genius always remains a mystery to itself." Carlyle especially likes this thought since he translates it on two separate occasions, once in his notebook entry for March 1823 and later in his Life of Schiller (1825).

The character of child-like simplicity, which genius impresses on its works, it shows also in its private life and manners. It is truthful, for nature is ever so exact that it is not possible for only conception to be ideal. It is more clear-sighted, for nature can never be the contrary: but it is as difficult, for this one art can be. It is faithful to its characters and institutions, but not so much because it is directed by principles, as because after all virtues more constantly receive from the primitive demand. It is modest, and tends for genius is always a guest to itself, but not be envious, for it knows not the dangers of the way which it travels.

We are forced to conclude that Schiller's concept of the naive is the basis for Carlyle's well-known concept of the unconscious. And moreover Carlyle is guilty of an unintentional affective fallacy - he unconsciously adulterates Schiller's concept of unconsciousness to Goethe.

But why does Carlyle forget Schiller? The answer is that Schiller's aesthetic writings themselves give Carlyle warrant for seeing Goethe as the predominantly unconscious artist. In Naive and Sentimental Poetry, Schiller defines two poetic types: one is naive in the sense that he is spontaneous, unconscious, and un-Pagan. His analysis of any kind of lyrical poetry is close to nature, close to the sensuous immediacy of his environment. The other is sentimental because he, unlike the naive poet, feels his alienation from external nature and from his own consciousness. He laments for this harmony, but he remains self-conscious. His intellect always mediates between his feeling and his expression. He is therefore sceptical of the spontaneous enthusiasm of the naive poet. Schiller initially considered Goethe an example of the first poetic type, while he saw himself as representative of the second.

In his Life of Schiller Carlyle indicates his understanding of these two poetic types by describing the fundamental opposition between Goethe's and Schiller's characters. "No two men, both of exalted genius, could be possessed of more different sorts of excellence, than the two that were now brought together, in a large company of their mutual friends. The English reader may form some approximate conception of the contrast, by figuring an interview between Shakespeare and Milton" (Works, 25, 90). Goethe-Shakespeare is calm, tolerant, a man of broad interests. Schiller-Milton is struggling, earnest, feeling intensely but narrowly, "at war with the one half of things, in love with the other half" (Works, 25, 90). In another discussion of the unconscious in his essay "Characteristics," Carlyle again points out the essential difference between Shakespeare and Milton in a typically Schillerian mode. Beginning with the significant phrase from Schiller's Naive and Sentimental Poetry, Carlyle writes that "on the whole genius is even a disease to us," of this old truth we have, on all sides daily evidence; The Shakespeare [sic] takes to airs for writing Hamlet and the Tempest, understands not that it is anything surprising: Milton, again, is more conscious of his faculty, which accordingly is an inferior one" (Works, 28, 38). It is not surprising, then, that Carlyle attributes Schiller's concept of the unconscious to Goethe, for Schiller's foremost example of the unconscious artist is Goethe. Carlyle perceives Goethe over Schiller as a poet because Schiller himself had shown Carlyle the greater preeminence of

4. See The Collected Letters of Thomas and Jane Welsh Carlyle, ed. C. R. Baker. New York: Doubleday, 1958. We refer to this work as CL.
Goethe. Schiller probably suggested the contrast between Shakespeare and Milton as well, since he names Shakespeare as one of the great naive geniuses (NSP, 97). The matter is further complicated, however, by Schiller’s theoretical attempts to fuse the naive and sentimental states into a third state which has characteristics of the first two. In Naive and Sentimental Poetry, Schiller describes a state which is a union of the two basic poetic types. Speaking in general psychological terms, Schiller identifies three different conditions of man: 1) the first, naive state of “pure nature” in which man “functions as an undivided sensuous unity”; 2) the second, sentimental “state of civilization” in which “the correspondence between his feeling and thought which in the first condition actually took place, exists now only ideally”; and 3) the third state, “the higher concept under which both can be subsumed” (NSP, 111-12). Schiller provides a more thorough account of the steps in this process of synthesis in his Aesthetic Letters (see NSP, 217n). And, as he tells Goethe in a letter which Carlyle read, “You will, in these Letters, find a portrait of yourself, beneath which I would gladly have subscribed your name, were it not that I dislike to forestall the feelings of thoughtful readers. No one, whose judgment can be of any value to you, will mistake it, for I know that my conception of it is good, and that it is faithfully drawn.”* Carlyle proves himself one of these valued readers because he recognizes Goethe as an artist who has achieved the third stage, the aesthetic state. Carlyle regards Goethe not simply as a naive artist of the first state, but as one who reaches the greatest heights of poetic activity because he manages to combine the two opposing qualities associated with the naive and sentimental types, that is, the Stofftrieb of the sentimental. Carlyle regards Goethe to be “a clear and universal man” (Works, 26:208; 27:400), “the Uniter, and victorious Reconciler, of the distracted, clashing elements of the most distracted and divided age that the world has witnessed since the Introduction of the Christian Religion” (Works, 27:434). “The thing that was given this man to reconcile,” Carlyle explains, “…was the inward spiritual chaos; the centre of all other confusions, outward and inward” (Works, 27:455). As a result of his successful resolution of these psychological contradictions, Goethe’s “poetry is no separate faculty, no mental handicraft; but the voice of the whole harmonious mankind, nay, it is the very harmony, the living and refining harmony of that rich mankind which forms his poetry” (Works, 26:208). Thus, when Carlyle claims that Goethe has “the skill to temper enthusiasm with judgment” (CL, 2:389), he does not mean that Goethe is a skeptic, but rather he is pointing to Goethe’s fusion of Stofftrieb and Formtrieb. Carlyle sees that Goethe’s:

* goethean enthusiasm, which, wandering wildly over the universe, found no resting place (as shown in the Sorrows of Young Werther), has here (in Wilhelm Meister) reached its appointed home; and lives in harmony with what long appeared to destroy it with anathemas. Here the ascent of high-spirited youth has grown into the sober man, yet with increase and not loss of action, and with suspicions higher as well as clearer. For he has conquered his subject; the fate has been built on the actual. (Works, 26:331-35)

Goethe’s renewal of his own character after having experienced the doubts associated with the speculative, sentimental phase impressed Carlyle, for Goethe conquered his sceptical alienation to achieve a new internal harmony. Goethe experienced the process of aesthetic education described by Schiller; he had become, in other words, the aesthetic man. Carlyle considers Goethe “the first of the moderns” because he had found the way to a new faith in an age of doubt. He had overcome the dangerous materialism associated with the Enlightenment’s narrow emphasis on analysis to achieve a higher naive condition. And it is Schiller’s Naive and Sentimental Poetry and the Aesthetic Letters that provided Carlyle with the pattern of consciousness which he finds Goethe embodying. Thus we see that Carlyle borrows from Schiller an important psychological pattern which he thought he borrowed from Goethe. That he did so is not a subconscious rejection of Schiller or his theories. Carlyle had always associated the two men together since they had been such close friends and literary collaborators. But since it was Goethe who manifested what Schiller described, it is only natural that Carlyle would finally confuse the two men’s thinking.

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Arnold and Bolingbroke

Joseph Carroll

In his 1877 essay on Lucius Cary, Viscount Falkland, Matthew Arnold depicts the English Civil War as an inglorious conflict between equally belligerent contestants, "a victory of inferior intelligence and temper illiberal." 1 In support of this view, Arnold appeals to the judgment of Henry St. John, Viscount Bolingbroke, "Let us consult a great writer, too little read. Who now reads Bolingbroke?" asked Burke sarcastically. And the tight answer is, so far as regards, at any rate, the historical writings of Bolingbroke: "Far too few of us, the more the pity! But let us hear Bolingbroke" (VIII, 200). Arnold's independent judgment of Bolingbroke's merits is founded on a long and thorough acquaintance with his political and historical works. According to the reading lists in his Note-Books, Arnold had, between 1863 and 1868, read A Letter to Sir William Windham, The Idea of a Parish King, Reflections upon Exile, A Dissertation upon Parties, Letters on the Study and Use of History, and Remarks on the History of England. In 1869 he read the Reflections upon Exile and in addition read one of Bolingbroke's essays on religion, A Letter Occasioned by one of Archbishop Tillotson's Sermons. The amount of attention Arnold devoted to Bolingbroke, and the high admiration which, on more than one occasion, he expressed for him, presents us with a question: what is it in Bolingbroke that appealed to Arnold, why did Arnold think him important, and what sort of impact did Bolingbroke have on Arnold's own work?

It is widely recognized that when Arnold came to praise the eighteen-century writers, he emphasized their development of a serviceable prose style. 2 And it is true that when Arnold first mentions Bolingbroke, in On the Study of Celtic Literature, he commends his "eloquent and writer of prose" (III, 357 and 361). 3 There are, however, other, more doctrinally substantial ways in which the Augustans could be of use to Arnold. Limiting our focus, i.e., this article, to the case of Bolingbroke, we shall try to show that Arnold responded not only to Bolingbroke's style, but to his ideas as well. Bolingbroke offers an interpretation of English history that Arnold could assimilate to his own work. Arnold revises his views on the English Civil War in accordance with the interpretation given by Bolingbroke, and he draws from Bolingbroke's historical study and political thinking to advance the direction of contemporary political policy. 4 Finally, Bolingbroke's political philosophy, in its basic terms, displays striking parallels to that of Arnold. 5 There are, of course, other major sources and confirmatory influences for Arnold's political ideas -- Burke, Dr. Thomas Arnold, Heinrich Heine, even John Stuart Mill -- but there is one essential respect in which Bolingbroke stands out from among the other native influences on Arnold's political thinking. 6 Arnold finds in Bolingbroke a distinguished precedent for his own attempt to establish his political principles on the ground of "right reason." 7, i.e., universally valid, a priori laws of political and social value.

There are certain obvious limitations on the significance of Bolingbroke's influence on Arnold. The scope of Arnold's interests is broadened through Bolingbroke's influence, and his conception of culture richer and fuller. Bolingbroke is concerned almost exclusively with political history and, unlike Arnold, he regards literature as of inferior utility in education. 8 Bolingbroke remains important to Arnold, nonetheless, because he is one of the first English writers both to expound and to practice a doctrine of a systematic historical study and political thought. 9 Taken together, the


2. On the whole, there has been remarkably little detailed commentary on Arnold's relations to Augustan literature, and the little there has been tends to emphasize the ideological and temperamental difference between the Augustans and Arnold. Geoffrey Tillotson, in Criticism and the Nineteenth Century (London: Allen and Unwin, 1941), correctly Arnold's affiliations with the Romantics and neglects his own views. Similar to E. K. Brown's article, "Matthew Arnold and the Eighteenth Century," University of Toronto Quarterly, 9 (1940), is Hess' essay (pp. 16 to 20) in Class and the Fall of Inequality. After Hess' 1962 essay, commentary on Arnold and the Augustans is limited to passing remarks in studies concerned with other topics.


4. For the best synoptic and interpretive account of Arnold's responses to his contemporary political milieu is that of Patrick J. McCarthy in Matthew Arnold and the Three Classes (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1969).


6. Lionel Trilling, in Matthew Arnold New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1979), gives considerable attention to Dr. Thomas Arnold and students throughout the influence of Burke. Edward Alexander, in Matthew Arnold and John Stuart Mill (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1983) offers an exhaustive analysis of Arnold's response to Mill. The most detailed study of Arnold and Heine is that of R. T. Johnson, Die Auseinandersetzung Matthew Arndts mit Heinrich Heine (Frankfurt am Main: Athen, 1911). Trilling maintains too rigidly the limits that Arnold, in contrast, was concerned most with political but with "literary freedom." Actually, Heine is probably the main non-English writer who confirms Arnold's belief in the "national" character of his political values.


8. See Bolingbroke, Works, II, 188 (Study and Use of History). For a description of Bolingbroke's place in the history of historical writing, see Isaac Kramnick, Lord Bolingbroke: Historical Wisdom (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1972), p. xvi. See also H. Kestel, in a 1962 article, remarks that The Study and Use of History is still "one of the few major works about the idea of history or English". "New Light on Bolingbroke's "Letters on History," Journal of the History of Ideas, 23 (1962), 357.

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churches on quite inconsiderable points of difference, which must prevail so long as separation is the first law of a Nonconformist's religion. Existence, would be checked" (V, 250).

The policy Arnold recommends is largely a reversion to the policy of Elizabeth as Bolingbroke explains its; and the consequences he anticipates from this policy are the same as those Bolingbroke supposes would eventually have resulted from Elizabeth's policy had that policy been continued in the reign of James I. Arnold says that Bolingbroke is "on a matter of this kind a very clear-judging and impartial witness," and he quotes from the relevant passage in the History of England, a work that is "far too little read" (V, 248). He omits several sentences not relevant to his own immediate purpose, but his skillful condensation neither distorts Bolingbroke's intent nor diminishes the vigorous lucidity of his prose."

The measures pursued and the empire observed in Queen Elizabeth's time, and to those of her religious opposition by a sober, a gradual, and for that very reason an effectual progression. There was even cause to hope that when the first stirrings of the Dissenters' zeal were passed, reasonable terms of union with the Established Church might be accepted by both of them as was not unaccompanied with fruition. These were friends to order in the end, though they displeased some. If those branches of Calvin's discipline had been once incorporated with the Established Church, the remaining sects would have been of little moment, either for numbers or opinion; and the very notions which were proper to give these sects were those that most effectually hindered the increase of them, and of the other sectaries in the nation."

(V, 248; from History of England, letter III)

Arnold maintains that the effect of sectarianism on the sectaries themselves is in "proximity they avoid" (V, 257), and in Bolingbroke he finds both suggestions for a practical political program that would correct this provinciality, and a standard of that "intellectual maturity" by which it could be judged and found wanting (I, 24; and see III, 352).

One of the keystones of provinciality is "smugness," and while laying plans for operating on the cause of this distemper, Arnold does not neglect to minister to the effect. In Culture and Anarchy he pursues this end directly by denouncing the "blindnessness" of middle-class, dissenting culture. In "Falkland" he seeks to counteract the Dissenter's complacency by undermining their historical identity. He quotes dissenting journalists' contention that the Puritan revolution was dedicated to "true facts assured of ultimate triumph" (VIII, 200), and in order to refute this contention he singles out three historical issues: Cromwell's foreign policy, the constitutionality of the Revolution, and the propagation of the spirit of liberty. In the interpretation he gives of these three issues Arnold demonstrates the impact Bolingbroke

10. Consideration for the view of the matter could have come to Arnold from his father's brief comparison of Elizabeth and James
has had on his view of English history. On the issue of Cromwell's foreign policy, Arnold simply quotes Bolingbroke and seconds his judgment. Cromwell ignored the cardinal rule of balancing the European powers and joined with France against Spain. As a result, "Europe had to bear, ... the infliction of the Grand Monarch and of all he brought with him" (VIII, 201). On the issue of domestic policy, Arnold again seconds Bolingbroke, and in doing so he implicitly modifies his own former opinions. Finally, on the issue of liberty, Arnold seems to have drawn on Bolingbroke, and in any case shows himself full accord with him.

Bolingbroke's analysis of the Civil War displays an eminent degree of merit and impartiality for which Arnold commends him in Culture and Anarchy. He takes sides with neither party, and though he locates the origin of the conflict in the nefarious and impolitic absolutism of James I and Charles I, he finds little to approve in the behavior and attitudes of the Puritans. The resistance to James' assertions of divine right was carried on not in a spirit of justice and wisdom, but in "resentment and passion and prejudice and faction." Consequently, when civil war broke out, "The English government was subverted, instead of being reformed." The conflict between Roundheads and Cavaliers was not a struggle of law against tyranny, but an entire collapse of law and civil process. Arnold himself, before reading Bolingbroke, had criticized the English Revolution, but the grounds of his criticism were not then the same as those of Bolingbroke. In "The Function of Criticism at the Present Time," Arnold had compared the English Revolution of 1642 with the French Revolution, and while deprecating the "spiritual" significance of the English Revolution, he had granted its practical success and honourable motivation: 11

[The French Revolution] is [in fact] of much more serious and world-wide interest, though practically less successful, a appeal to an order of ideas which are universal, certain, permanent. 1789 asked of a thing, Is it rational? Is it a fact? Is it legal? Or is it just? If it is legal, is the order maintained, is it according to circumstance? This is the English fashion. It is a fashion to be respected within its own sphere, with the highest respect: for its success, within its own sphere, has been prodigious.

(R.E. 264)

In "Falkland" Arnold revokes this interpretation of the English Revolution and brings his views into alignment with those of Bolingbroke. The Revolution was, he now holds, neither "legal" nor successful. He quotes and approves Bolingbroke's succinct summation:

Cavaliers and Roundheads had divided the nation, like Yorkists and Lancastrians. To reconcile these dissensions by treaty became impracticable, when neither side would trust the other. To terminate them by the sword was to fight, not for preserving the constitution, but for the mass of destroying it. The constitution might have been destroyed, but the sword of preservation. It was destroyed unprepared for the sword, and we floundered under absolute monarchy. We fell into absolute anarchy.

(VIII, 201; quoted with a slight change from The History of England, Book 1.)

Arnold's analysis of the plight of Falkland situates itself within this historical context. The peculiar pathos of Falkland's fate is that he was a man of heroic temper reluctantly engaged in a conflict where there was no hero's part to take. He knew that "the final victory" would be "neither for Stuarts nor Puritans. And it could not be for either: of them, for the cause of neither was sound." (VIII, 204). The final victory, Arnold says, lay with "the spirit of English political liberty, as we now conceive it, and as, by the Revolution of 1688, it triumphed" (VIII, 203). Here, too, Arnold aligns himself with Bolingbroke, who in the Dissertation upon Pufaffix argues that "the spirit of liberty" first formed the English Constitution, and that this constitution achieved its culmination in the Revolution of 1688. 12

The main purpose of Bolingbroke's historical writing is to fashion a coherent theory of the English Constitution, its nature and development, and to relegate to this Constitution the authority of reason. Arnold, too, seeks to fashion a rationalist political ideology, though he does not base his effort on a theory of the Constitution, his conception of a rational social order is similar to that of Bolingbroke. Before drawing out this parallel, we should consider the ways in which Bolingbroke and Arnold differ. In Bolingbroke's view, the English Constitution provides the best conceivable form of government, a mixed monarchy in which the monarchy acts as mediator and executor of the national will manifested in the commons. From Arnold's perspective, the balance of powers comprising the Constitution, because it rests on fast-decaying habits of feudal subordination, no longer seems adequate to sustain public order (V, 117). Arnold retains Bolingbroke's belief in the symbolic function of royalty, "in its idea the expression of the collective nation, and a sort of constituted witness to its best mind" (V, 153-54), but to use the monarch as the actual vehicle for the national will no longer seems a real alternative to him. 13

12. Arnold's distinction between the rational motivation of the French Revolution and the practical motivation of the English seems to reflect the influence of Heinrich Heine, who speaks of the French Revolution as "that world of speech when the doctrine of freedom and equality so triumphantly arose out of that general source of insecurity that we call reason" (see Heine, Lebens-Schilder, ed. Klaus Gengen (Karl Humf, 1898-99), II, 58). From Feudal Society, "English Feudatism", Heine says that in England, "no modern state has ever derived from its principle, but only from practical necessity." 137.
13. In designating Falkland a "scoundrel," Arnold was influenced by his father. See Dr. Arnold's analysis of Falkland's partiality from Matthew Arnold's Dr. Arnold, stresses that Falkland felt that the Cavalier cause was "naturally just," and habitually the weaker, although it was "steadfast" and left alive by an unenlightened generation of princes," Introductory Lectures, p. 316.
15. Dr. Thorowgood also remarks that the person of the monarch "was common life, which we could not find represented by any private member of the state, brought to a head, as it were, and exhibited intelligibly and visibly in the government," Introductory Lectures, pp. 29-30.
He proposes instead that England adopt the idea of the "State," or "the nation in its collective and corporate character, entrusted with stringent powers for the general advantage, and controlling individual wills in the name of an opinion wider than that of individuals." (V, 117).

Bolingbroke recognizes that the structure of English society, and thus the structure of the Constitution, has changed in the past, but he tends to regard its contemporaneous form as a declining point. He is not a conservative, as his treatment of Burke's authority and the Constitution suggests. Whereas Arnold argues that all institutions must adapt themselves to new circumstances under the one guiding criterion of a progress towards perfection (III, 29 and V, 219), Bolingbroke believes that the Constitution can survive only by means of a frequent revision to its original principles.

Having duly noted these necessary qualifications, we may now mark the close accord that exists between Arnold and Bolingbroke in respect to the ideal relations between the individual and the State. The political principles that Arnold defines as fundamentals to the idea of the "state" are the same as those which Bolingbroke identifies as the original principles of the English Constitution. Bolingbroke conceives of the Constitution as Arnold conceives of the State, as a corporate unity in which the will and interest of individuals are subordinated to the good of the whole. Bolingbroke outlines the course of English history as a perpetual struggle between the "spirit of liberty" and the "spirit of faction." By "faction" he means any political coalition joined for the purposes of private or party interest in disregard of or conflict with the best interests of the nation. By "liberty" he does not mean "doing as one likes," but rather participating freely in the duties of a citizen. The "friends of liberty" are, he holds, "friends to order, and enemies to license." Or, as Arnold puts it, "the only perfect freedom is, as our religion says, a service." (V, 307)

For both Arnold and Bolingbroke, the polar deviations from the spirit of liberty are anarchy and tyranny. Anarchy consists of a collapse of social order amidst the diverse assertions of individual wills, and tyranny consists of an order maintained through the arbitrary power of one will. Both of these extremes betray a defect of just authority, and Bolingbroke alike locate just authority in what they call "right reason." Arnold describes the State as "the power most representing the right reason of the nation, and most worthy, therefore, of ruling." (V, 124). Bolingbroke declares that "a society of freemen by a constitution founded on the eternal rules of right reason, and directed to promote the happiness of the whole, and of every individual, is the noblest prerogative which can belong to humanity, and if a man may be said, without impiety, to imitate God in any case, this is the case." (V, 124).

Arnold's idea of the State as the nation in its collective and corporate character is originally drawn from Burke (III, 377), but his designation of right reason as an authority for the State is entirely alien to Burke's utilitarian base. Burke declares the authority of the State to be founded on hereditary rights of prejudice and confirmed sentiment. It is in opposition to the ideology of traditional authority that Arnold develops his doctrine of criticism (III, 109), and he requires of criticism not only the destructive power of analytical acuteness, but also a power of evaluative affirmation. His advocacy of a political rationalism similar to that of Bolingbroke is symptomatic of a broader tendency in his whole line of thinking, the rejection of Romantic subjectivism and a return to the neo-classical belief in the existence of objective standards in every field of experience, morals, aesthetics and politics. Therein, Arnold thinks, "a certain ideal centre of correct information, taste, and intelligence" (V, 147), and he extends this standard of correctness to political morality by way of "the best self." The best self is the self that recognizes the claims of a common life and a common reason, and so mediates among the impulses of individual passions. "By our everyday selves... we are separate, personal, at war; we are only safe from one another's tyranny when no one has any power; and this safety, in its turn, cannot save us from anarchy... But by our best self we are united, impersonal, at harmony." (V, 346). Arnold's idea of the "ordinary self" corresponds to Bolingbroke's "spirit of faction," and the "best self" corresponds to the "spirit of liberty." Thus, while abandoning Bolingbroke's devotion to a fixed form of government, Arnold remains in agreement with Bolingbroke on the spiritual content of political life.

Ultimately, of course, Arnold requires more of man than political rectitude. Bolingbroke can be of little assistance to him in his campaigns for poetry and religion. But then, Arnold was one of the most eclectic thinkers of his eclectic age. He took what was useful to him from wherever he found it, and it is clear that in Bolingbroke he found a writer of stylistic distinction who gave clear and forceful expression to political ideas congenial to Arnold himself.

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The Key To All Mythologies – A Possible Source of Inspiration

Katherina M. Wilson

The battle over the possible historic identity of Edward Casaubon in George Eliot's Middlemarch still rages on. Robert William Mackley, Mark Paterson, Herbert Spencer, and Dr. R. H. Braithwaite, just to name a few, have been put forth as possible models for the pedant scholar of Middlemarch. George Eliot herself, as Gordon Haight records, when asked from whom she drew Casaubon, replied by painting "with humorous solemnity which was quite in earnest" to herself. But, as the editor of the Middlemarch Manuscripts, John C. Frail and Victor A. Neufeld, most appropriately remark, "in the creation of Edward Casaubon, George Eliot was concerned with something much more fundamental than caricaturing certain unpleasant acquaintances and events in her life; she was portraying a whole set of prevailing attitudes and ideals, ideals that to her mind were hindering rather than furthering the search for truth."

The essentially composite nature of Casaubon's character cannot be seriously doubted by anyone even vaguely aware of George Eliot's remarkable list of readings before and during the writing of Middlemarch. The question, however, remains as to why she chose to use the name of Casaubon (rather than any near contemporary scholar) for her Middlemarch character. Yet aside from the obvious tragic irony underlying the appellation of Edward Casaubon, who cannot lay claim to being even a pale shadow of the great classical scholar, no attempt has been made to suggest a possible source for the connection of the name with a rambling and confusing piece of work. In the present note I propose such a connection which may have provoked George Eliot with the initial idea of fathering Casaubon's name on her Middlemarch pedant.

Will Laddaw says in Chapter 22: "The subject Mr. Casaubon has chosen is as changing as chemistry: new discoveries are constantly making new points of view. Do you not see that it is no use now to be crawling a little way after men of the last century – men like Bryant – and correcting their mistakes?" Edward Casaubon, as has been argued, subscribes to ideas that have been invalidated by new discoveries but of which he is unaware because of his linguistic limitations. Thus, as Harvey points out, "Casaubon, the pedant, is a complete anachronism, lost in the labyrinth of an exploded pseudo-science." Technically speaking, Casaubon's work in progress, The Key To All Mythologies, is a set of notes and annotations on recommendations of what others have said. During their Italian journey, Casaubon sets up his labors and says to Dorothea: "I have been led farther than I had foreseen, and various subjects for annotations have presented themselves which, though I have no direct need of them, I could not prevent." While there are certainly countless works that could qualify as models for an unfocused, rambling, unfocused, anachronistic work of scholarship, even as models for a book which corrects the mistakes of men of the last century and annotates various subjects, I am aware of only one that combines these qualities with the name of the great French scholar Isaac Casaubon: the confusing and often convoluted encyclopedia compilation in three languages, the Dictionnaire Nouveau Hebraico Melto Cognitio. Descritto e Tte Lingua de David de Pennis. The book, as also referred to as the Zemah David, was published in Venice in 1587, dedicated to Pope Sixtus V. It contains "numerous discussions of scientific and historical nature," it deals, among other things, with true and false myths, and tests for ascertaining the genuineness of miraculous and mythical items. Occasionally, the work is described as a Talmudic dictionary, and composed of Rabbinic teachings. David describes himself as a Hebrew linguist, philosopher, and physician from the tribe of Levi – "one of the few distinguished Roman families which were brought by Titus from Erez Israel to Italy." This most complicated work was made even more confusing by the erudite marginalia and annotations of none other, but the great Isaac Casaubon himself, who, to top it all, added an Arabic vocabulary to this trilingual work.

The Dictionnaire, bearing Casaubon's name on the title page, was probably purchased by Patrick Young, King James I's librarian in 1614 together with the acquisition of many of Casaubon's works for the Royal Library. Casaubon, one will recall, had received an official invitation...
tion from the Archbishop of Canterbury in 1610 to reside in England. He was graciously received and soon became one of King James’ favorites on whose request he undertook the arduous task of editing the Annals of Borraine. Casaubon’s annotated copy of the Dictionario arrived at the British Museum as part of the “Old Royal Library” when the Museum was founded in 1753. It has remained in the Museum since that date. Thus, George Eliot could easily have seen it there.

George Eliot was familiar with the work of Isaac Casaubon and spent a summer in his birthplace, Genoa. In her Middelmore Notebook she remarks: “Curious to turn from Shakespeare to Isaac Casaubon, his contemporaries…” It is curious indeed,” observe the Notebook’s editors, “especially when one notes the significance of the name Casaubon for George Eliot. There is a marginal check mark to this passage in what appears to be her own hand. To the ‘curious’ reader such as George Eliot was, the ironies implicit in Casaubon’s obscurity versus Shakespeare’s fame provide an important clue to Middelmore.” Moreover, Gordon Haight points out that both Mr. and Mrs. Mark Pattison consulted George Eliot about the last chapter of The Life of Isaac Casaubon, a biography which Mr. Pattison published in 1875. They did so, presumably, because of their awareness of George Eliot’s interest in the great antiquary and his work.11

Of course, George Eliot was interested in etymologies which the Dictionario supplies copiously, in philology, and in antiquarian curiosities. She spent long hours in the British Museum collecting historical and philological background materials for her novels. She may have seen the Dictionario as early as 1860 when she was gathering information on late medieval Italy for Rasselas, but in the unlikely case that she did not discover the book on her own, she was very likely to have done so through her Hebraic tutor and friend, Emmanuel Deutsch. Deutsch was a German Jew who came to work as a cataloguer of books in the British Museum in 1855. George Eliot met him in 1866 and he was “soon a frequent caller at the priory.”12 Deutsch was, the Dictionary of National Biography remarks, “a Hebraic scholar of the first rank … Seldom has the department of printed books acquired the services of so variously accomplished a man.”13 He was a prolific writer, and his works include articles on the Talmud, Semitic philology, and the Targums.14 It would have been inconceivable had he not encountered the Zemah David, de Pomis’s Talmudic dictionary-lesson during his eighteen years as a cataloguer of printed books at the British Museum. As George Eliot’s friend, fellow intellectual, and fellow scholar, he was very likely to have remarked on the great Casaubon’s perversion of industry in annotating the Dictionario. In addition, he may have suggested the Dictionario as an encyclopedic, etymologic, etymological and antiquarian curiosity for their Hebrew lessons.15

Could it be suggested, then, that perhaps, an obviously great scholar’s not so obviously great work stood godparent at the birth of Middelmore’s Edward Casaubon?16

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12. Information confirmed by the department of Printed Books, British Museum.
15. The fact that the Zemah David is not included in the index of Mark Pattison’s Life of Isaac Casaubon (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1900), pp. 375-414, does in no way suggest lack of familiarity with the work. None of Casaubon’s “annotative” works are included even though at least one instance Pattison was familiar with them. In the Life he refers to Casaubon’s annotations of Calvin’s work but he does not include that item in the final chapter concerning Casaubon’s works. See Height, p. 149.
16. Height, p. 469.
17. DNB, vol. 9, p. 372.
18. Literary Review of the Late Emanuel Deutsch (London: John Murray, 1874).
19. Interestingly, in chapter 62, just before Mr. Casaubon’s death, and directly preceding his request that Deutsch mark the pages of his notes to the key, Deutsch is in a dispirited state of mind, confident, but regrets reading a book on Jewish antiquities.
Carlyle’s Historical Imagination: Untrue Facts and Unfactual Truths

Beverly Taylor

Because recent historiographers have emphasized the fictive character of historical reconstructions and challenged history’s claims to a place among the sciences, we see no paradox in combining the terms history and imagination. Yet most nineteenth-century historians, philosophers, and even book reviewers would probably have deemed the phrase “historical imagination” essentially incongruous, for they generally maintained that history could and should be a rigorous science. Consequently they wrangled over what constituted historical methods of inquiry and even argued whether historical fiction, such as Walter Scott’s novels, furthered or impeded the study of history. Thomas Carlyle’s reviewers frequently debated whether his works were historical or imaginative, or could truly be both simultaneously, and John Stuart Mill anticipated that the questionable coupling of history with an imaginative style in The French Revolution would draw considerable critical fire. Having compelling personal reasons (thanks to his maid) to hope that Carlyle’s work would succeed financially, he foretold its “hasty conflagration” by denouncing Carlyle’s style and denouncing the one aspect of the work which he confidently assumed would appeal to Victorian tastes—its historical validity.

At the heart of this quarrel of the age with Carlyle’s imaginative treatment of history lay the growing nineteenth-century enthusiasm for approaching the past less through fiction, legend, or intuition, than through documents—the concrete evidence necessary to a self-consciously scientific century. By examining Carlyle’s attitude toward historical “fact,” his process of writing history by suppressing facts in order to achieve truth, and his use of documents as evidence about the past, we may more clearly understand the Victorian interest in historical imagination—which produced so many fictional recreations of the past, but also imaginative visions of the present and future. Before investigating Carlyle’s attitudes, we may briefly recall the context which nineteenth-century historiographers practiced created for imaginative literary depictions of earlier times.

Pursuit of the past in documents, aided by a dozen important historical societies formed between 1834 and 1846, affected even imaginative portrayals of past ages. Before resurfacing the Tristram legend, for example, Swinburne conducted research of sorts, reading all available extant medieval versions of the story. Swinburne doubtless intended to craft a poem rather than to describe customs or events of the Middle Ages. He selected episodes of aesthetic, not historical, grounds, for he planned to include “everything pretty that is . . . in keeping with the tone and spirit of the story.” Significantly, he also aimed to portray the Middle Ages more authentically than Tennyson had done in The Idylls of the King. Swinburne proposed to correct the faulty medi evalism of the poet Laureate’s “Morte d’Arthur,” which had merely dressed Victorians in medieval costume and actually reflected the modern “divorce-court” more than the courtly past. Reviewers, more often than poets, evaluated the general authenticity of such imaginative representations. Commentators on Tennyson’s Idylls and Morris’ Defence of Guenevere volume, for instance, debated which poet had rendered the Middle Ages more genuinely. In such a climate, where critics upbraided poets who reshaped legend for distorting the past, Mill was no doubt wise to argue that although The French Revolution should be judged as “an epic poem,” it was also “the treatise of history,” based on “irrefutable authority” collected by a “historical day-dream.”

Carlyle’s research clearly rivaled that of professional historians of the period—in volume and duration if not in meticulousness. His hyperbolic notwithstanding, we can readily accept his claim that the volumes on Oliver Cromwell “had been a continual toil and misery to me; four years of a tiresome toil, obscure occupation, futile wrestling and misery.” Yet despite his industrious pursuit of the past through documents, his weakness of attested “factual” became a familiar caution, in the metaphorical figure of Dryasdust, that studying facts is too often produced tedium more than enlightenment. This pedant Dryasdust had long before Carlyle’s work became a familiar target in reviews of nineteenth-century historical fiction. In 1822 Sir Walter Scott had invented a fictitious Dryasdust, who criticized the novelist’s license with historical facts, so that Scott in his own voice could defend the methods of his fiction. Against Dryasdust’s charges, Scott countered that he sought only to entertain, and win inducement readers “to neglect the severer and more accurate sources of information” for

6. Peter = Oliver Cromwell’s Letters and Speeches, ed. H. D. Traut (London: Chapman and Hall, 1909-1911), VI, 29. All subsequent reference to Carlyle’s works will be identified parenthetically by volume and page numbers in this fashion.

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the "frothy and superficial knowledge" in his fictions. Since Carlyle aimed to write history rather than fiction, he objected to the DryasDOT historian who "reasons rather than the aesthetic concerns of Scott. Carlyle's DryasDOT insisted not only on the fidelity to fact urged by Scott's hypothetical critic, but also on comprehensiveness. To Carlyle, the DryasDOT historian ultimately accumulates so many facts that he could not discern the larger patterns of truth, being rather like the blind man who can see only the tail of an elephant and then confidently judges that the beast closely resembles a snake. On such grounds Carlyle castigated an earlier biographer of Cromwell not so much for garbling dates (though he criticized such inaccuracies) as for having missed overall patterns. The "unreconcileable" Reverend Moby has "gone into much research of old leases, marriage-contracts, deeds of sale and the like: he is learned in parish-registers and genealogies; has compiled pedigrees; . . . gives much upon heraldry," but his "large heap of evidence and assertions" proves "worthless"; the result is "not properly a Book, but rather an Agglomeration of haphazard jottings" lacking analysis and arrangement (Oliver Cromwell, VI, 15, 16).

Carlyle's use of source materials betrays his paradoxical sense that recorded evidence about the past is both an asset and a liability for a historian. After amassing facts, the historical writer must suppress details in order to isolate larger truths. Because men are necessarily immersed in the familiar and petty, one can rarely assess the personal nature of his art: "No age ever seemed in the Age of Romance to itself;" Carlyle declared. "Roland of Roncesvalles . . . found rainy weather as well as sunny; knew what it was to have long ears drooping; got tough beef to chew; or even went dauntless, was sturdy, sanguine, calumniated, constipated . . . and oftest felt, I doubt not, that this was a very Devil's world, and he, Roland himself, one of the worst cavils there:" ("The Diamond Necklace," XXVIII, 337). Although Roland might not recognize his role in history or the essential nature of his age, the winter distanced by time and place might abstract this essence in part because his factual knowledge of his life is limited.

For the nineteenth-century historian who had begun to perceive history as the experiences of men rather than as "empty invoice-fuss of Pitched Battles and Changes of Ministry" (325), as Great Events, too much DryasDOT detail produced what Hegel termed the "psychology of the valet, namely the detailed analysis of small, human peculiarities which have nothing to do with the historical mission of the person concerned." The genuine history of the heroism and romance of Roland could not be written from the trivia of his individual experience or from a list of Great Events, but had to be abstracted by the poetic imagination — "your Thuripins and Aristeos" who discovered the "music" of Roland's age (337).

But once the poet — or the rare historian — had divi-

fabulous necklace from the court of Marie Antoinette. Carlyle sees in memoirs and legal documents that he studies, he focuses on the unreliability of each one. He describes his principal source as a "bound collection of such Law-Papers (Memorials pour etc.) as were prepared and emitted by the various parties in that famed 'Necklace Trial." It is one of the largest collections of falsehoods that exists in print; and, unfortunately, still, after all the narrating and history there has been on the subject, forms our chief means of getting at the truth of that Transaction." He continues, these are "not, of course, Historical statements of truth; but Calypso's and Lawyers' statements of what they wished to be believed; each party lying according to his ability to lie." ("The Diamond-Necklace," XXVIII, 334). After assessing these collected sources, Carlyle throughout the narrative discounts individual testimony on particular points: One witness is "vague" — "yet sometimes you do catch him, and hold him." He "makes mistakes," "misrepresents," and "wilfully misrepresents" (343). Another "requires to be read with suspicion everywhere; but yields something in that way" (347). One offers "endless confusion," while others confuse when Carlyle juxtaposes their conflicting testimony (370-71). Combined, these evaluations reveal that Carlyle's ostensible sources are not actually sources of his "historical" account; the footnotes cite his reading material, but not his evidence. Finally, the "truth" affirmed by Carlyle's history is what he has intuitively determined to be truth, even though it remained untested by the mistaking and lying participants in the events. All he knows about the incident "comes to us borne . . . on a whole illustrious dim Chaos of Lies!" (334). 9

The problem of piecing truth from rags of innocent arises from the nature of this source material. As memoirs and autobiographies, they afford only limited, subjective perspectives: and as legal depositions, they represent biased efforts to avoid criminal prosecution. But what would seem to be the least desirable sort of evidence for history actually serves Carlyle's thematic purposes and historiographic procedures ideally. Although autobiographies and memoirs provide the least reliable testimony, their subjectivity also permits the most intimate, though fragmented, entry into the past. They allow the historian to reconstruct earlier scenes not from the skin inward, as Carlyle charged Scott had done, but from the heart outward. (This ambivalence of autobiographical testimony as the least reliable yet richest access to the history of an individual or age is precisely what underlies the historical imagination of Browning's dramatic monologues.) Moreover, first-person observations, which have little claim to evidential integrity, allow the historical writer the greatest freedom in selecting and arranging details in order to distill the essence of an event or age. Thus Jocelin of Brakelond's "Chansonde provided both the authority of first-hand evidence and the vulnerability of any subjective account. Carlyle could selectively follow as much of Jocelin's account as revealed Bishop Sampson to be heroic; and then suppress, as biased testimony, the many passages that would have belied Carlyle's view of the medieval ideal.

Carlyle's sense that the historian is, first, a "sifter" (333) who abstracts truth from ostensible fact, and, second, an "editor" who establishes the most meaningful (not the most literal) version of the "Letter of Instructions" ("On History Again," XXVIII, 147) from the past, today rates more highly with historians than at any time in the last hundred years. But to us as students of Victorian letters, his use or abuse of historical documents more significantly represents a recurrent Victorian assumption that historical documents, like other physical evidence, have no greater claim to authority than the human imagination has. Carlyle insisted like many contemporary writers that scientific perceptions be wedded to intuition, imagination, and faith. Like Tennyson, Carlyle admonished that knowledge may come while wisdom lingers. As a writer who beheld with the "historical eye" ("The Diamond-Necklace," XXVIII, 379) events which occurred only in his imagination and who listened to the "sieves" of Cromwell's letters (Cromwell, VI, 13), Carlyle is most significant as a historian not of previous ages, but of the spirit of his own.

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Books Received

Braun, Thomas. *Discord The Novellas*. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1981. Pp. x + 149. $19.95. This is not a critical biography; it does not provide close analyses of the novels, but is about Dyle’s life as novelist, as distinct from his life as politician.

Browning, Robert. *Robert Browning: The Poems*. Ed. John Patterson, supplemented and completed by Thomas J. Collins. 2 vols. New Haven and London: Yale Univ. Press, 1981. Vol. I, pp. xxiv + 1191; Vol. II, pp. xxvii + 1167. $45.00 cloth, $16.95 paper per vol. The much-needed carefully edited edition of all poems the editor could find and/or get permission to print (some previously unpublished) except The Ring and The Book, plays printed between 1837 and 1846 (same Paper Passes) and the “transcript” of the Agasiasmos. The basic copy-text (collected edition of 1888-89) has been collated with “textually significant editions,” available manuscripts, proof-sheets, and copies with holograph alterations. To the texts has been added 379 pp. of notes which include “a generous selection of manuscript and textual variants” as well as references “to much of the best scholarship and criticism.” Plus “dates, sources, textual details, biographical references, etc. This is a splendid addition to the fine editions which are now becoming available for major Victorian writers.


Hallam, Arthur Henry. *The Letters of Arthur Henry Hallam*. Ed. Jack Kuhn. Columbus: Ohio State Univ. Press, 1981. Pp. xx + 840. $45.00. This handsome volume includes all known surviving letters and fragments by and to AHH generously annotated. There are 248 letters or fragments, more than two thirds of them previously unpublished, essentially covering 8 years, 1825 to 1833, a helpful 38 pp. introduction, and a careful index. A fine and necessary publication.


McSweeney, Kerry. *Tennyson and Swinburne as Romantic Naturalists*. Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1981. Pp. xvii + 222. $25.00. Tennyson belongs to the first generation of post-Romantic artists, Swinburne to the second. McSweeney traces the “naturalistic vision through the work of both poets,” analyzing ten of Tennyson’s poems plus parts of *In Memoriam* and *Idylls* and a number of Swinburne’s earlier pieces and four of those from his later career. There is also a chapter on Swinburne’s Tennyson and one on Swinburne and Tennyson.

Super, R. H. *Trollope in the Post Office*. Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press, 1981. Pp. vii + 135. $10.00. “This is the story of a civil servant who was also a novelist, and who consciously drew upon his own experiences in the writing of his fiction. No small part of the aim of this book is to show the connection between the two aspects of his life.”

Tennyson, Alfred. *The Letters of Alfred Lord Tennyson*. Vol. I, 1821-1839. Eds. Cecil Y. Long and Edgar F. Shapness, Jr. Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press, 1981. Pp. xxi + 366. $30.00. The first of three projected volumes includes letters from 1821, when Tennyson was aged 12, through 1830, Tennyson made laundress, more than 530 letters in all. The edition includes a witty and informative 33 pp. introduction, copious helpful annotations and an index. As the editors say, Tennyson is revealed as “the living, thinking, breathing, man, husband, father, householder, householder, income-earner, warrior, patient, invalid; selfish, self-indulgent, self-pitying yet generous, egotistical and altruistic, introverted and extroverted, graphically sentimental, vulnerable and spudishly self-protective, anti-social recluse and social lion, [in the old sense, 'lions'].”
ANNOUNCEMENTS

The Seventh Browning Conference will take place at the University of Leeds 2-7 August 1982. There will be a series of lectures that will explore the 19th century circumstances of Charlotte and Emily Brontë's development as writers. Special emphasis will be given to Charlotte's interest in teaching, including her friendship with Sir James and Lady Kay-Shuttleworth, and the place of music in life in Haworth Parsonage. For further details write: Director of Special Courses, Department of Adult Education and Extramural Studies, The University, Leeds LS2 9JT, UK.

Professor Wendell S. Johnson is serving as editor of a special issue of the *Browning Institute Studies*, the topic of which is "Victorian Modernism." Papers should be sent to Professor Johnson at the following address: Ph. D. Program in English, Graduate Center, CUNY, 33 West 42nd St., New York, NY 10036. Papers will be accepted up to Sept. 1, 1982.

*Victorian Institute*. The Victorian Institute solicits papers for its 1982 Conference on the topic of which is "The Profession of Authorship in the Victorian Period." Scholars are invited to submit papers of no more than 12 pages by June 1, 1982. Please address inquiries or papers (2 copies please) to: Virginia Fowler or Nancy Metz, Department of English, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Blacksburg, VA.

Dickens Society Annual Award. A prize of $250 will be awarded by the Dickens Society at its annual meeting in December for the best first article-length publication on Dickens (i.e., more than five printed pages in length), appearing between June 1981 and June 1982. (Article-length chapters on Dickens from books—either wholly devoted to Dickens or concerned with a wider subject—may be submitted.) The award is intended to encourage young scholars, but those who have published previously on subjects other than Dickens are also eligible. Entries (three copies or offprints) should be sent as soon as possible but no later than 31 August 1982 to Sylvia Manning, Secretary-Treasurer, The Dickens Society, Department of English, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA 90007.


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